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Abstract 
This thesis provides a framework for viewing socio-political contexts and how these 
relate to interventionist projects. The framework draws on and combines strands from 
international relations and sociological perspectives of social interaction. The central 
question becomes how intervention and existing social contexts interact to produce 
unintended outcomes. It applies the analysis to two separate wider contexts: 
Afghanistan and Somalia, with a particular focus on the self-declared independent 
Somaliland as an internally generated and controlled transformational process. Unlike 
abstract directions of theoretical development the framework seeks to provide a 
platform that sets aside ideological assumptions and from which interventionist 
projects can be observed and evaluated based on literature, field observations and 
interviews.  
Drawing on such diverse influences as fourth generation peace and conflict studies, 
Morphogenetics, and social forces theory, the framework explores conditions and 
interest formations to capture instances of local agency that are part of a continuity of 
local realities. It views social interaction without imposing Universalist value 
assumptions, but also without resorting to relativism or raising so many caveats that it 
becomes impractical. It exposes the agency of local interest formations hidden 
beneath the discourses of ideologically framed conflicts. These social agents are often 
dismissed as passive victims to be brought under the influence of for example the 
state, but are in reality able to subvert, co-opt, constrain or facilitate the forces that 
are dependent on them for social influence. In the end, it is the modes of mobilisation 
that emerge as the most crucial factor for understanding the relevant social dynamics. 
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Introduction 
This thesis springs from the perception of certain aspects being askew in the way 
international interventions engage with different social contexts, even when based on 
the best of intentions. Throughout the research this perception was enhanced by 
conversations with practitioners, policy developers, and most importantly, people on 
the recipient end of interventionist projects. It gradually became clear that the 
problems themselves were largely recognised and that insightful questions were often 
being asked, but that the implemented ‘answers’ were often framed in the same 
perspectives and assumptions that raised the questions in the first place. This thesis 
does not seek to provide ‘solutions’ to the problems of individual projects or 
programmes because there are experienced practitioners far better suited to do so. 
What it does however seek to do is to provide an alternative lens through which to 
view the production of outcomes in the meeting between social context and outside 
interventions. This facilitates a perspective outside the narrow understanding provided 
by notions of Universalist values and ‘simple’ solutions that in the end may well serve 
to complicate and prolong the very tasks they were supposed to address. Effective 
engagement requires contextual understanding in order to interpret and ascribe 
meaning to events,1 but this is of course impossible if no effort is devoted to it. The use 
of prescribed meanings, blanket solutions, recycled models and the discrepancy 
between discourse and practice supports the view articulated by Mosse that 
‘development’ is merely re-framed in order to strengthen its own legitimacy.2 
This thesis adds to a growing body of literature examining issues relating to peace, 
conflict and the notion of the liberal peace.3 It provides an alternative platform for 
viewing social environments, in particular active- and post-conflict areas. The focus of 
the discussion is primarily on aspects of contemporary international peacebuilding and 
all that this entails in the shape of state-building, aid, development and other 
externally generated strategies. 
 The framework is largely aligned with what Richmond has called a ‘critical fourth 
generation’ of peace and conflict theory;4 but while it shares the concern over 
‘representation and sovereignty’ and how to ‘sensitise’ to the local,5 it is not so much 
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focused on developing a shared notion of peace. It can instead be described as going in 
the same direction but on a parallel track. The focus on the interaction between 
internal factors and external influences also contributes to the understanding of 
‘hybrid political orders’ and how they shape peace- and state-building as pursued by 
for example Boege et al.6 When not romanticising the view, hidden agency and 
resistance become more visible.7  
It is necessary for social analysis to employ a framework that conceptualises social 
interaction without imposing either a Universalist assumption of values and opinions 
or raising so many caveats that it becomes impractical.8 The strategies and 
perspectives applied today largely fail to achieve this and the literature, while often 
critically astute, often falls short of addressing the problems in a constructive way. This 
thesis seeks to address that gap by providing a perspective influenced by international 
relations and sociology that recognises the agency of both internal and external agents 
and actors and their influence on the largely unintended outcomes of social 
interaction. 
 
Observing social contexts 
Any type of social analysis requires some degree of generalisation in order to 
become graspable. The framework developed here has a degree of generalisation built 
into it that can be compounded by a careless entry of data for the analysis of a specific 
context. It is however felt that when applied properly the nature of the framework 
forces the analysis to engage with a specific context level and take into account issues 
that are often side-lined r simply wished away. Every social setting is specific in terms 
of conditions and generalisation therefore has to be restricted to mechanical dynamics 
rather than subjective and contextual values. As Boege et al point out; the objective 
should be to comprehend what ‘truly constitutes political order in those regions of 
apparent fragility.’9 The weakness of most international interventions is not so much 
that they fail to understand that there are a variety of ideas and values in the world, 
but that they reject or misunderstand any deviation from their own perspectives as 
abnormal with the norm being defined by what ‘we’ are as opposed to the ‘Other.’  
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There has been much written on the subject of engaging with societies, especially in 
the ‘Global South’ and societies in conflict,10 but the challenge is to develop a 
framework that allows a view of both the situational logics facing local social agents 
and actors as well as interventionists. ‘The local’ is used here to signify the locally 
recognised dynamics as they are understood in locally shared images rather than in 
external perceptions based on elite encounters with ‘right-think’ and ‘right-speak’ 
agents and actors. Social context can be understood at multiple levels and each society 
consists of a number of different social contexts. Depending on the location of a social 
agent in a particular set of circumstances, different institutions are actuated to 
produce situational logics that guide, but do not force, agential responses to the 
situation. An existing social context can thus be understood as for example a village, an 
area, a country, or a region and the level of analysis provides the level of specificity. A 
country-wide analysis cannot provide a sufficient understanding of the dynamics in a 
valley any more than a village-specific analysis can provide knowledge of all the social 
categories in a country. People in geographical proximity may live in completely 
different social worlds11 just as people separated by great distances can share ‘mental 
maps’ and images. Thus, the local socio-political dynamics must be understood in 
order to mitigate potential unintended but avoidable negative outcomes. When 
undertaking a socially wider project, there must thus be a macro-level analysis but also 
multiple localised contextual analyses. The more heterogeneous a society is, the bigger 
the need for multiple level analyses.  
The concept of intervention may invoke images of invasion or ‘humanitarian 
interventions’ but its usage here is distinctly wider. It refers to any type of externally 
generated project into an existing local context12 at any level that represents, in that 
specific interaction, ‘the local.’13 The basic mechanics are assumed to be the same at 
all levels in the sense that at the point of intervention there is an existing specific 
pattern of local structures, social interaction and dominance, institutions, and 
distribution of resources that are affected. Less overtly violent projects can also have 
deep effects on a social context; for instance a new well may generate violent 
confrontations in an environment where water is a scarce resource. For the purposes 
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of this framework such projects are also considered interventionist as they are 
generated outside of and introduced into a social context. Thus, any intervention, at 
any level, offsets the conditions and interaction of that particular context to some 
degree whether benign or confrontational in nature. While the framework can provide 
a better understanding of the dynamics facing the local agents and actors as well as 
the interventionist project, the interaction between the project and the local context is 
going to produce largely unintentional outcomes.  
Seen in the framework here hybridisation is an uncontrollable outcome of 
interaction between different ideational and structural features. It is the emergent 
properties of the interaction of two different systems, voluntarily or through 
imposition. Rather than being eliminated by development strategies for example, 
many ‘traditional cultures’ survive through a transformative engagement with the 
external influences of ‘modernity.’14 This engagement may lead to hybridised models 
developing more or less consciously. The nature of the interaction however means 
that there is no element of reliable prediction involved and a range of possible 
outcomes. 
 
The Question Unfolds 
This project started with the notion of the ‘traditional’ as a viable route to 
peacebuilding and local governance development. A rather simplistic and 
‘unproblematic’ understanding of local dynamics facilitated a perceived route to a 
‘solution’ for intra-social conflicts in particular in ‘developing’ countries. The position 
could however not withstand deeper scrutiny and issues soon arose. It became 
obvious, especially during the field research, that the local social dynamics were 
nowhere near as static and coherent as had been assumed. What was needed was 
instead a framework that would put context-specific factors in relation to each other 
and facilitate an understanding of how social dynamics worked locally to constrain or 
encourage certain responses. The constant presence of international forces such as 
aid, development, or even jihadists also needed to be included as the pressure and 
influence exerted by them changed the conditions of social interaction. It gradually 
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became clear that ‘the local’ had a considerable potential agency in relation to 
externally generated projects, even when perceived as weak and disadvantaged by 
comparison. The pressures of the encounter therefore operated in both directions and 
all these factors had to be understood before proceeding to any type of solution 
studies. The direction and subject of the research had thus dramatically changed into 
an attempt to answer the question of how social contexts form and how they interact 
with interventionist projects to produce unintended outcomes.  
 
The Framework 
The framework developed here focuses on the formation of social interest groups 
and social forces, as well as their interaction in a social context to produce outcomes. 
It holds that any externally generated project is subject to these logics15 while also 
changing them and that intervention needs to be seen in relation to this. The 
framework provides a platform for viewing social dynamics differently from the highly 
generalised and idealised images of the state and social order present in the liberal 
state-centric notions of peacebuilding16 and other ideological agendas.17 The 
interaction between external and local offers opportunities for mutual co-optation18 
but also levels of hybridisation as the meeting local and external transforms the 
outcomes in their meeting.19 With this in mind the thesis explores and combines 
aspects of Migdal’s perspective on state-society relations and social forces; frames it in 
the morphogenetic framework of Archer; and fills it with influences from fourth 
generation peace and conflict studies. It is then applied to the cases as a method of 
gleaning the local realities of Afghanistan and Somalia, in the spaces where ‘local 
populations live and develop political strategies in their local environment, towards 
the state and towards international modes of order.’20 
There is a distinct echo in this thesis of Migdal’s assertion that in order to ‘glean the 
patterns of domination’ one must focus on the struggles and accommodations in 
society’s multiple arenas.21 It also shares a social constructionist view of our 
knowledge of the world being generated in human relationships (interaction) and 
brought into being by historically (antecedent emergent properties) and ‘culturally’ 
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(here referred to as ‘ideational’) situated social processes.22 It is an examination of the 
perceptual answers to questions such as ‘Who and what is present?’, ‘Who and what 
matters?’, and ‘What elements make a difference?’ in the specific context at hand 
shaped by interaction, historical and ‘cultural’ norms.23 It seeks to understand what 
social factors and institutions are actuated by social agents and actors to shape the 
situational logic of the context-specific strategic environment. It also acknowledges 
that social realities, or more precisely the meanings attached and attributed to them, 
are ontologically subjective and multiple.24 It is thus necessary to examine the 
narratives involved and how the contextual situational logic is produced, understood, 
explained and disseminated within and through them.25 For example, investigating the 
influence and situational logics generated by religious affiliations requires a historical 
and socio-political ‘mapping’ of the context but being observations and interpretations 
by the researcher, it can only hold so much validity. It becomes paramount to allow 
respondent feed back into the interpretation in order to correct the original 
assumptions or categorisations if need be. The more complex understanding of the 
different influences, and the demands they make on the agents and actors, provides a 
better opportunity to accurately contextualise behaviour and responses made by 
involved parties. The focus is thus at least in part on the ‘arenas of domination and 
opposition where various social forces engage one another over material and symbolic 
issues.’26 The framework can be said to focus on three broad levels allowing for a 
holistic approach while also examining particular aspects more individually. The 
division is for analytical purposes only and does not suggest completely separate and 
atomistic features.  
a) Socio-structural and ideational components:  
All social phenomena involve historicity to at the very least some degree27 and are 
related to the structural and ideational conditions of a specific context. The material 
and ideational spheres hold significance as they generate institutions through their 
internal and external relationships and are the consequence of previous and the pre-
condition for future action.28 Similarly to ideational features such as ideology, the 
distribution of power, resources, or other factors of a structural material nature may 
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for example trigger social conflicts. In this research, actualisation and relative 
importance have been given meaning through a combination of interviews and 
literature. This precaution is in recognition of the interpretive layering of signification 
as texts and artefacts may have been created with ‘becoming history’ in mind.29 
b) Institutions:  
Institutions are to be understood as the outcome of interaction between material 
and ideational conditions and are actualised by social agents as subjectively relevant 
features. The institutional structures of the state generate situational logics for agents 
and actors in society but the state at the same time consists of multiple sites of 
competition and contestation (for example different ministries) and is thereby 
reconstituted by the agents and actors (their roles and options changed). The formal 
institutions of the state become agent-specific resources with which to compete for 
social control against informal or alternative institutions30 (for example religious 
councils). Assigning a level of importance without corresponding textual and oral 
support would be a severe mistake. While influences on situational logics in social 
interaction can partly be traced in literature of mainly an anthropological and historic 
nature, it is through interviews and cross-referencing respondent typologies that a 
more accurate and contemporary picture can be revealed, an imprint of situational 
logics guiding agents and actors in the current situation. The interaction between 
formal and informal institutions and to what extent they can guide local power-holding 
agents and actors is crucial for stability.31 The resulting situational logics do not exert a 
pneumatic, forcing pressure, but merely options. One choice may thus be more 
beneficial to that agent or actor, at that moment, in that situation and is thus 
dependent on subjective judgements conditioned by the social context.  
c) Agents and actors:  
Social agents are understood here as collectivities that can be non-interested social 
agents; primary agents that have an interest in a particular matter; and corporate 
agents that are able to organise, mobilise, and articulate an interest. This can be a 
kinship-group32, a political party, unions, neighbourhood watch groups and so on. The 
interaction between institutions and agents produce roles with vested interests 
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attached, that are filled by actors who are interchangeable individuals. Roles can in 
some instances be utilised by corporate interest groups in order to attain a specific 
goal such as patrimonial access to resources.  
To move to understand the complex web of agential and institutional interaction 
requires a multifaceted approach recognising the multiple identities an individual 
belongs to. Having multiple identities also means potentially being part of multiple 
corporate or social agents and also has implications, for example for role-bearers. The 
social context determines what identities a mobilised individual can act in the interest 
of while the mobilised individual determines which he or she will act in the interest of. 
In Afghanistan a local commander may present a challenge to the state when 
unaffiliated, but may also be its strongest competitor for social control even when 
allied with it as a public servant.33 The framework is also concerned with how the 
infusion of resources and influences from external sources affect the options available 
to agents and actors.34 As Escobar has suggested this focus provides an opportunity to 
examine externally introduced dominant social discourses and their relation to the 
cultural meanings and practises they upset or modify.35 It is through interaction that 
agents and actors initiate or quell the propensity for change and mediation occurs 
locally in the situational context where the situated agents and actors exist. External 
discourse often speaks of those perceived as ‘marginalised’ by the situational logic 
such as gender inequities.36 At the same time however it is often marginalising the 
entire context as irrelevant or plain ‘wrong’ to be replaced by external solutions. 
Interventionist projects present agents and actors with a new situational logic due to 
the change in structural and ideational balance to which they must choose a response. 
The unpredictable nature of interaction however provides no pre-knowledge of what 
that outcome will be because agents and actors will choose their responses based on 
subjective or collectively produced understandings of the situation.  
 
Data Collection – Methods, Ethics and Sequence 
The purpose and circumstances of the research made some methods more 
appropriate than others and generated a number of issues that had to be addressed. 
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The initial issue was the positionality of the researcher and the research was fully overt 
throughout. The situations in the sites of research are of such a nature that a 
misrepresentation of intent would not only risk corrupting the data, alienating 
respondents, and give the researcher a ‘bad name’, but could also create 
misconceptions about the true role and nature of the researcher and the research. This 
risk is exacerbated in Afghanistan by a close relationship between some social 
scientists and military programmes represented externally as ‘social research.’37 The 
nature of the investigation is not of such a sensitive character that covert research was 
deemed necessary or desirable. There was a balance to be struck to maintain distance 
while also being sensitive to the small-scale interpretive context in which narratives 
were formed.38  
While it may be beneficial to engage in a long-term befriending manner, the time 
constraints and the nature of the research did require some distance to be maintained. 
This could possibly be described as the ‘familiar stranger’ and was employed as part of 
the impression management39 of the researcher. A balance also had to be struck 
between the positive effects of being facilitated and assisted by one or more 
organisations and not being associated as part of that same organisation and sharing a 
specific agenda. It was judged that in both Afghanistan and Somaliland, the perception 
of belonging to a specific organisation prejudices the respondents and thus affects the 
data collected and the nature of respondent reactions through the assumptions they 
brought to the interview.  
 
Methods employed 
The research focused on data acquisition through a number of means intended to 
generate both direct and background data. 
-Observation of interaction in the shape of discourse and interrelationships both 
locally and externally, for example vis-à-vis funders. This entailed observation of how 
institutions and organisations interacted with each other and with the local 
populations. Points of interest involved among other things decision rights, modes of 
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influence in both directions, setting of the agenda, and defining problems and 
solutions. Primarily though, the focus was on discursive actualisation by respondents. 
- Investigation into documents and produced materials by organisations and 
institutions that provided insights into what image of the social reality is being 
produced and enacted, in effect how local agents, actors, and their situational logics 
were represented in institutional culture. The understanding of historical or descriptive 
texts as socially produced narratives rather than an absolute truth is crucial, and it is 
only in comparison with the subjective narratives of the respondents that such texts 
are given their full meanings. Particular attention was given to literature produced 
locally and by persons situated in the context. 
- Interviews of a semi-structured nature with the questions following a general 
topic-guide40 consistent with the specific context but largely open-ended in order to 
allow for as much self-reflection as possible. The semi-structured interviews were 
employed as a means to control the topics of discussion but allow for an individual 
narrative to develop based on personal reflections. This allowed for probing responses 
through follow-up questions and brief discussions to penetrate dubious statements 
and potential ‘parroting’ of party-lines41 something that proved increasingly important. 
By engaging with people in the environment of interest it became possible to let 
observation and engagement complement what people claimed that ‘they believe and 
do.’42  
Structured interviews were considered much too blunt a tool and it was felt that 
using focus groups would potentially produce a situation where group dynamics and 
respondent concerns with the perceptions of others would corrupt the data collection 
process. Improvised group discussions did however became part of the methodology 
when no other solution was available. 
A further consideration was that of the interview as both a topic and a resource. 
While the open-ended interview may be considered a source there is also the 
possibility of it turning into a topic,43 a narrative created in a perceived need to defend 
or justify the respondent’s own actions, or to make the answers fit what the 
researcher is perceived to be after. This was a fully understood issue going into the 
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research and responses have been viewed with an eye to this potential problem as 
well. It turned out to be a constant problem with answers tailored to an assumed 
agenda of the researcher in a defensive or accommodating fashion. 
 
Case selection 
There are both multiple similarities and differences between the chosen cases. 
Somaliland is a small country that is not recognised and with a relatively small 
population that has gone through internally controlled peace processes. It has also 
undergone a political transformation and successfully held several elections. Somalia 
by contrast is by contrast still subject to a range of conflicts and an internationally 
supported government tries to consolidate its power while insurgent groups ‘control’ 
over 60% of the territory. Somalia has a relatively small population and like Somaliland 
the social divisions are along kinship segments rather than ethnicity or sectarianism. 
Afghanistan is ethnically and religiously more complex while also incorporating kinship- 
and other solidarity structures in different sub-national groups. The differences are 
many but the most significant one is the nature of the Somaliland transformation and 
the relative absence of externally driven change. In Somalia and Afghanistan, by 
contrast, the external involvement and manipulation has been substantial. The 
similarities are at a generalised level also quite numerous but the most important one 
is that all three cases are characterised by a weak influence from the state and 
extremely strong and capable social interest groups and networks at a local level.  
The cases were picked primarily for the reason of being some of the most complex 
and protracted social conflicts that have repeatedly posed a challenge to outside 
interventions but also managed to remain largely outside the absolute control of the 
state or any other social force whether domestic or external in origin. Somaliland was 
at the outset supposed to be the shining example of indigenous peace- and 
statebuilding, a powerful argument for relying on the traditional while Afghanistan was 
supposed to be the negative example of an externally controlled process gone awry. 
The research made it clear that this was incorrect to some extent in both cases. There 
are some periods of relative control in Afghanistan, Somalia, and now Somaliland, but 
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in all these cases the multiple local realities of society have existed either 
autonomously or in direct confrontation with larger social forces seeking to dominate 
the physical and mental space in which society exists. The complex relationship within 
and between local interest groups, social forces and external influences issued by 
these environments were simply the most interesting and challenging cases available. 
As it turned out they did in the end provide excellent examples of the dynamics 
addressed by the framework and a fantastic opportunity to view them in a different 
way than what has become the norm. 
 
Source material 
There is extensive literature on Afghanistan and Somalia/Somaliland, but it seems 
to exist largely in three distinctly different segments. The first is the historic literature 
that focuses on lost empires and mainly on conflict. The second in the anthropological 
that focuses more on observable conditions and interpretation. The third is what could 
possibly best be termed ‘policy literature’ and concerns reports and strategies for 
engagement by international interests mainly in pursuit of ideologically generated 
ideals. 
The available literature presents several potential problems of which the dominant 
is that of interpretation. The source and data selection as well as its interpretation in 
this thesis is dependent on interpretations and accounts of others, thus gradually 
removing it from the actual local contexts. In addition there was a language barrier as 
the researcher did not speak Somali, Dari, or Pashto which exposes the research to the 
representations presented by gatekeepers and interpreters. The aim has been to 
mitigate this in two ways:  
a) Informed choice and cross-referencing of literature: A particular focus has been 
placed on anthropological and historical literature to provide a background 
understanding of social structures and ideational influences in the respective contexts. 
This has then been compared and examined against contemporary narratives in 
literature and media. By cross-referencing the literature and comparing it to current 
and historic events the more fanciful accounts of the cases, both historical and 
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contemporary, could be eliminated. The lines of investigation have departed from this 
part of the research but have also been allowed to develop through interaction during 
the fieldwork. 
b) The fieldwork for this thesis, undertaken in periods between July and November 
2009, served to reduce the distance between the research and the researched. The 
researcher received assistance from organisations in both Somaliland and Afghanistan 
and in effect these organisations acted as gatekeepers for entry into the research. This 
was particularly true in Somaliland where the Academy for Peace and Development 
provided office space, transport and some contacts. In Afghanistan the Swedish 
Committee for Afghanistan provided advice, accommodation, and some contacts. The 
limited amount of time available and the conditions under which the research was 
undertaken did not allow for long-term observational study. Despite this the fieldwork 
has been invaluable as it served to adjust, complement, and sometimes contradict the 
often quite ‘box-shaped’ pieces of knowledge that had been gained through the 
literature. It provided the researcher with an opportunity to observe, experience, and 
compare narratives directly and engage them not from behind a desk far away but in 
the immediate realities being discussed. The research was also allowed to change 
along the way in order to adapt to the local reality as it was found. This has been 
considered acceptable if not beneficial and in line with the notion of the research 
process being a ‘constant interaction between problem formulation, data collection 
and data analysis.’44  
 
Respondent typologies: 
There are three main typologies of respondents engaged with in this research.  Each 
interview was semi-structured in nature and typically lasted between sixty and ninety 
minutes. 
1) Local social- and corporate agents and actors. This refers to individuals with a 
potential or articulated interest in the on-going process and mainly engaged with the 
modes of mobilisation and actuation present in the respective contexts, but also 
subjective perceptions of enablers and constraints of a material or ideational nature. 
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While access was relatively easy there were ethical concerns connected to engaging 
with this category as interaction could trigger negative consequences for the 
respondent in terms of for example criminal violence. This was observed in a 
sometimes slightly overprotective way that complicated interaction with local 
population in particular in Afghanistan and in relation to formal interviews. It is 
however felt that this was compensated through informal interaction that provided 
additional depth to the background. 
2) External agents and actors situated locally. This refers to organisations and 
individuals physically present in these countries and how they perceive their own role 
as well as the role of the ‘local.’ This predominantly entails expatriate staff in 
international organisations and agencies, but also to some extent national staff.  
3) External agents and actors situated externally. This category consisted of 
organisational headquarters and donors situated outside of the countries in question 
yet influencing the interaction going on in those societies. It allowed for a comparison 
with how external agents and actors situated in the respective countries perceive and 
engage with locally situated agents and actors. This category became mainly focused 
on the Afghan engagement as an outcome of the responses to interview requests. 
The lines of enquiry were adapted to each of these typologies in order to achieve a 
higher degree of ‘benevolent’ penetration of the common discourse. By asking a 
respondent about not only their own but also the other typologies a cross-reference of 
perceptions and understandings was held to be possible. This type of feedback was 
then allowed to influence a continuing development of the lines of enquiry to expand 
somewhat to incorporate new factors. It was thus a living investigation that evolved 
with knowledge acquired locally through interaction with direct sources in a dynamic 
and self-reflective feed-back. 
Not all interviews have been used and conversations outside the interview format 
have only been referred to in a few instances. The interviews used are listed in the 
source material but are all anonymous as per the ethical discussion below and they 
break down in a number of categories. In total there were sixteen international aid and 
development workers interviewed from different parts of the world. There were also 
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two international diplomats, one intelligence official, one military officer, two 
international analysts, and four journalists of whom two were Somali, one was Afghan, 
and one was from a ‘Western’ country. In Somaliland three Somaliland politicians were 
also interviewed, as was one Somaliland businessman and four Somali NGO workers. In 
Afghanistan four Afghan state workers and one former Taliban official also contributed 
to this research bringing the total number of interviews used to thirty-nine. Of these 
nine were situated outside of the contexts while sixteen were in Afghanistan, and 
fourteen in Somaliland. While the social distribution is reflected in the categorisations, 
the gender distribution largely reflects the male-dominated face of the societies 
investigated. Out of a total of thirty-nine interviews referenced here, thirty-two are 
with male respondents and seven with women. The distribution of female respondents 
is relatively evenly distributed between the three research environments. With this 
said there are several interviews with women that, together with additional interviews 
with male respondents, have not been used as reference material but form part of the 
background understanding. In terms of age distribution all respondents were adults. 
The youngest was in their early twenties and the oldest in their seventies. The majority 
of respondents were between twenty-five and fifty. 
 
Ethical considerations 
A particular note has to be made on the ethical aspects45 of the interviews as the 
three general areas where they were undertaken offer a number of different 
challenges. The researcher’s status was completely overt and each participant was 
issued a participant information sheet in the relevant language that detailed the 
project, the data storage and processing. They were also provided with contact 
information in case they wanted to later retract their statements. Because of the 
intention to reflect personal perceptions and opinions rather than an official position 
or narrative, the interviews departed from a point of total anonymity regardless of the 
position or location of the respondent. In the end all statements were made 
anonymous in order to reduce the possibility of particular statements being linked to 
specific persons by exclusion. A conscious decision has been made to err on the safe 
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side and all respondents were given the opportunity to withdraw or change their 
statements before July 2010. One respondent expressed such a wish and has been 
removed completely from the research. The project was fully approved by the 
University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) at the University of St 
Andrews. 
 
Thesis outline 
The first chapter examines the historical background of international peacebuilding 
and its associated concepts. During the research it became apparent that the 
framework applied to any type of intervention and that by separating the ‘external’ 
and the ‘local’, any type of conscious action from the former into the latter constitutes 
an intervention. However, keeping the focus on international peacebuilding addresses 
the full range of means between aid and armed force, an increasingly blurred space for 
peacebuilders and military forces.46 It thus takes centre stage and the literature review 
examines the concepts that appear at the heart of current interventions whether at 
village or state levels, often making them into political enterprises rather than the 
apolitical aid projects they are often portrayed as.  
Having examined the foundations of current strategies the focus in the second 
chapter shifts to constructing an alternative framework for viewing a social narrative. 
Archer’s Morphogenetic theory provides an understanding of how the properties of 
social interaction and interest group formation emerge from material and ideational 
preconditions. The interaction between these social interest groups is then considered 
as networks of groups forming social forces and viewed through the lens of Migdal’s 
theory on state and society relations. Both of these theories are however found 
wanting and are amended in the construction of the framework. The emerging 
framework considers the historic and contemporary conditions in order to form an 
understanding of interest group dynamics and, detached from the international state-
centric obsession, instead focuses on understanding the socially established modes of 
mobilisation. Social forces in terms of the state, insurgency, social or ethnic groups are 
explored as networks that have internally diverse agendas, grievances, and 
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motivations. Social interaction is complex and often unpredictable making 
comprehensive mapping unrealistic as the possibilities are endless. One can however 
glean these instances in social time and while they may have one interpretation as 
single snapshots of ‘the local’, they can provide more insights when seen together with 
a multitude of similar snapshots.  
The third chapter is focused on the social dynamics of Somalia with a particular 
focus on Somaliland in the north-west. The unrecognised Republic of Somaliland 
declared independence in 1991 and has fashioned a peace that has largely held since 
1997. There have been several elections and the people of Somaliland have overcome 
internal friction through reliance on traditional social structures. However, while 
displaying most of the trappings of a ‘modern’ state, politics largely tend to play out 
locally even within the theatre of the central state institutions. The chapter examines 
instances of how the social interest formation and solidarity groups played a role in the 
peace processes of the 1990’s and indications of change within the traditional 
framework, specifically in terms of gender relations. Examples from both Somaliland 
and South Somalia are drawn upon to illustrate the modes of mobilisation and local 
agency at a sub-national level in relation to external influences.  
Chapter four engages with the complex social environment of Afghanistan. Drawing 
on anthropological and historical studies as well as contemporary commentary and 
interviews a pattern emerges of even the Afghan state in its many manifestations 
throughout history as being external to Afghan society. While social networks will draw 
on local frictions in order to gain social ‘mass’, the local agendas and conflicts will 
likewise draw on the ‘higher order’ issues in order to affect the balance within their 
own spheres of interest. Entering into this social context is a multitude of international 
actors with a lacking understanding of the dynamics and with their own distinct 
agendas. The chapter examines both national and international interventionist 
projects into the highly localised social contexts. 
The fifth and concluding chapter provides a final discussion of the cases and the 
implications of the research. The central contention is that by viewing social contexts 
through the lens of the suggested framework it is possible to understand the dynamics 
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behind socio-political interaction and how intervention changes its conditions. By 
inserting resources and offsetting balances without taking into account an 
understanding of the social or political dynamics, the externally generated project not 
only transforms the social context but also makes itself subject to the situational logics 
produced in local actuation by social agents and actors. This is particularly true in 
relation to opportunistic groups who understand both how to play according to the 
local structural and ideational conditions, as well as how and what discourse to employ 
in reference to ‘external’ agents. In an existing social context the externally generated 
interventionist project is the ‘Other.’ This thesis provides a framework through which 
to view and recognise this relationship. 
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Chapter One: Strategies and Literature 
This chapter consists of two parts intended to provide an overview of the 
foundational thoughts underlining international interventions.1 The purpose is to form 
an understanding of the assumptions and perspectives that have been established 
over the years and that penetrate strategy at all levels. The focus has been placed 
mainly on international ‘peacebuilding’ as this field incorporates means ranging from 
diplomatic talks to armed force, via aid and development. The first part examines the 
principles and values on which international peace-interventions operate. Portrayed as 
‘universal’2 they have a protected and almost untouchable position of centrality. The 
second part is formed around these central themes and examines available literature 
and perspectives expressed in either support or critique of the employed concepts, 
and what these are missing. 
 
Part I – Strategies and Practise 
The strategies employed today are the logical conclusion of their theoretical roots 
and the associated social imagery. There are a number of assumptions about the 
supposedly ‘peaceful nature’ of a liberal market democracy, the Wilsonian 
understanding of the international system, and the understanding of conflict as 
predominantly caused by social injustice or failure by the state to provide within a 
preconceived role. These assumptions lead to the understanding of peace not only as 
the eradication of such issues, but as a fulfilment of ideologically pre-determined and 
defined needs. Reconstruction efforts of ‘failed states’ are often geared towards hasty 
political and economic reform that may have destabilizing effects 3 on already unstable 
societies. Among the problems is a high level of focus on the working functions of a 
distinctly centralised though not necessarily big, state;4 the focus on the individual; the 
presumption of liberal democracy as a universally effective system of governance; and 
as a result the failure of most to relate to the socio-political dynamics, even when 
trying. Government agencies and NGOs often seek to foster and develop ill-defined 
concepts such as ‘civil society’ with no real consideration of what their local meaning 
is. The result is often a cluster of local elites who are discursively adhering to the 
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agenda. The generated organisations may be skilled at writing grant proposals but 
often lack sustainability5 and sometimes interest when resources run out. Despite the 
discursive contradictions of contemporary strategies, it is clear that ‘the West’ engages 
with ‘the rest’ in a relatively uncompromising way where adaptation and conformity is 
expected to be on the end of the recipient society, not in the planning and 
implementation of interventionist projects. The reconstruction of crumbled systems is 
continuously sought, the more or less forced recreation of single political entities often 
based on a post-colonial bunching of people with few shared ideas of community.6 This 
state-building increasingly appear to be vain attempts to recreate states in the image 
of the ‘Western’ liberal democracy or as ‘colonial mimicry’: a reformation of the 
‘Other’ as a subject that is becoming almost the same but not quite7 and thus 
remaining in a position of ‘inferiority.’ The assumption of universalism is projected 
further by ‘Western’-supported organisations promoting a Eurocentric agenda8 or as 
Ignatieff puts it as he compares the spread of the liberal peace to imperial aspirations: 
‘[…] what is Empire but the desire to imprint our values, civilization and achievements 
on the souls, bodies, and institutions of another people?’9 
 
Intervention to build a peace 
John Paul Lederach defines peacebuilding to ‘be understood as a comprehensive 
term that encompasses the full array of stages and approaches needed to transform 
conflict towards sustainable, peaceful relations and outcomes.’10 In the context of 
international peacebuilding however, the ‘needed’ stages and approaches are often 
conceptually predefined in a setting external to and disconnected from the ‘target’ 
society. The model for post-Cold War peacebuilding can largely be traced to the 
surprisingly quick11 post-World War II reconstruction of Europe and Asia and the social 
remodelling of the defeated Axis powers. On the ruins of the defeated, something new 
was to be constructed that would safeguard against a future regeneration of conflict. 
This would be designed in line with an international open economy founded on the 
principles of liberal capitalism, but also equated with democratic forms of 
government.12 The 1942 Atlantic charter defined the principles on which the post-war 
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world would be built on as freedom, democracy, and a prosperous economy based on 
free exchange.13 These principles are still strongly present in international strategies of 
peacebuilding. 
International peacebuilding and its associated functions are predominantly 
performed by states or organisations originating in ‘the West.’ This is arguably a result 
of the economic and power dominance by this select minority of nations and it has 
implications for strategy, goals, and measurements of success. There is seemingly a 
developing consensus amongst academics, policymakers in liberal states, institutional- 
and NGO actors14 that conflict resolution demands a certain form of governance 
imposed by force if necessary. This consensus becomes even more obvious when 
dealing with peacebuilding in so called ‘failed states’, where the (re-)construction of a 
centralised government is seen as a necessity by international interventionist projects. 
This is based on a set of assumptions on how to establish a sustainable peace by 
shifting violent political competition to political non-violent competition.15 It is multi-
arena and multi-level intervention that, like international development policy, is 
largely characterised by a convergence of ideas of neo-liberal reform, democratisation, 
and poverty reduction16 as well as a focus on the individual as the primary social 
component. While a gradual construction of a central polity with delayed elections 
could possibly serve to facilitate change,17 the short timeframes of benchmarks of 
‘success’ generate tumultuous effects.18 The assumption that it is the type of system 
that matters rather than the level of internal stability is not without its challengers,19 
but a large number of international interventions in the post-Cold War era are 
governed by a ‘Wilsonian approach.’20 International peacebuilding is torn between two 
versions of liberalism: One with the state as the vehicle of security and regulation; and 
one with a more emancipatory perspective. The two strands combine to make the 
venture overall unstable.21 These interventions have a tendency to turn into social 
engineering as a result of being disconnected from an informed understanding of the 
local context. But they also fail to relate past and present interventionist actions to the 
development of the conflict and social environment.22  
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 The United Nations and peacebuilding 
The term ‘peacebuilding’ was defined by the UN in 1992 as ‘action to identify and 
support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a 
relapse into conflict’,23 a definition that has been criticised on the grounds of being too 
wide and lacking priorities.24 In response to this, the UN Peacebuilding Commission is 
an attempt to develop a co-ordinated strategy for peacebuilding efforts to create 
‘foundations for sustainable peace and development.’ Human rights and gender issues 
are complemented by economic reconstruction and rehabilitation as major issues to 
be addressed through a series of risk reduction strategies.25 Boutros-Ghali once 
stressed that peacebuilding demands time and sensitivity and that ‘[t]he United 
Nations is[…] reluctant to assume responsibility for maintaining law and order, nor can 
it impose a new political structure or new state institutions,’26 but this is a position that 
has arguably changed since. Examples include the UN administration of the province of 
Kosovo between 1999 and 2008, the democratisation attempts in Afghanistan post 
2001, the political role of the UN in Somalia, and several peacebuilding missions in 
Africa. A very recent example is the UN strategy for 2010 to 2013 to support the 
government controlled Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).27 The 
ANDS is framed in a language heavily saturated in the ‘universals’ of the liberal peace, 
a saturation further exacerbated by the UN’s support-strategy which focuses on three 
core issues: good governance, peace and stability including institution building; 
sustainable livelihoods including a focus on youth employment; and ‘basic social 
services’ such as education, health, water and sanitation while ‘building on the 
significant progress made.’28 There is also a group of ‘cross-cutting issues’ defined as: 
gender; human rights; mine action; anti-corruption and border management; and 
counter-narcotics.29 The strategy is thus largely a recycling of generic ideas that are 
part and parcel of the typical aid and development strategies. It does mention 
‘customised local solutions’ but this does not appear to be ‘customisation’ equated 
with adapting goals to work with local perceptions and value sets. The ‘customisation’ 
is instead an adaptation of implementation strategies to the local security situation. By 
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contrast, those trying to build strategies based on understanding complex local 
dynamics seem to have a small voice and few ears listening to them.30  
Another body involved in the social reform side of peacebuilding is the World Bank. 
Though expressing an interest and seeking measures to understand the complexities of 
conflict- and post-conflict societies, the favoured ‘solutions’ are usually the same 
reductionist generalisations of social complexities that can be found in other aid and 
development strategies. The Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) of the UN and the World 
Bank resulted in the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) that 
was allegedly ‘highly participatory, reaching all parts of the country’ and developed in 
‘extensive consultation’ with Somali as well as regional and international bodies.31 
Considering strategies employed in other countries, it comes as no surprise that the 
three core priorities of the programme are: peace, security, and ‘good governance’; 
‘basic social services’; and infrastructure coupled with what could best be described as 
private sector development.32 The report encourages not building from scratch but 
‘capitalizing’ on existing social structures.33 The substantial ideological baggage 
integrated into the RDP means this should more likely be understood as ‘use’ rather 
than ‘be informed by and cooperate with.’ 
It is obvious that institutional peacebuilding lacks a solid platform from which to 
understand social dynamics separated from ideological and normative objectives. Even 
the terminology of ‘good governance’ implies both a promise of local control as well as 
conditionality,34 while aiming to transform ‘dysfunctional’ state bureaucracies into 
efficient state providers.35 The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ as it was conceptualised in 
200936 is an example which, as has been observed, clearly internationalises rather than 
contextualises strategy, failing to engage with local social realities.37 Peacebuilding has 
been turned into a ‘system of governance’ instead of pursuing reconciliatory goals in 
the local context.38 The road to peace and reconciliation has become inseparable from 
the transformation of a society into a specific state format and a specific set of values. 
An important discursive term to achieve this is ‘local ownership’ which is used to 
justify and legitimise externally constructed and imposed strategies and priorities. The 
term ‘local ownership’ can be seen as a tool that absolves donors from having to 
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consider the consequences of their interventions.39 It is mainly ‘lip-service’40 and by 
instilling a ‘partnership’ mentality self-regulation is presumably generated as a method 
of governance.41 The ‘local’ wants the strategy because some of the ‘locals’ have been 
trained, or ‘capacity-built,’ to implement the strategy. The lack of perspective also 
enables the recycling of non-working strategies in ever new arenas of intervention as 
the implementation of ideological normative narratives and ‘adjusted’ reporting 
obscures what happens in the local contexts when strategy meets reality.  
 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
The role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in peacebuilding and conflict 
mitigation increased dramatically during the 1980’s42 and has continued to proliferate. 
The presence of NGOs in conflict and crisis areas is extensive. Both local and 
international NGOs have emerged as vital actors and agents engaged primarily in the 
long-term tasks of prevention and peacebuilding. These tasks are generally intended to 
contribute to the construction of neo-liberal democratic entities, thus raising questions 
about the NGO roles, objectives and relationships to states and other organisations43 
as well as that of coordination.44 There are a number of issues that arise surrounding 
the role and involvement of NGOs in relation to their funding situation: 
Conditional aid and scarcity of funds: Money is a source of competition in the NGO 
community. There is only so much available, and there are often conditions tied to it.45 
Even an organisation that is reasonably apolitical and non-religious may well find itself 
having to choose46 between lying, not performing its mission, or conforming to 
demands made by major donor/-s in order to gain funds in the intense and 
unregulated47 competition for it.48 Donor pressure for quick results is likely to be 
’unrealistically high’ at an early stage when the media focus is still on a particular 
case,49 and the externally supplied resources more often than not subject the NGOs, 
especially local and small organisations, to some degree of control by funders.50  
The ad hoc nature of the relationship between donor and NGO is also a problem as 
structural, focal, or managerial changes in the donor organisation may lead to 
disruptions in the NGO programmes. A de-prioritization of the NGO or instructions to 
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change focus in order to retain the funding,51 are potentially highly disruptive features 
in particular in long-term projects.  
The language of generating funding has led to a situation where project proposal-
writing has become an all-important skill, effectively excluding local initiatives where 
the language, the experience, or lack of knowledge of how to secure funding creates 
disadvantages.52 It has been suggested that organizations that originate in ‘developing’ 
nations should empower themselves by rejecting funding that conflicts with its 
mission.53 During the research at least one local NGO was encountered that had 
mobilised efficient resistance and developed their own locally adapted strategy to 
which the long-term donor partners agreed. Without the type of relationship with 
major donors that this organisation enjoyed however, such acts can be futile and may 
lead to a loss of funding. The competitive nature of aid and development does not 
encourage confrontational or non-conforming behaviour on the part of the 
implementing parties. When donor interests shift to ‘development’ rather than aid, 
the agenda also seems to contain more ideological direction and a closer relationship 
with the state. This has many potential implications, not the least in intra-state 
conflicts where it means aligning with one side of the conflict.54 
Another very serious critique raised is that NGOs agreeing with the ‘crusading’ 
aspects of a liberal peace agenda may help to legitimate ‘the use of force for the end 
of reproducing the liberal order.’55 The on-going trend of primarily government aid 
agencies and International Organisations (IOs) but gradually also NGOs and businesses 
being incorporated into a securitisation discourse where aid and development delivery 
becomes a military mode of engagement, is likely to exacerbate this. It is certainly 
conceivable that implementing partners who are not strategically fully in agreement 
may see their funding diverted to groups who will act according to donor wishes and 
by extension also donor interests. 
 
The issue of donors 
Another issue surrounding externally generated projects is the influence of donors. 
While it is true that policy planners are not actually in control of a particular project,56 
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and that agency at all levels alters it and therein disputes the instrumentalist notion of 
the all-powerful policy framework,57 the influence of policy and donors, either 
explicitly or implicitly, cannot be dismissed. Throughout this research there were 
indications and statements58 that conformity to donor policy outputs were part of 
project design and goals. Just as Mosse describes local communities becoming 
‘appropriate clients’,59 organisations also present a self-image as ‘appropriate 
implementers’ in order to get funding.60 Subordinate actors will create spaces that are 
autonomous from policy models but also work to preserve those same models out of 
self-interest.61 While it may be understandable that donors want to have a say because 
it is their money,62 this should not mean that their ‘say’ does not have to reflect a local 
reality. The tools used to measure ‘success’ seem designed to convince a ‘home 
audience’, rather than to actually achieve sustainable and lasting results in the social 
context. There appears to be a bigger concern for demonstrable outputs than 
sustainable outcomes, making Anderson’s call for aid workers to question whether 
their aid creates exacerbated tensions63 important but often unheeded. 
 
Civilian-Military operations 
State building has become an intricate part of ‘peace interventions’ backed by 
international coalitions of military might. In some areas the more overt aspects of 
military force and objectives are completely non-existent and in others they are 
increasingly blurred, for example in Afghanistan where development engineers speak 
in terms of ‘counter-insurgency.’64 The penetration of military discourse into the aid 
and development world is arguably a relatively new phenomenon, whereas the 
reverse has been the case for some time resulting in ‘development projects’ as part of 
military strategy.65 Using military resources to enforce a normative agenda dubbed 
‘universal’ by some is nothing new, however since the 1990’s liberal state- and 
peacebuilding has increasingly crept into the military agenda. In the post-9/11 world of 
increased securitisation the global war on terror is fought with no defined battle-space 
or territorial limitations. This increasing blend of civilian and military objectives 
apparently does not contradict the upholding of international norms. Instead it has 
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added legitimacy to military endeavours as it seemingly makes the forcible 
transformation of ‘undesirable’ social orders acceptable in the name of ‘universal’ 
rights and needs reflected in strategies such as ‘human security.’ The resulting 
discourse lays the foundation for ‘humanitarian’ military interventions, armed aid and 
development strategies, and increasingly the security perspectives of predominantly 
‘Western’ governments. 
There is a developing stress between international aid agencies and the military as 
the agendas grow increasingly integrated in counter insurgency frameworks. While for 
example civilian projects are increasingly being asked to support a military agenda the 
military weight given to aid and development is an illusion. ‘Development’ and ‘aid’ in 
a military context refers to ‘quick impact’ projects of limited-sustainability designed to 
buy local support through immediate and visible results. This misses the fact that the 
local environments in which interventionist projects are undertaken are continuous 
and dynamic contexts that extend beyond the project time in both directions. While 
Mosse has observed how the success of a project is determined throughout its 
interactions,66 it is argued here that this constitutes a temporally compartmentalised 
and project-centric perspective that is common in international engagements into 
social contexts.  The questions asked subsequently relate mostly to efficiency that 
covers reform implementation, sequencing speed, avoiding corruption, and how to co-
opt local elites.67 Projects become lopsided and mono-directional in nature, doing 
things ‘at’, rather than ‘with’ local people.68 They thus aim to satisfy the political needs 
of development agencies long before they meet the needs of the local communities.69 
Such a distinction is not lost on the recipient end.70 
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Part II – Literature Review 
This part of the chapter examines literature relevant to the central tenets of 
intervention strategies. The nature of the subject addressed here necessitates a rather 
cruel and possibly unfair limitation on the body of literature included. The amount of 
literature available on the subjects of the state, social interaction, peace, conflict, 
political theory, international relations, humanitarianism, development, aid, and so on 
ad infinitum, would require several volumes in their own right for a full review and 
account. Focus has instead been placed on literature that is central both in favour and 
critiquing a specific subject for different reasons. Relevance has been determined 
largely based on its centrality to the core of theories on the subject, specific points 
made, or proximity in time that represent recent developments. Though somewhat 
shallow and brief considering the several fields covered, the aim is to provide an 
overview of perspectives on the mechanisms behind social order and disorder, and 
how to address these issues. It identifies and highlights the central tenets of 
international interventionist strategies related to peacebuilding, understood to 
incorporate for example utilitarianism, and universalism.1  
Peacebuilding as an applied strategy concerns itself increasingly with the overall 
formation of the state in which the sustainable peace is to be constructed2 at all levels. 
However, it also engages in changing many aspects of the value bases present in the 
societies concerned. While there is some discursive movement towards a more open-
minded and inclusive attitude, it is quite obvious that strategies generally originate 
from a highly state centric position with the model and values of the ‘Western’ liberal 
democracy as the benchmark to achieve. Even when identifying sub-state issues like 
land disputes as conflict generators,3 the focus remains on the same ‘universal’ 
constructs of problems and solutions. A distinct formula has developed that contains 
numerous goals for the transformations of societies, and the UN system alone has 
continued to generate a ‘specification of international norms for states’ while 
assuming that there is broad acceptance for its plans and goals.4 In reality however, 
this is often a case of discussions focusing on catch-phrases rather than concrete 
outcomes.5 Reconstruction efforts are geared towards hasty political and economic 
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reform that may instead have destabilizing effects on states and societies. The high 
level of focus on the working functions of a distinctly centralised state6 and a 
presumption of a ‘Western’ liberal democracy as a universally effective system of 
governance according to many scholars and practitioners are among the existing 
problems. As Richmond has observed, attention has been diverted away from ‘local 
contexts, communities and agencies.’7  
The approaches discussed here aim to change two types of overarching conditions: 
Format in the sense of constructing a specific type of state structure to control and 
regulate a specific territory and population; and substance in the sense of norms and 
values derived from international declarations that ‘should’, according to this view, 
guide the social system. While state agencies tend to focus on the functions of the 
state as a vehicle to deliver pre-determined functions, international organisations 
often step in to de facto replicate and perform such functions if the local state cannot. 
Though not absolute and with notable exceptions, the general impression is that 
through the mechanisms inherent in the donor-client relationship, a system is created 
which perpetuates and works towards changing the format and substance of a target 
society. The intention of this system seems to be, in spite of its own discourse of 
adaptation, to create an externally defined vision of social interaction. These attempts 
are largely supported by a body of literature reproducing the assumption of primacy of 
that vision.  
 
Format – The State as the vehicle of social order and delivery 
The international system is exclusively geared towards states. Right or wrong, this is 
how the system works in terms of international representation and the rights and 
duties of states. There can be no question that in the current international system 
there is an inherent expectation that the state is the guarantor of a territory. There is 
little flexibility in this systemic demand by the international community for a number 
of reasons. A territory is not only an internal boundary but also an external reference 
as neighbouring states define their territory in relation to the borders of their 
neighbours. Thus, the social arrangements of the territory in question can be different, 
30 
 
and possibly even cross over into the neighbouring country via nomadic movements or 
kinship affiliations. If a state lacks clearly defined borders it carries implications for the 
capacity of its neighbours to exert authority, collect taxes, and draw the lines of 
responsibilities. In other words, there is a compounding pressure in the international 
system that a territory be organised as a state with a specific set of responsibilities 
even if these formal functions, defined by that same system, have disintegrated or 
function poorly. Unlike the historic norm during the European state formation, the 
annexation of neighbouring territories is rarely accepted in the contemporary 
international climate and it is less likely that a weaker (militarily or otherwise) state 
will be swallowed by a stronger neighbour. Thus the internal conditions of a territory 
are of less relevance to the maintenance of borders. This external demand for juridical 
representation thus makes statehood a pre-requisite for any strategy decision, but the 
external demands on the state also goes beyond representing and controlling a 
territory.  
 
The functions of the state 
The functions of the state are central to many interventionist strategies and 
international perspectives, expressed in terms of the functions prescribed for it. The 
performance of these functions is also used as a benchmark for measuring whether it 
is a ‘failed’ state or not. 8 Security, representation and welfare9 are prevalent in 
literature and strategy as core functions of the state with little variation other than in 
detail. This follows closely Tilly’s definition of the ‘super-state’ as a strongly 
consolidated entity with a high capacity for coercion and resource extraction from the 
population in the shape of taxation, conscription, and censuses, and police systems.10 
An example of a more detailed definition of when a state has ‘failed’ lists six defining 
conditions11: 1) lost control of the borders; 2) cannot protect citizens from organized 
violence and is sometimes predatory itself; 3) cannot prevent the growth of organized 
crime, 4) has weak or failed institutions; 5) fails to provide adequate healthcare, 
education, and other social services; and 6) has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population. 
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International interventionist strategies and mainstream literature tends to focus on 
a highly centralized government and how to make that 1) function, and 2) legitimate in 
relation to the population. Governance is created and legitimacy sought afterwards 
even though most communities already have their own socio-political systems 
whether the state is functioning or not. These seem to be assumed to either simply not 
exist or to be misguided at best.  
A state has two modes of legitimacy: the juridical external recognition by the 
international system, and the empirical internal recognition of society. If the state has 
juridical legitimacy it should also ideally have empirical sovereignty. Some states, 
occasionally referred to quasi-states, have juridical sovereignty only and are not able 
to actually control or defend their territory.12 There is little consensus on what 
constitutes legitimacy but the two most commonly proposed means to achieve it is 
mobilisation popular support based on nationalism and creating democracy13 through 
elections.  
Early European state formations were 
shaped by external pressure in the form of 
aggressive neighbours which made defending 
the borders and consolidating the state 
necessary. The state’s ability to project power 
across territory and meet the threat 
determined where the border was eventually 
drawn; weak or failing powers were likely to 
be absorbed by a neighbour. Under such a 
model there are three major issues to 
overcome: the cost of expanding the domestic 
power infrastructure; the nature of the natural boundaries; and the design of the state 
system.14 Now, the pressure from the international community is generally not of the 
same kind and does not generate the same need for border protection.  
Intervention in the form of a nakedly aggressive conquest in order to gain territory 
is highly uncommon and by far overshadowed by smaller interventions aimed at 
Consolidation through external pressure 
and internal projection 
Figure 1 
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specific goals, resources, or for humanitarian purposes. A more raid-like style of 
warfare rather than conquest, these tend to be limited in time, scope, and do not 
include the incorporation of the target territories into the invading party’s claims. The 
change in the international pressure is obvious for example in Europe where the EU 
has opened its internal borders. In many other parts of the world there is also a lack of 
external territorial threats15 and international pressure instead serves to preserve the 
current borders even when there is no state capacity to uphold them.  
International pressure today does not so much threaten the integrity of borders, 
but rather strives to freeze them in place. Border consolidation is very much decided 
by the globally more powerful states rather than in the local regional context as shown 
in Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, and other examples. However, borders remain important 
as their protection is a part of maintaining stability in many regions. This takes on 
immediate importance where neighbouring states are actively inciting or serving as a 
staging ground for insurgent groups, international criminal networks or terrorists. In 
such situations, the security interests of other more powerful states serve to exert an 
additional pressure to maintain border integrity. 
 
‘State failure’ 
 ‘State failure’ supposedly results in the evaporation of cohesion between state and 
society16 but the external application of the label is often guided by the subsequent 
policy responses it warrants. A fragile state is seen as engendering conflict and further 
state deterioration.17 The label of ‘failed’ can be withheld when other interests 
preclude its usage despite conditions more or less identical to another state that has 
been declared ‘failed.’ It is thus a tool of exclusion and dominance that works by 
denying the juridical sovereignty needed for accessing international loans and support. 
The difference in application or not may be business opportunities or the posing of a 
perceived security threat. The label is withheld until such a point where it poses a 
challenge to the interests of more powerful states. Declaring a state ‘failed’ unlocks a 
range of policy alternatives18 for intervention and pressure to further the 
interventionist policies. 
33 
 
The usefulness of the concept of ‘state failure’ has been questioned with reference 
to flawed assumptions of state uniformity and as a label that is ‘inherently political, 
and based primarily on ‘Western’ perceptions of security and interests.’19 The focus on 
central government is problematic for several reasons because it raises contentious 
issues related to assumptions of format and substance in an environment where a 
central government may not necessarily be an immediate priority. It also reflects the 
erroneous assumption that the absence of a central government equals an absence of 
governance.20 This type of discourse has for example been very much present in 
relation to international representations of Somalia since 1991.  
The Weberian categories of governance typologies often used are ideals and should 
not be confused with a norm21 yet nevertheless are treated as such. The literature on 
state failure is therefore generally based on a negative logic of what is missing in the 
polities that do not fulfil and conform to the Westphalian state and a Weberian social 
order ideal. It is presumed that a state that cannot provide political goods, as defined 
by an international consensus, ‘loses its legitimacy within society.’22 It cannot 
effectively control its territory and may even completely lose control over parts of it 
with official power restricted to the capital or major cities. If the state ‘fails’, it is 
expected to become characterized by enduring, though not necessarily high, levels of 
violence with roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other inter-communal enmities.23 
However, this expectation is based on two assumptions: a) that the state is the sole 
provider of political goods and social stability and; b) that political goods and local 
priorities can be independently defined from outside the local reality.  The counter-
argument is that a closer examination of non-state social agents may indicate what the 
priorities are locally as opposed to externally defined ‘universal’ constructs.  
The ‘state system’ assumes predominance of the state in social control 
mechanisms,24 but there is also an alternative narrative that the state is part of and 
challenged in a web-like system of social organizations with varying degrees of 
autonomy, rather than at the top of a centralized pyramid structure.25 While it is true, 
as argued by some, that a classification of ‘universal’ responsibilities of a state does 
facilitate easy comparison between different countries of absolute performance,26 the 
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social conditions underlining state formation risk being lost in the translation when 
using ‘typology tools’27 to determine ‘state health.’ The level of generalisation and 
over-simplification of social interaction required to make such tools useful is 
predicated on expectations generated in the international system rather than how the 
population relates themselves to the state. The simplified tools generate any number 
of lists with a set of factors usually covering a spread of functions such as: external and 
internal security; rule of law; political opportunity and participation; healthcare, 
education, infrastructure, economical opportunity, a ‘flowering civil society’, and 
regulation of environmental commons.28  
While state collapse can be viewed as the breakdown of state-oriented good 
governance, law and order, and societal collapse can be viewed as the breakdown of 
social coherence,29 one does not necessitate the other. This is especially true 
considering that societies viewed as a singular territorially defined unit, usually contain 
multiple social orders. The assumption that these orders would collapse because of the 
state system failing does not hold. The state is better viewed as the attempted 
subordination of people’s own inclinations of social behaviour, or that which is sought 
by other ‘social organizations.’30 There is also often a connection between low internal 
legitimacy and high external dependence,31 a relationship exemplified by the practise 
of propping up certain regimes in furtherance of international political objectives that 
relieves the state of the necessity of wide domestic support. Such relationships have 
long been very obvious in the cases of both Afghanistan and Somalia. 
While the state does hold a potentially unique position for international 
negotiations or making peace between different segments of society,32 it has in reality 
a less than clear-cut position or role. International acceptance does not necessarily 
mean domestic representation or legitimacy and the state is often a party to, or 
subject to, domestic conflicts and competition between groups. By including, for 
example, the provision of ‘political goods’ by alternative sources, a more accurate 
analysis of what is already in place can emerge.33 The attitude towards the state from 
such alternative sources of political goods is also a determinant of the state’s survival 
capacities. The state may well be dependent on non-state sources of influence and 
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power to survive, but as long as its existence is not challenged, it can also persist 
relatively intact in a reduced role. In its extreme it could be an organic federalist 
system of a reduced state reliant on localised sources of power for authority projection 
and support only loosely held together and nominally controlled at the centre. It is 
however obviously important to actors in the international system that the state takes 
on a shape and functions that are easily recognisable and ‘universally defined.’  
The contemporary response to ‘failed’ or ‘weak’ states seems to be the installation 
of externally constructed systems and government, for example from a Diaspora, 
pushed by powerful international actors. When these local allied interest groups have 
little credibility,34 the lack of actual legitimacy is plastered over by hastily convened 
elections that may or may not lead to the need to intervene in the election process in 
order to prevent the ‘wrong’ political figures to be elected by popular vote. This can be 
done for example by selectively postponing elections in ‘unreliable’ areas or by actively 
intervening to make people vote for a specific candidate, all paradoxically claimed to 
be done in order to further the interests of democracy. When an effort is made to 
actually include at least some semblance of local societal modes of legitimacy, these 
are placed under conditions that are contradictory to, or just not legitimate to, the 
local power-structures. In parts of Africa the holding of multi-party elections, usually 
equated with ‘democratisation,’ has come about through outside pressure while in 
reality a set of democratic institutions become subject to the situational logics of local 
political structures, for example patrimonialism, rather than the often proclaimed 
other way around.35 While the institutional system may shift, the pathologies that 
created the incentives for state recession and de-formalisation in the first place remain 
intact.36 It is also not the case of a breakdown in social order but rather that even while 
ideologies, regimes, and order changes, societies and established patterns of social 
and political interaction continue to function.  
Because consolidation of national borders is not strictly necessary, the empirical 
legitimacy of local social agents and actors is enough to control a piece of territory and 
consolidate control to a sufficient degree to develop a functioning polity. ‘Warlordism’ 
can in some cases be viewed as a ‘sample of adaptive social innovation to conditions of 
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intense economic globalization.’37 When the state does not exist or lack authority and 
legitimacy, other formats of localised governance such as ‘warlord’ fiefdoms and other 
socially produced power structures rise to replace it locally. This can sometimes be 
utilised by the state to expand its control. One such example is when the state relies 
on traditional structures to project authority and supplement legitimacy gained 
through elections with traditional leadership support.38 When the state does not 
provide security and other basic services, people turn elsewhere for basic modes of 
protection.39  
There is however also definitions of state failure that are largely disconnected from 
a political description and more focused on function. According to such a perspective, 
when the state no longer receives any support or demands from the population, it also 
loses its right to command and exercise control over the people. There no longer is a 
working relationship between the state and the society and thus the notion of being a 
citizen of that state becomes meaningless,40 undermining or destroying the legitimacy 
of the state. The question arising from this perspective is whether an externally 
imposed state format and substance would generate support and demands in the first 
place, and thus whether it can have legitimacy, if a society does not expect, want or 
understand the format. 
 
Substance - The ‘Right Values’ equal State Rights 
The expectation of what role the state should fill found in the academic literature is 
also heavily reflected in the development of theories on how to approach, understand, 
and ‘fix’ societies. There is a clear notion that the state is what is holding off 
‘destructive forces’ such as identity mobilisation and other sub-state social divisions. 
While an absence of the state does not automatically mean anarchy some observers 
see it as leading to a reversion to ethnic nationalism as the ‘residual, viable identity.’41  
In An Agenda for Peace the responsibility of the individual’s security is squarely 
placed with the state42 thus also demanding a certain form of internal representation 
and responsibility. This perspective is continued in for example the ‘rights-based’ and 
‘human security’ approaches to aid and development but has become a prescriptive 
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tool by powerful states than an emancipatory discourse.43 The format as well as the 
contents are thus prescribed and can be made to serve as justification for 
interventions into non-conforming states. The viability of such interventions is directly 
related to how powerful the interventionists and the target state are, resulting in a 
highly relativistic application of these norms. 
In order to stave off this threat to the ‘universal order’, the agendas of 
‘development’, ‘aid’, ‘reconstruction’, and ‘stabilisation’ are often linked in with the 
notion of what the state ‘should’ provide. When a state does not, international 
agencies and organisations step in to provide what they have defined as to be lacking. 
This is often along the very lines outlined in state performance and failure, but also 
grounded in notions of what drives conflicts and ‘universal’ values and needs. These 
goods are defined by externally generated priorities and delivered through the tools of 
aid, development, state-building, and military objectives. They constitute the moral 
core and justification of international interventionist projects, particularly in 
peacebuilding. 
When ‘grass-roots’ social interaction is discussed it is usually in the sense of forming 
a ‘civil society’ to balance and pressure the central government to conform to the 
‘universal’ standards expected of it by those imposing the structure in the first place. 
This artificially created ‘civil society’ is thus assumed to represent the ‘universal values’ 
embedded in the interventionist strategies. There is however reason to assume that 
social conflict and other problems affect civil society groups as well.44 The new civil 
society is supposed to replace local expressions that do not ‘fit’ the model and are 
seen by some to be ‘non-governmental actors hostile to fundamental values and 
interests of the international society such as peace, stability, rule of law, freedom and 
democracy.’45 
Debates for and against interventions tend to polarize into Universalist or culture 
relativistic arguments. The reality of implementation however seems to land 
somewhere in between as failed compromises rather than pragmatic adjustments and 
adaptations. The point of departure is the format of the state, but within that frame 
the needs, wants, and priorities are based on a number of assumptions of 
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‘Westernised’ perspectives claimed to be ‘universal’ and strengthened by their 
integration into the UN system.46 Even the most casual observer can recognise that in 
the international system the states that do not conform to the views of the more 
powerful will be judged to be outside of the ‘norm.’  
In order to understand the approaches of intervention it is also necessary to grasp 
the ways in which conflict, peace, rights, and needs are understood and employed. The 
way we understand conflict varies wildly and ranges from the purely statistical, such as 
the PIOOM scale,47 to more complex notions of an injustice-free existence. First 
generation conflict analysis was focused on international conflict causes originating in 
contest over scarce resources and maximisation of gain that can be negotiated and 
settled with elite representatives of a state. Second generation peace-making, conflict 
resolution, aims predominantly to reach long-term solutions to the issues central to 
the conflict and thus create the pre-requisite for a sustainable peace.48 This more 
complex approach to peace-making necessitates a more intricate analysis and 
understanding of conflict and its mechanisms. In particular, it has been the emerging 
civil and intra-state conflicts that have necessitated the use of a new analytical 
framework. The perceived changes in warfare required a deeper understanding of if 
not ‘new wars’,49 then a new understanding of old ones that better fit the context of 
sub-state forms of organisation. Yet the understanding and analysis was largely guided 
by the same ‘universals,’ and the debate surrounding ‘universal human needs,’ and 
their relevance to the process of conflict resolution, became a large part of this second 
generation peacebuilding. 
 
Human Needs 
Abraham Maslow’s theory of needs hierarchy has been utilized in political analysis 
since the 1950’s50 and keeps reappearing in revised forms. Maslow argued for a 
holistic approach to the understanding of human motivation and the psyche, that it is 
the environment that fulfils the needs of the individual.51 Maslow differentiated 
between ‘healthy’, self-actualizing people and those driven by the gratification of basic 
needs,52 for example hunger. While basic needs are primary drives, at the other end of 
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the scale are self-actualization needs that allow an individual to release him- or herself 
from the ego-centric deficit-motivated strategy of coping. A basic notion linking needs 
theory to peacebuilding is that the environment can facilitate the pursuit of needs 
located higher in the hierarchy.53 This suggests that creating conditions for needs 
fulfilment would in theory be conducive for peace, but it also triggers the question of 
what needs and how; can human needs really be universally defined or are they 
subjective?  
The Basic Needs Approach (BNA) debate in the mid-1970s was adopted by a 
number of international organisations in more or less modified versions54 and still 
carries some influence. Two schools of BNA theory emerged with one seeing needs as 
universal, quantifiable, and measurable; and the second considering needs to be 
historically relative and that they should be seen in context of specific social systems. 
The pursuit of needs satisfaction would be undertaken by any disposable means and 
sometimes at any price.55  
The attempt to impose some sort of integration scheme over a given territory by 
coercion or socialization is potentially counter-productive as any individual whose 
needs are not subjectively fulfilled will express deviant behaviour.56 This is however 
not the attitude present in peacebuilding which instead seems more aligned with the 
conscious attempts to expand a list of human needs to include for example human 
rights.57 This line of thought argues for a more normative approach with the inclusion 
of basic human ‘liberty needs’ as necessities,58 thus reflecting a specific value system 
defined as ‘universals’ in some societies and political systems.59  
Some critiques of the human needs debate for example consider it to be overly 
focused on a ‘Western’ individualistic perspective.60 According to this view, traditional 
and deeper ‘cultural’ meanings are being replaced by ‘ideal human society’ that 
emphasizes individuals.61 Johan Galtung offers an alternative typology of human needs 
divided into actor- (security and freedom), and structure- (welfare and identity) 
dependent factors.62 This view is in turn contested by those who claim that needs are 
less specifically cultural ‘than some behavioural scientists would have us believe.’63  
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The notion of ‘universal’ human needs and their definition is obvious in 
contemporary strategies such as ‘human security’ and ‘rights-based approaches’ that 
focus on the individual and how the state can facilitate needs-fulfilment, explicitly 
defining the state as ‘ultimately responsible’ for the fulfilment of, for example, human 
rights requirements.64 However, the conceptualisation of human security as a 
derivative of a liberal peace, and the ‘universal needs’ associated with it, dispossesses 
the local of the agency to assume its own political identity.65 Needs-theory easily takes 
on a vertical division of labour where either ‘the West’ or the central authority is trying 
to shape the periphery by beaming ‘Western’-defined needs-structures in all directions 
as ‘universal norms’66 or even as objective facts.  
The tendency within human needs theory is to stretch the meaning of needs into 
something that more closely resembles an ideological vehicle for ‘Western’ values and 
organisation. ‘The West’ ‘finds itself in the role of remaking states to meet the needs 
of people’;67 while that may be true on the surface of things, the ‘needs’ are 
ideologically pre-defined and the interpretations imposed on the ‘Other.’ As Richmond 
has argued, the definition of basic needs posits them as inexhaustible and the 
assumption that their denial results in a backlash disconnects aspects of conflicts from 
the environment in which the actors are located.68 In addition to this there is also the 
simple consideration that the effects of needs fulfilment can be conflict promoting 
themselves. In the local socio-political dynamics, the pursuit of security for one can 
generate insecurities for others.69  
 International interventionist strategies tend to prioritise ‘needs’ that are based on 
a specific set of assumptions and perspectives rather than locally defined priorities. 
However, the viability of lofty norm enforcement in a post- or active conflict 
environment is slight at the very best. A good example of how need-priorities change is 
the post-9/11 responses where liberal values were suddenly, and willingly, replaced by 
a massive securitisation after the sudden and substantial deprivation of perceived 
security. This allowed for social measures to be introduced that would have been 
unacceptable just months before. It is hardly a stretch to assume that war-zone 
priorities will be more similar to this than to an ‘ideal’ vision of peace and democracy.  
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The logics of social agents in such an environment are likely to be focused on coping70 
and forging strategies of survival.  
Maslow argued that ‘good choosers’ can better determine what is ‘right’ for ‘bad 
choosers’ than they can for themselves, and that only the judgements of ‘healthy 
human beings’ can tell us what is good for the human species in the long run.71 The 
assumption of one’s own level of ‘civilization’ as higher than another, and the 
subsequent assumption of the invalid grounds for the systems of belief and values of 
the ‘Other’ is however arrogant at best. While the actual fulfilment of basic needs may 
be environmentally generated, the perception of fulfilment is mainly an internal 
process and subjectively determined. The ‘definition creep’ that has afflicted the 
human needs debate has rendered it largely useless as a concept. The concept of 
‘human needs’ has gradually become an ideological tool intended to reflect ‘universal’ 
normative values and judgements of a specific category. This category of self-
perceived ‘good choosers’ largely exists outside the subjective sphere of conflict and 
post-conflict settings where priorities of deficits and fulfilment are actually 
determined. By understanding needs as pre-defined universal values and solutions, 
‘human needs’ has become a discourse of justification for intervention rather than a 
practical discussion that is possible to operationalize. 
 
The Liberal Peace 
 The general international consensus of the liberal democratic peace not only covers 
aspects of Galtung’s negative peace (the absence of overt violence) and positive peace 
(the removal of root/structural causes and oppression),72 but extends further by 
providing a set model for how this is to be achieved. In discussions on peace the 
concept quickly slips into a ‘universal and/or idealistic form,’ and the spreading of 
democracy has seemingly become an acceptable strategy for ‘Western’ states to 
attempt to end conflicts.73 The notion that democratic liberal states are more peaceful 
than others has thus led to a strategy of spreading a ‘liberal peace,’ be that by 
influence, coercion or intervention. This view carries the deeper implication that ‘[…] 
actors involved in conflict are somehow inferior, deluded, or obsessed by violence, 
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identity claims, power, territory or resources,’ and that contemporary peacebuilding 
reflects a view of conflict zones as terra incognita where measures can be 
superimposed without any deeper concern for the outcome.74 The interventionists 
cast themselves as ‘good choosers,’ justified to determine what is ‘right.’ 
There are also those who consider the timeframe too narrow, but still agree with 
the overarching strategy of the universally formulated peace template.75 Michael 
Ignatieff has discussed the subject of a hegemonic liberal peace stating that: ‘[t]he 
humanitarian empire is the new face of an old figure: the Democratic Free World, the 
Christian West. It is held together by common elements of rhetoric and self-belief: The 
idea, if not the practise, of Democracy; the idea, if not the practise, of Human Rights; 
the idea, if not the practise, of equality before the law.’76 Ignatieff points to something 
crucial in this argument. It is not necessarily the case that the state and society as 
envisioned in the policies and strategies of intervention actually exist in reality. The 
format and substance being imposed are thus perhaps ideals in the heads of policy 
makers, a wishful self-portrait of how ‘the West’ would like to be seen. This raises 
questions about the potential for success of ideals that have yet to be fully realised by 
its proponents when implemented in conflict environments. While supportive of a 
benign ‘Empire Lite’, Ignatieff warns that there is no reason at all why this new type of 
imperialism would not suffer the same failure and discredit as its predecessors have 
done.77  
The World Bank and other major actors in the development ‘industry’ lend their 
support to a particular capitalist-friendly and neo-liberal vision determined by the 
programmes of major donors. There are a host of specific priorities within these 
frameworks: economic growth, poverty reduction, reform of trade regimes, reduction 
of international debt, decentralisation, democratisation, social development, 
environmental issues, and with the later additions of good governance, privatisation, 
and economic transition.78 Modern development theory has been normative and 
instrumental from the beginning. Theorists also allowed themselves to have subjective 
views on what development ought to be about, meaning that the definitions have 
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shifted wildly. In addition to this there is an assumption of controllability of the 
development process, normally by the state.79  
The perspective of development levels being primary conflict generators has come 
under much critique as the units of measurement are determined externally by actors 
situated in different ideational, material, and social settings. During the 1980’s there 
were external challenges to the development theories that had evolved during the 
1960’s and 70’s. The challenges were issued in part by academic mono-disciplinary 
trends and political neo-conservatism that reduced the ‘development problem’ in 
highly simplistic ways, and in part by ‘third world’ academics who questioned the 
relevance of ‘Western’ development research.80 Yet development theory misses out 
on several aspects of the societies in which it engages. For example, by defining ‘work’ 
as paid employment, contributions by women in societies where gender-divisions of 
labour have them performing mainly domestic tasks are excluded from the agenda.81 
The development discourse ‘achieved a hegemonic representation’ where it 
constructed and re-produced ‘the poor and underdeveloped’ as pre-constituted 
subjects, erasing their complexity and diversity.82  
The concept of development itself views everyday social life as a technical problem 
to be handled by professionals seeking to make societies fit pre-defined models of 
modernity rather than development being processes rooted in the local history and 
traditions.83 Counter-models exist such as Bjorn Hettne’s concept of ‘Another 
Development’ that envisions development as oriented towards both material and non-
material needs; endogenous with deep roots in society; relying on its own natural and 
cultural environment; ecologically sound; and containing self-management and the 
participation of all.84 This is however not a model that is present in implementation. 
Another alternative perspective that has a focus on welfare structures is also being 
advanced as a reaction to the market-based liberal democratic agenda that is 
promoted by most current development projects. This alternative focuses on the 
construction of welfare as a way to establish social security and a facilitating 
environment for peacebuilding. Hettne argues that the creation and use of a welfare 
fund makes a legitimate, consolidated and integrated nation state possible. He defines 
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three common basic elements for any nation building project: 1) exclusive 
military/political control over territory; 2) the defence of this territory; 3) the creation 
of welfare and political legitimacy. This obviously also makes a welfare-oriented 
development strategy inseparable from a state-building strategy,85 and requires a 
state-centric orientation. Oliver Richmond makes a very similar point in regards to 
welfare and peace-making by arguing that adjusting the current neo-liberal 
development strategies to focus more on creating a welfare society rather than a 
liberal market may produce a stable liberal polity.86 
 
Human Security and Rights-based Approaches 
 ‘Third generation peacebuilding’ is aimed at large scale and multi-dimensional 
peace creation developing out of conflict management. It argues for the containment 
of the conflict by stabilising the structures of a state and conflict resolution, a focus on 
removing violence and injustice mainly for individuals.87 These are more complex 
operations that imply integrated multi-dimensional and multi-level attempts to rebuild 
failed states in terms of social, practical and normative aspects88 but give the social 
and economic relations of human beings equality with or primacy over those of the 
state.89 It also represents a shift in security focus from the state to the individual while 
also broadening it beyond military issues90 and defining security as the absence of both 
direct and structural violence.91 In the post-Cold War environment order is largely 
defined in international discourse through human security and democratisation92 
although the post-9/11 securitisation offers a strong challenge. ‘Human security’ is 
linked in with perspectives on human needs93 and gained attention as a concept in 
1994 through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).94 It is supposed to 
constitute an approach to development practises that makes achievement of human 
rights central or even ‘the scaffolding of development policy,’95 but its contents vary 
and it is alternatively defined as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from fear, wants 
and indignity.’96 While some would say that the human security perspective focuses on 
the socio-political conditions under which people live,97 the focus still seems to be less 
on understanding these conditions and more on how they do not conform to the pre-
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defined format. It thus hints at social engineering for the purpose of creating a society 
that meets the normative values discursively defined by the international debate of 
needs and development98 rather than locally produced and framed understandings. 
The ‘Rights-Based Approach’ (RBA) is the concerted effort of trying to promote human 
rights through development delivery99 often supplemented by additional ‘universal’ 
norms and values. The marginalised, kinship, community, and localised agency, are 
recognised rhetorically at best.100 For example the local image of modern womanhood 
in many parts of the world is often nothing like the language of liberation in ‘the 
West’101 and thus conflicts with the norm set by those financing and defining the 
broader development agenda. Locally generated changes in gender relations and the 
sites of resistance created by local women are thus often overlooked or disregarded in 
favour of quantifiable project goals.  
A number of mechanisms are used for norm transmission within interventions, 
including proxy-governance by deep control of state structures; conditionality on aid, 
loans, and projects; ‘expert advice’ and embedded experts; as well as the shaping of 
agreements to reflect the dictated norms.102 The latter can be easily observed through 
a comparison of the Afghan and Kosovo constitutions, and the Somali ‘transitional 
charter’, all of which include gender quotas and free market provisions. A key issue is 
thus who defines the core values of the individuals that are being secured103 and how 
benchmarks are set. The notions of human security and rights-based approaches are 
still very strong within the international aid and development system. This is obvious in 
the country strategies put out for Somalia from the UN and the World Bank, and it is 
obvious in most of the discourse utilised in other interventions as well. The 
Afghanistan strategy of the UN is a showcase of how many times in a single set of 
documents that the words ‘gender’ and ‘human rights’ can be used. It recognises the 
difficulties involved in spreading the ’Millennium Development Goals’ but provides 
little actual guidance on exactly how the terminology of ‘universal’ rights and freedoms 
is defined in the Afghan context or how it supposed to be achieved in the multiple 
Afghan social realities.104 
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State Obsession  
The notions of the ‘state’ as an objectively universal format and what substance it 
should contain leads to strategies that are disconnected from a very specific local 
reality of crucial social structures.105 As Ignatieff has noted: ‘[w]hen traumatized 
peoples fail to play out our script of reconciliation, we tend to blame them, rather than 
our own wishful thinking.’106 The ‘script’ instead should be negotiated and written in 
the local context rather than generated externally and applied, a social contract 
developed by the parties to the contract rather than an outside third party 
implementing a process to renegotiate the terms of interaction on which legitimate 
governance can be based.107 After all, if legitimacy is the popular belief and acceptance 
of the political system and the authority’s right to rule108 and issue commands, then it 
is also inherently a highly internal process. Yet international peacebuilding largely has 
only Weber’s ‘rational-legal’ entity of impersonal bureaucracy109 in mind when seeking 
to shape a socio-political context. The Weberian state is an Ideal110 that raises critiques 
about ethno-centrism as it hardly exists outside of the Organisation of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD),111 but also raises questions about actual 
achievability. The pre-dominance of the state in the international system and how it is 
understood discourages the exploration of alternatives even though the usefulness of 
the state in some settings, especially as a vehicle of peace, is debatable.112 Few states 
have the absolute control envisioned in Weber’s ideal and more importantly, societies 
do not necessarily break down when the state does not function well enough to satisfy 
these expectations. With the decline of the central state, society has a tendency to 
continue functioning on many levels.  
The state can instead be seen as an entity with two types of boundaries: the 
territorial and the social.113 While international interventionists affect territorial 
boundaries as they define the state against other states, the social boundaries are 
primarily the domain of social interest groups and require their cooperation in order to 
change. A state that is disconnected from its society does have boundaries against the 
social, but the social can also shut the state out behind boundaries of its own. What 
are needed in the aftermath of civil war are then not so much quick elections as 
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political stability and effective administration114 through socially legitimate authority 
structures. In Somaliland the pattern of ‘political goods’ and social services being 
supplied by communities, international aid organisations, Islamic charities, the 
Diaspora, and businessmen115 continues as a result of the weak state. By necessity and 
adaptation delivery it is a highly deregulated and decentralised system that could 
never be matched by the state and its lack of resources. While not unproblematic, 
Somaliland society maintains a peace, gaining stability from social interest formations 
rather than the state.  
There are alternatives to a central state that can be worth exploring for stability in 
the context of a ‘failed state’ and while ‘warlords’ and local power holders can be seen 
as non-state actors with localised empirical sovereignty116 they are not the only 
possible alternatives. The critical factor is internal legitimacy, and it is therefore of 
outmost importance that there is a local support for whatever the suggested format, 
as well as a plan of sustainability.  
Donors, foreign states, or international organisations telling participants what they 
should want or coercing them does not constitute a local negotiation. Nor will the 
enforced format remain unchanged in the interaction with the local realities. Using 
‘armies of trainers’ to ‘educate’ a population in what to think and do117 does not erase 
the existing social contexts and meanings. It only frames ‘localised’ to mean 
‘conforming the local’118 rather than conforming to the local.  
As shown by the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Somalia, this is a regional 
problem and not only for states. Dispersed and displaced groups with affiliations 
across the borders or social organisations in competition with the state for social 
control are also affected indifferent ways by the state obsession. Social and territorial 
boundaries do not necessarily align and the actual effect of state lines as boundaries 
encompassing a people connected by shared meaning may vary considerably.119 This is 
for example is clear in the case of the Pashtun peoples along the Afghan-Pakistan 
border. The transformation of Somaliland is also a showcase for the perception of 
negative and positive influences from Diaspora groups who served to both mitigate 
and exacerbate conflict during the 1990’s. Being externally situated but having vested 
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interests allows such groups to be more ‘purist’ and absolute in their positions120 as 
they are removed from the immediate social pressure and suffering. It is therefore 
potentially somewhat counter-productive when Diaspora members are brought in as 
‘technical experts’ to validate an external agenda over the views expressed by the 
locally situated population.  
The delivery of ‘political goods’ seems largely geared towards two sets of goals: 1) 
to provide ‘legitimacy’ and generate support for a state-system by giving people what 
it is they ‘need’ and ‘want’ as defined by the notion that interests are universal and 
that any deviation from internationally defined priorities is the agenda of ‘spoilers’; 
and 2) to serve as a vehicle for norm diffusion thus also telling people what it is they 
‘need’ and ‘want’, as a way to convey norms of ‘acceptable’ and ‘civilised’ behaviour 
into ‘less developed’ social settings.121 This constitutes a ‘Pax Liberalis’ of sorts which, 
like its Roman predecessor, sees itself as spreading ‘civilising norms’ to the ‘barbaric 
fringes’ based on a notion of superiority. 
The two strands of format and substance are also obvious in inter-state relations. 
There is a selective policy of recognising whoever is in control of the capital as the 
legitimate ruler rather than those in charge of some, most, or all of the territory 
around it. Anything else would be considered yielding to secessionist demands and the 
strict structure of the format is generally respected. An exception to this occurs when 
powerful external agents establish or support an alternative social force in order to 
eventually install it through force or manipulation of election processes or other 
mechanisms of power such as resource access.  
The strand of substance thus also has to be acknowledged as a subjective and 
selective factor. It is applied to coincide with the interests of the intervening power. 
Thus a ‘valuable ally’ today, can easily be transformed into a ‘despicable dictator’ 
tomorrow depending on the discourse actualised. International interests determine 
whether a security- or humanitarian discourse is employed and who is considered the 
‘legitimate’ ruler in the eyes of the international community. In the end however, fickle 
as the substance support may be, the format does not change.  
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The policies relating to state sovereignty are also maintained out of fear of 
destabilising countries where secessionist demands are raised and by extension the 
entire international state system. For example countries such as Spain and the UK have 
separatist movements in their territory which could be encouraged by setting 
precedents elsewhere.  
At the point of intervention however, the target country has already been 
determined to be lacking in some respect, the appropriate discourse chosen, and 
either ‘regime change’ or support of an existing regime decided upon. This also applies 
in peacebuilding operations where institution building, ‘capacity building’, and a 
strengthening of the internationally preferred format of the state have become 
central. The international system of institutions and organisations is thus not only 
assuming and pursuing the format of the state as the means to govern and control 
territory but increasingly also as the vehicle to build peace.122 
 
The failing view of ‘the local’ 
While it perhaps is not always the case, there appears to be a reliance on limited 
and fairly narrowly defined groups that conform to certain values and aspects of an 
interventionist project. The motives and sincerity of these ‘good performers’ rarely 
seem to be seriously questioned with reference to the ‘universal’ nature they 
supposedly represent. As dependence on these groups grows, the issues expand in two 
different directions: 1) there is a propensity for the ‘externals’ to extrapolate the 
response by an exclusive group with which they engage, for example locally employed 
staff or local elites,  to represent the views of ‘society.’ A common version of this is 
that the capital of a country, and its educated urbanised elites, is seen to represent the 
entire country even in the face of obvious discrepancies.  
This problem is exacerbated in environments where the situational logic revolves 
around survival and where the ‘external’ lacks communicative skills such as speaking 
the local language(s) or having even basic contextual social understanding. External 
agents and actors increasingly become reliant on a small group of people who have 
those skills without knowing what interests these people represent or how they relate 
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to the local dynamics; 2) the local interest groups that have gained the trust or 
cooperation of the external agents are increasingly able to manipulate and control 
them and the project in order to fulfil their own agendas. This has been the case in 
both Somalia and Afghanistan with local groups adopting the language of counter 
terrorism, universal human rights, and similar political and ideological concepts 
embedded in many of the international projects. The assertion is of course not that 
this is always the case but that it does happen and that it is facilitated by an over-belief 
in the ‘universalism’ of one’s own views. 
The peacebuilding process can be divided into two parts, namely preventing a 
relapse into war and creating a self-sustaining peace,123 but there are issues with the 
scope of both when applied. For example, the cost of consolidating the authority of 
the state, the ‘vehicle of peace,’ over territory is one not easily met. This is especially 
true especially in countries with little governmental resources, vast expanses of land, 
low population density, and geographical features that create isolation between 
power-centres and the hinterland. Any aspirations to promote peace through a new 
set of institutions need to be based on whether there is access to sufficient means to 
perform the defined duties and tasks.124 Failure to do so only creates a new set of 
problems. 
Peacebuilding and development strategies often seem to share the view of the local 
population as largely a passive mass of victims without agency,125 a situation 
exacerbated by such approaches as ‘human security’ as it is understood and employed 
today by many development actors. The population is to be brought under the 
influence of a specific social force such as the state in rejection of the ‘non-modern.’ In 
an environment where political and social concerns are formed and pursued on a 
highly local basis, the assumption of higher order mobilisation needs relevant qualifiers 
and specific conditions.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter set out to explore the assumptions and positions underlining 
international peacebuilding strategies and the literature supporting it. In the course of 
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this examination it was found that the state was central to the perspectives in 
interventionist strategies.126 These strategies focus on both format and substance, 
thus making conformity to externally generated theories a priority.  
Perceptions of conflict and peace are largely tied in with the notion of the state, and 
there are notions of ‘universal’ rights and needs127 to be delivered by the state 
underpinning much of the arguments and research literature relating to peace and 
conflict. Rights-based approaches, needs assessments, population-centric strategies, 
human security and other components are generally employed as vehicles of value 
transmission rather than originating from local social conditions. It is an external 
normative perspective of what is needed or wanted rather than a perspective being 
formed on the priorities of the local interest groups and socio-political dynamics. The 
Council for Foreign Relations stated in 1942 that ‘Americans are inclined to believe that 
the period at the end of the war will provide a tabula rasa on which can be written the 
terms of a democratic new order.’128 It seems that the notion of tabula rasa is still in 
effect today in international peacebuilding129 though in no way is it confined to 
Americans. In the case that an existing social context is acknowledged there is an 
expectation of being able to change or overwrite what is there, to transform it into 
something ‘better’ and more ‘developed.’ This largely translates as ‘more like us.’ This 
has become part of an attitude of big and small ‘Western’ actors engaged in different 
types of projects around the world.130 As Mosse has observed first hand, even when 
the local is acknowledged the system works to identify willing sources of legitimisation 
that changes the local discourse to fit the model design rather than the other way 
around.131 The interventionist perspective is also often ‘taught’ to local agents and 
actors, only to then be allowed to retroactively ‘confirm’ that it was correct from the 
start.132 This is most easily achieved by enlisting local elites that have adopted the 
preferred values or at least the discourse. The ‘local’ is clearly seen as a problem to be 
overcome by changing its composition and script. 
The human needs debate initially offers a window of opportunity to escape the 
focus on the state as a pre-requisite for peace, but the politicised co-opting of its 
meaning into the liberal peace discourse has confused needs with values to such an 
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extent that the only way to fulfil human needs as they are understood in the language 
of conflict resolution is through a liberal democratic state. The focus on the individual 
inherent in the Universalist position of liberal interventionism ignores the fact that 
while needs are subjectively defined they are also socially scripted and shaped by the 
social context. To acknowledge this social script is not to deny the importance of needs 
in social practises but it does reject any universal understanding and definition of 
them.133 It would perhaps be more useful to see needs as produced in social practises 
and focus attention on the contexts in which they are produced rather than trying to 
produce a pre-determined set. 
Socio-political dynamics in the local are far from always playing out at a state level 
and the assumption that they are or can be made to be is presumptuous at best. While 
often well intended, the mere fact that the current strategies fail to adequately 
identify at what level relevant politics are taking place makes them ill fitted for any sort 
of sustainable results. The analysis underlying strategy often simply does not match 
the engagement level. Interest formation and legitimacy are too complicated to be 
framed in a generic terminology deriving from a normative wishful thinking of 
‘universal’ values. Effective strategy requires an understanding of the particular 
meanings and priorities of a particular local reality at a relevant level of engagement. 
The strategies and mainstream literature informing it today rests on theoretical 
underpinnings that make large assumptions about the motivations, interests and 
priorities of people in general, resulting in sweeping, highly diffuse, and subjectively 
defined conceptualisations with little usefulness. Assumptions of universal values and 
applicability produce certain logics of action for the international organisations and 
actors engaging in other societies. Drawing on these assumptions, the overarching 
strategies may be logical but they are based on erroneous premises. When confronted 
with reality they find themselves largely disconnected from the local conditions 
produced in a physical, social and historical context which, through subjective-
collective actualisation by social agents and actors, has produced particular institutions 
and situational logics.  
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The discussed relationships illustrate an international system where donor pressure 
and ideological assumptions condition organisational behaviour into certain types of 
programming that is largely self-referential, even while referring to local capacities. 
Within this system there are projects and organisations that are working hard to align 
with local realities and to achieve sustainable results. But these organisations are 
exceptions to the rule and even then often subject to donor pressures.  
The state-centrism prevalent in international strategies and perspectives today 
produces a perceived mono-directionality of influence when in reality it is more likely 
that a social force such as a state or an insurgency becomes subverted or co-opted as a 
means to affect local conflicts and power relationships. An acknowledgement of this 
would however mean that the population was capable of pursuing a non-state agenda, 
a direct violation of the ‘universally’ accepted format and substance of the state. It 
simply does not conform to the pre-defined assumptions of universality or of passive 
victims, and thus has to be explained away as a minority of ‘spoilers.’ The subsequent 
co-optation or subversion is more than likely to result in a dysfunctional state since its 
resources and functions are devoted to an array of unaligned sub-state agendas. 
‘Spoilers’ can be re-defined simply as opposing or not conforming to the state-wide 
ambitions of an interventionist or collaborating partner. They are violating the 
subjective vision imposed on them with their own subjective priorities. Regardless of 
the agenda, this clash between different interests will produce unintended outcomes. 
The major weakness of strategies and supporting literature are the large 
assumptions of social drives and subjectivities. This has implications for how social 
mobilisation occurs, social interests are formed, and how institutions and roles are 
legitimised. In terms of the concept of ‘the Vote’ it can easily be argued that it is not 
the vote that legitimises the institution, but that the vote generally is an already 
legitimised way of filling already legitimised roles in already legitimised institutions. If 
you create socially new institutions, roles, and means of legitimisation, there is a clash 
with the socially actuated systems in place. This type of obvious social engineering 
necessitates the existing assumption of a ‘universality’ of the prescribed format that 
will automatically ‘fall into place’ once enforced.  
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In reality, the meeting of two systems is likely to produce unintended outcomes 
through a number of interactions. While intended to simplify and make engagement 
easier, these assumptions become constraints rather than enablers as they preclude 
any agency and capacity to mobilise in pursuit of alternative formats among the target 
population. The debate produces constraints for itself as it is held within the normal 
frames of reference in terms of relativism or liberal peace where the latter has 
seemingly become self-referential dogma. While it does not hinder the raising of 
questions, and questions there are, the answers are restricted in that they 'must' 
reflect a certain set of assumptions. It is thus like an ideological house of mirrors where 
there is the possibility of an infinite number of reflections. While there sometimes are 
different levels of distortion they in the end reflect the same things and will inevitably 
become reflections of reflections: the recycling of old images. 
By remaining within the house of mirrors the debate obstructs the view of the 
relationships that are relevant. Even the critics are constrained by the fact that they 
are reflecting off and deconstructing the images found in the mirrors, but provide few 
constructive alternatives for how to view the relationship between social mobilisation 
and the effects of interventionist projects. It is crucial to grasp what is already present 
as legitimate and established models of social interaction, but also at what levels 
interests are pursued and how it relates to an interventionist project. This requires a 
framework that provides an alternative platform from which to observe how social 
dynamics are enacted to produce outcomes without pre-supposing formats or 
contents through ‘universal’ models. In the end, and as Ignatieff has warned, 
‘whatever people want to do, they do not want to be forced by us.’134
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Chapter Two: Towards a framework for viewing socio-political dynamics 
In any social analysis it is necessary to include material, ideational, and institutional 
aspects of social change.1 The challenge is to provide a simplified but sufficiently 
comprehensive model of human interaction to facilitate the explanation of observable 
events and allow us to ‘meaningfully unpack the complexities of real life.’2 The 
framework developed here suggests that a viable middle-road between theory and 
practice aiming to understand socio-political dynamics and their relationship to 
interventions requires two components in order to be successful: Firstly the 
conceptualisation of social interaction in an applicable, and for analytical purposes, 
segmented system that allows for an investigation of the subject of intervention, the 
‘Other.’ This investigation should span through time and across an array of factors with 
a partial analytical separation in order to provide a ‘map’ of a society. The terminology 
of ‘mapping’ employed is to be understood here in the meaning of charting unknown 
areas to avoid hidden dangers as opposed to a colonial understanding of mapping to 
subjugate. It is about understanding the ‘strategic terrain,’ not dominating it. The 
purpose of the framework is to engage with the ‘Other’, rather than to change it 
dramatically or frame it in an external ideological language. A useful perspective is 
Migdal’s argument on seeing the social terrain as a mental map with a set of 
boundaries and virtual checkpoints, responsive to the pressures of specific situations.3 
Secondly, while a framework of social interaction can provide a mechanical 
understanding of the relative influence and power of structure and agency in the 
formation of interest groups, it says nothing about how relevant knowledge is 
acquired, where and how values form, nor provide context-specific understanding of 
agents, structures or actuated institutions. These are subjectivities that require 
localised knowledge and understanding. 
This chapter is comprised of two parts and establishes the theoretical perspective 
from which the two cases of Somalia/Somaliland and Afghanistan will be examined. 
The first part discusses a series of premises derived from the theories used in order to 
establish the theoretical foundations for this chapter. The second part is the 
development of the framework that will be applied in relation to interaction and 
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intervention in a social context. The underlying notion is that contemporary strands of 
strategy and literature tend to take one of four directions: overly ideological: based on 
wishful thinking of the normative as objective facts; unconstructively critical: seeking 
only to tear down but presenting no constructive alternative; generalising, over-
simplifying, and technical: reducing complex social interaction to easily graspable 
models that fits nicely with strategy thinking but lacks in reality; or simply too ‘fluffy’: 
rejecting analytical separations and prioritising of factors, thus becoming impractical 
and inapplicable. The framework established here serves to strike a balance between 
applicability on one hand, and acknowledgement of the complexities of social 
interaction and the unpredictability of outcomes on the other. To do so it focuses on 
the formation of interests, the mobilisation of interest groups, and the production of 
outcomes in the complexities of social interaction. 
 
Part I 
There are many debates in studies of peace and conflict that are specifically related 
to different ideational or material goods4 and many of them have at the very least 
some merit. Social contexts can be seen as consisting of shared definitions whose 
sources can be found in structures, ‘cultural patterns’ and institutions5 but this 
understanding in itself is not enough. Without proper contextualising, any singled out 
and generalised factor of social interaction produces simplistic and static renditions of 
an entire social conflict spectrum. Its contribution to wider understanding is 
diminished by an analytical isolation and atomistic perspective of causality. Employed 
instead in a framework that examines and explains their influence in relation to other 
factors and agents they can be properly contextualised and their relative importance in 
a specific situation explored.  
By selecting a factor without examining its actual and locally determined social 
relevance, there is a risk of imbuing it with a false value and an importance that does 
not correspond to the contextual reality. For instance, when examining gender 
relations in patriarchal societies there appears to be a notion that women are not part 
of the society in which they live and that they mobilise only in a capacity of being 
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women. This image of the ‘woman’ seemingly disconnects her from any social interest 
group such as the family, and makes her devoid of shared social expectations. Their 
roles are often constructed in an external ideological image that reduces the woman to 
a passive victim. This ignores viable options for the promotion of ‘female 
emancipation’,6 but also dismisses the sites of resistance and methods of coping 
developed by women in response to the context. Importantly in conflict contexts, it 
also underestimates the capacity of women to act in favour of war and division7 based 
on the notion of women as more peaceful than men. This heritage from Essentialist 
Feminism8 obscures reality and leads to easily subverted strategies of engagement.  
The position taken here is that interests and strategies are shaped in the interaction 
between subjective perceptions, social conditions and pressures. Interests are pursued 
as part of one or several mobilised socially defined groups and normally within socially 
defined boundaries. It is therefore crucial to understand how interests and social 
boundaries are formed and to what degree they are shared. 
This framework is an attempt to make sense of and contextualise social influences 
internally as well as in relation to intervention. By employing the framework it is 
possible to understand how institutions, interests, agents and actors form and relate in 
the contextual environment. It allows for an examination of what available ‘spaces and 
options’ are produced in the interaction between institutions and social agents and 
thus what responses are incentivised within a specific context. Two main theoretical 
influences are used as points of departure to explain how the social environment and 
interest groups are formed and interact. Margret Archer’s Morphogenetic theory 
provides a base for the understanding of interest group formation, situational logics, 
and how existing conditions and institutions affect social agents and actors. Joel S. 
Migdal’s theories on the competition between social forces provide a way to relate 
these interest groups to each other and their interaction. Neither theory is held to 
sufficiently explain the mechanisms involved and will therefore be developed further 
in order to provide the needed functions. Combining and exploring these theories to 
understand interest formation and social interaction, a series of underlying premises 
emerge. 
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Social Interest Formation and Interaction 
We are all born into on-going social contexts ‘constrained to speak its language, 
take up our place in prior distribution of resources, be sanctioned by its laws, and 
confront its organisations.’ 9 Emergent properties are the unintended outcomes of 
ideas, actions, and interactions, that is to say that they have in part been socially 
constructed by previous generations and exist as analytically separate entities that can 
potentially be actuated by current social agents and individual actors. The 
circumstances that each new generation has to confront are not of their own making. 
They define the parameters of what can be made of it and how social agents can 
reconstitute themselves and society in the process.  
This is at odds with the typical liberal view that the individual is prior to society, 
society is created by individuals, and society exists to serve individual purposes.10 
Constraints and enablers originate in emerging properties of society through shared 
images and expectations produced prior to current agents. The social space as it exists 
in any given society is an unintended consequence as it is dependent on human 
intentionality but never conforms fully to the original intentions. The different social 
agents and factors interact to produce an outcome that exerts its influence on the next 
sequence of interaction. This social dynamic constitutes a negotiation and re-
negotiation that ultimately produces change or preserves the system.  
 
The structural and ideational environment is shaped prior to, but also mediated by, 
current social agents. Schmitt and Schröder have argued that groups follow ‘cultural 
models’ of appropriate action and that they in the context of war follow codes of 
legitimisation of which historicity is the most important one.11 The assumption of 
structure preceding agency for analytical purposes is a necessary assertion in order to 
understand the process of change and transformation over time. It should however in 
no way be taken to indicate determinism or that structures are constant and 
unchangeable, or indeed produced by something other than people. However, while 
social integration always takes place in the here and now, system integration is 
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antecedent to it.12 Thus ‘the local’ includes social conditions, structures and practises 
that have been developed by previous generations and generated established 
institutions that can be actuated in social interaction.  
‘The social’ in its entirety can be seen as two 
spheres that produce emergent properties through the 
internal relationships of their parts. In Archer’s 
terminology they are ‘social structures’ and ‘cultural 
systems’ that exert parallel influence on, but are also 
ontologically independent of, the people present here 
and now.13 Thus it is for example that the symbols, rituals, and meanings of a religion 
are often produced in the past and may subsequently exist in their own right without 
the active knowledge or observance of current actors, but with the potential of being 
actuated.  
‘Social structures’ concerns aspects such as societal distribution of resources, 
governance, or social divisions, while ‘cultural systems’ concerns ideational goods such 
as beliefs, theories, and ideology. This clear division between structural and ideational 
conditions is useful. A similar mode of thought is employed for example by Schmidt 
and Schröder in relation to violence as a means to attain materially or ‘culturally’ 
defined goals.14 The perspective also aligns with that of social and ‘cultural’ capital 
complementing material conditions,15 and that both material and cognitive factors 
should be included16 in analysis. Henceforth, the use of the term structural implies the 
structural sphere including resource conditions. The ‘cultural sphere’ however will be 
referred to as the ideational as it is employed to mean ideas, political ideologies, 
religions, and other similar influences. To use the term ‘culture’ draws it unnecessarily 
into the veritable quagmire of misdirection generated in the debate on definitions and 
importance of ‘culture’ as a concept.17  
Structural and ideational conditions influence the social arena and the responses 
made available to agents and actors. A particular social environment produces specific 
dynamics and is therefore crucial for any useful analysis. Within social frameworks, 
institutionalised norms and values emerge over time through actuation and 
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internalisation, determining for example what warrants conflict and what solutions are 
acceptable.18 The use of the ideational here and the feed-back between agential 
interaction and institutional development, allows for the discursive social construction 
of a set of beliefs and their institutionalisation through actuation and systemic 
evolution. History matters as it provides us with clues about what constraining or 
enabling conditions have been and may still have bearing on social interaction. 
  
Structural and ideational institutions are generated in the interaction between the 
two spheres and the actualisation of different parts by people. The structural and 
ideational resource distribution determines the potential bargaining power, or ‘life 
chances’ of social agents. It is assumed 
and expected that there is 
interpenetration between the structural 
and ideational spheres but in order to 
distinguish and analyse differently 
formed conditions it becomes necessary 
to make a separation.19 In central conflationist theories the constituent parts cannot 
be examined separately because ‘culture’ becomes an all-embracing phenomenon in 
which all facets of signification are intertwined with every feature of social practise.20  
The interaction between the structural and ideational spheres produces social 
institutions within the constraints placed by the existing conditions. To become 
relevant these institutions have to be actuated by social agents able to mobilise for 
their interests. The purpose of examining the structural and ideational institutions is to 
look at what conditions exist for agents before examining what they can do within the 
parameters21 to reconstitute themselves and the environment through interaction. It is 
important to stress that there is not a uniform distribution of ideational goods in a 
society. Signals and meanings are independently processed and interpreted in direct 
relation to distributive patterns.22 This is explored in the case chapters in terms of 
actuated institutions and roles. 
 
Emergent Properties 
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institutions 
Ideational 
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Roles and interest groups are formed in response to context-specific conditions 
generated in the structural and ideational institutional interaction and they have their 
own vested interests. The social environment is a derivative of experiences, learned or 
passed on by contemporaries and ancestors. Any individual can at once reflect 
multiple identities and potential interest groups such as professional association, 
religious belonging, or kinship and 
family.23 Which identity is actuated in a 
particular instance and thus the basis of 
interest formation24 is dependent on 
context and situational logic. It is in the 
interaction between these formal and 
informal guideposts and their respective 
proponents that societies are given their structure and individual character25 whether 
as a diverse aggregate of multiple groups or as a small identity group.  
There can however be no clear isolation to individual needs as groups have needs as 
well,26 and social interests are pursued as part of a mobilised interest group. It is 
necessary to contextualise social agents and actors in order to understand the 
available responses and possibilities presented to them. If we omit reference to 
structural and ideational conditions, we imbue an actor or agent with the ability to 
‘will’ an outcome regardless of its circumstances.27  
There are two categories of active interest groups that are separated analytically 
from the rest of the population. The first are the organised groups, corporate agents, 
who are able to formulate and mobilise to attain specific goals relating to their 
interests (for example political parties, religious groups, criminal gangs). This largely 
corresponds to the ethnographic term ‘corporate descent group’28 expressed for 
example in kinship terms.29  
Using Migdal’s understanding of social interaction, ‘corporate agents’ as used here 
correspond to his ‘social organisations.’ The ‘state in society’-approach focuses on the 
interaction between social groupings and in relation to those they are trying to control 
or influence.30 These are formal and informal organisations that are the units through 
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which people have structured and regularised interactions with others. They have a 
variety of sanctions and rewards to induce conformity to the rules and norms of the 
collectivity. The individual pursues social change through collectivities and relate to 
other individuals against a backdrop of social agent membership.  
Primary agents have non-articulated interests but have not been actively mobilised 
in their pursuit. They can however potentially be recruited or mobilised as corporate 
agents. An example of this was the initial mobilisation of local support by the Taliban in 
Afghanistan (corporate agent) was facilitated by the elimination of local militia 
commanders as a service to the communities,31 mobilising primary agents by satisfying 
their interests.  
The aggregate effect of primary agents can also constrain and influence corporate 
agents and actors, such as to conform to popular opinion and expectations or follow 
social expectations and patterns in their situational logic.  
Social actors in turn emerge through a process in which social agents condition, but 
not determine, who will occupy certain roles. Any attempt at conceptualising the actor 
needs to be completed by reference to their properties as social agents in order to 
reach an adequate conception of their social identity. For example, while a person in a 
governmental position may seem to be appropriating funds for personal enrichment, 
as a member of a solidarity-group these actions may be in the context of a social 
corporate agent. It may thus be a means to access resources and acquire patrimonial 
means to secure political legitimacy32 and continued access and representation for the 
group, rather than simple theft for personal gain.  
Social agents and actors respond to constraints and opportunities produced by 
multiple sets of rules33 in turn generated by a number of identity solidarities. It is not a 
hydraulic pressure being exerted but a series of rewards and sanctions depending on 
the response,34 that incentivises certain actions or not. Migdal describes the process in 
terms of survival strategies and argues that these strategies are severely constrained 
by available resources (here: material conditions), ideas (here: ideational gods), and 
organisational means (here: corporate agent capacity). Social control rests on the 
ability to deliver key components for them.35 The manipulation of ideational resources 
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such as identity for alternative reasons is obvious in some conflicts. Identity- or other 
types of ‘in-groups’ represent vested interest groups aggregated for the purpose of 
accessing resources of a material or ideational type. There is a degree of agential 
interpretative freedom but an agent opposing rewarding options risks harming its 
vested interests. Conversely, supporting a source of experiences that are frustrating a 
‘project’ is to invite further impediment.  
Agents and actors are not used inter-changeably and are not reducible to each 
other. Nor are they the same as ‘human beings’ employed as a general description of a 
social category that has no particular interests to be innovative about at a particular 
time. An actor has only got those interests that come with the role while social agents 
are collectivities sharing interests that are external to roles but can be realised through 
them. An individual can be part of multiple social agents at the same time36 which is 
linked to identity and at risk of being utilized as ideological resources, for example in 
exclusivist politics.37 The alliances that develop have varying access to structural 
resources (especially wealth and power) and ideational resources (for example social 
legitimacy), and this affects the outcome of their strategic action. Put another way, not 
every agent or actor can affect society in major ways or mobilise enough resources and 
power to influence outcomes.  
For the purposes here, social forces are defined primarily as networks of interest 
groups. It is rare that an interest group becomes large enough to constitute a social 
force in its own right and more common that alliances form where different interest 
groups with a range of diverse interest align in the pursuit of an overarching and often 
loosely defined goal. 
 
Social corporate agents and actors are constrained or enabled by the situational 
logic generated in interaction with the actuated institutions of their structural and 
ideational environment. When subjectively actualised, institutions produce situational 
logics that constrain or enable responses. The institutional environment conditions 
viable options but the actor or agents are not forced to respond in a specific way; they 
must however make sense of the situation for themselves within the socially available 
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possibilities.38 The situational logic for an individual is in part shaped by expectations of 
social conformity among its peers and thus social conventions and penalties also serve 
to gradually shape interpretation and lived experiences.  
The individual is contextually not free to interpret at will but is subject to the 
socially generated expectations of both its own and other peer-groups. It is important 
to understand that this framework refers to social interests and while an individual can 
pursue for example economic gain individually, social interests and change are pursued 
either as part of a social agent collectivity, or as a socially defined actor. Societies 
contain a web of rule-
generating functions39 where 
several sets of rules and codes 
can be enacted at any one time 
by different, and sometimes the 
same, social agents. There is no 
single code but multiple formal 
and informal sets that guide 
behaviour and are promoted by 
different groups.40  
Any given society will have a number of different interest groups whose access to 
material and ideational resources create separate institutions of for example social 
rules or religion and thus their own identities. This can be class belonging, religious 
sectarianism, and other factors such as mechanisms for dealing with conflicts or having 
‘capacities for peace.’41 Some institutions are actuated on a society-wide basis while 
other concepts such as ethnicity, religious beliefs or geographical proximity are 
actuated only in a limited social context. The decision to actuate an institution is 
subjective and arguably not possible to force.  
The specific relationship of emergent properties to the particular project of a 
particular agent, in a particular subjectively understood position, and at a particular 
time, determines whether the conditional influence is a constraint or an enablement.42 
There are interests built into all social positions and while motivations like altruism are 
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fully possible, it carries a price in relation to the interests of the position.43 The Israeli 
reprisal attacks against Egypt in the 1950-60s are an example of a clash of completely 
different situational logics. While the Israeli logic stated that the harder the reprisal, 
the bigger the deterrence, the Egyptian situational logic was that the disproportionate 
attacks humiliated and shamed them into supporting further attacks against Israel in 
order to regain lost honour and erase the shame. The power projection and power 
reception between the respective elites became a feed-back loop for the production of 
violence.44 
The mediations of institutional influences feed back into institutions as well as roles 
and agential constitution. An example would be a person with an authority claim and 
local political recognition in a specific area45 where a de facto governing role is created 
by legitimacy being awarded locally for services rendered and an ability to project 
authority within the context of shared interests. This role is imbued with meaning by 
the actor filling it but is also dependent on its supporters and thus constraining the 
options available to the actor. It can transform into a centrally sanctioned role such as 
a governor if a structurally superior authority source accepts the claim as well, but this 
would in turn also change the vested interests of the role. In lieu of willing support 
coercive force can be a substitute which shapes the role and its possibilities and 
dependencies in yet another way. The socially produced meaning of the role is thus 
reconstituted through changing conditions facing the agents that give it meaning 
socially. Threats to the vested interests of a role provide incentives for negative 
situational logics and opposition. 
In the formal state it might also be the case that individual parts of the state 
apparatus respond more to their social context than to the rest of the state 
organisation,46 leading to local mediation or adaptation of central decisions by locally 
situated employees or representatives.47 Inhibiting pressures may also be generated in 
for example situations where the authority of the state is locally outweighed by the 
authority of non-state groups.  
The same is arguably true for organisations that rely on staff placed far from the 
centre and being pressured from one direction by the demands of the employer, and 
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from the other the demands of the local community. The situation in deprived areas of 
‘Western’ cities often generates situational logic that is miles apart from that of a 
middle-class suburb and the same is true for the role of the underpaid and 
outnumbered officials in areas controlled by drug gangs. Situational logics change 
dramatically, for example when a group threatens the children of a role-bearer. The 
subjective question becomes whether the role can be maintained and at what cost. 
Less obvious inhibitors can be produced by for example kinship ties or ethnic 
sympathies. Does the police officer report a crime committed by a family member? 
Does the politician hire his or her spouse despite no relevant competence? Does the 
warrior fight for the concept of the nation or for the interests of those he knows?  
People have multiple collective identities that are actualised depending on the 
circumstances;48 it may be helpful to conceptualise identity as divided between a 
personal self and a larger social self that is reflected in successively expanding identity 
circles or collectivities. Drawing on P.W. Preston, family, union, clan, religious group, 
ethnicity, and nationality are examples of different potential groups to which the 
individual can belong. These multiple identities are dependent on locale, networks, 
and memory.49  
Locale concerns the concentric circles of identity in which the individual situates 
him or herself and at what level the respondent puts the most importance. The notion 
of identity is reflected in the framework in terms of ‘modes of mobilisation’, non-static 
and changeable factors dependent on subjective actuation by individuals as part of 
collective social agents.  
Networks refer to the way in which the different identities interact, at what level, 
and at what time. A prime example of this is when members of the same family who 
are living in different communities or who practice different religions produce 
diverging identities in addition to their shared kinship. The question becomes which 
identity commands the most loyalty at a given time and to what extent it affects the 
alignment of the individual when multiple and sometimes contradictory demands are 
made on him or her.50 
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The Role of Memory as used here refers largely to relevant subjective and socially 
shared understandings of history. It focuses on the perception of identity in relation to 
the preceding structural and ideational features of the context that is ‘collective 
memory’, traditions, codes, and knowledge, thus referring to the emergent properties 
that produce social pressures and expectations. These different selves are subject to 
obligations and responsibilities as well as rights and privileges that are socially 
defined.51 Thus in some societies social constraints and enablers emphasise the 
individual and in other the collective. In the latter case submission to the group’s rules 
supports not only the collectivity but also the individual whose identity rests on the 
continued existence of the group.52 It is reasonable to assume that this may be 
exacerbated in environments where the very survival of the individual is dependent on 
one or multiple groups53 but should not be understood as a singular identity or a lack 
of diversity and interaction.54 In an individualistic society the social and physical 
repercussions of certain responses are less overt than in societies where a measure of 
survival concerns is always present, especially when tied in with a group membership. 
It may thus seemingly be the case that the available responses (diversity options) are 
fewer when in reality it is more about the constraints and severity of the disincentives 
produced in the social context. However this does not mean that a ‘conducive 
environment’ will automatically produce a response that conforms to a specific 
ideological value-set.  
An additional point to remember regarding the interaction of ideational and 
material interest groups is the possible development of dependencies. If an ideational 
group aligns itself with a structural power group in order to safeguard its activities it 
also potentially becomes associated with, and dependent on, that group. It is thus 
subject to the promotion of the interests of the power group for its own continued 
‘survival’ as an ideational agent.55 The power group can in turn seek legitimacy from 
the ideational corporate agent. This is arguably the case where the practise of 
structural subjugation of one group is justified with the help of, for example, religious 
claims. Similarly, an ideationally based corporate agent can seek legitimacy through 
material redistribution such as has been the case of Saudi-funded Islamist groups in 
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Pakistan providing for the poor.56 This has its own implications for state-centric 
interventions where the alignment with the interventionist agenda by a local social 
agent may for example give juridical legitimacy in the eyes of the international 
community, but where actual empirical legitimacy is lost by the association. A 
structural, material, and ideational dependency may thus develop which makes the 
continued survival of the interest group conditional on continued external support. 
All agents and actors in a specific context are subject to the locally produced logic 
including external forces, even as they change the conditions of the context. Any 
externally generated injection of directed and intentional influence or resources 
changes the dynamics and by extension the situational logics. Its interaction with the 
pre-existing conditions, the locally actuated institutions, and the subjective interest- 
and social formations is a political act, if not in intention, then at the very least in 
impact. The exact outcome of this interaction is largely unintended, unpredictable, and 
thus uncontrollable. 
 
The final outcome will always be unintended in varying degrees, never quite 
conforming to a singular intention as it is the result of social interaction. Focus should 
thus be on interaction and outcomes of interaction between structural and ideational 
institutions, agents/actors, and actuated reinterpretations/redefinitions. Structural and 
ideational change or stability relies on social agents and their interaction. The results 
of this interaction are passed on to subsequent generations as new conditioning 
influences. But it is also important to recognise that in the process of structural and 
ideational transformation, agents are also responsible for the simultaneous 
transformation of agency itself.57 Through their strategic interaction, corporate agents 
shape the environment for everyone. This occurs as an unintended consequence of 
corporate interaction in response to situational logics such as conflict or not, and 
compromise or co-optation. Primary agents inhabit this context but by responding 
they also reconstitute the environment that corporate agents are trying to control58 by 
releasing a stream of aggregate pressures. An example of this is the formation of social 
movements or protest in response to strategic pressure exercised by corporate agents. 
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Thus in response to the civil war in Somaliland many women, having been primary 
rather than corporate agents in the conflict for structural reasons, played an integral 
part in the peace protests between 1992 and 1995.59 The pressure on the social 
environment caused by corporate agents in conflict triggered an aggregate pressure 
from primary agents that changed the strategic environment for the corporate agents 
and shaped the alternatives available to them.  
 
Summary  
Social interaction is complex, highly contextual and unpredictable. Outcomes are 
seen here as uncontrollable and rarely conforming to the wishes of the instigators. This 
perspective is shared by for example normative institutionalism that considers the 
destabilisation of instituted norms and values a way to open the gate for competing 
formats that conform to no one’s specific intent.60 In the context of a society, ideas 
and structural conditions interact to form institutions. These provide situational logics 
for actors/agents who mediate, actualise and feed-back through action and 
interaction, thereby reconstituting their relationship as well as the institutions. This 
leads either to change or maintenance of the status quo but as emerging properties, 
not in accordance with any single design. In the context of international interventions 
there is an additional influx of resources, ideas, and structures, brought into this 
interaction. This alters the conditions of the societal process, in effect the collision of 
two systems. The outcome is not predictable or fully controllable by any party to it, but 
it is a reasonable assumption that the higher the level of confrontation and 
discrepancy the lower the chances of a positive situational logic. A direct challenge to 
the balances and vested interests shaped by emerging properties and social interaction 
is a challenge to whole systems of perceptions and beliefs. Such a challenge facilitates 
a number of possible routes of temporary mobilisation of diverse interests groups into 
wider social forces sharing only a rejection of the non-conforming external pressure.  
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The development of social 
conditions for interaction between 
interest groups can thus be seen as 
occuring in a model where   
structural and ideational emerging 
properties produce structural and 
ideational institutions that, when 
actuated, generate situational logics 
in interaction with agents and 
actors that mediate and initiate 
possible responses (see figure 6). 
The complex nature of social 
interaction requires a constant re-
visit and dynamic analytical process 
that acknowledges the constant 
feed-back cycle and shifts in social 
composition. Societies and social 
agents/actors are neither atomistic nor static and there are often inter-linkages 
through overlapping issues. Analysis cannot afford the luxury of treating the local in a 
static manner or settle for a macro-analysis perspective. There is a constant need to 
repeat the analysis at a local level and the greater the fragmentation or diversity is the 
greater the necessity of continuous local analysis in order to understand the situational 
logics in a specific context.  
There is a very wide range of factors with an influence over societal formation and 
change. In order to even begin to understand a society and the environment it 
generates for the people inhabiting it, and there is a need to carefully identify and 
acknowledge these influences without over-romanticising them.61 This becomes an 
even more acute need when approaching a complex environment of conflict from the 
outside. By looking at the history of a society important aspects can be mapped out 
temporally and their structural and ideational importance identified. This naturally also 
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includes the history of specific societal institutions and ideas such as religion, 
legitimised political structures, bureaucracy, ideology, and more, providing a way to 
see how these have been mediated, developed and legitimised through social 
interaction. Was it tumultuous and according to logics of resistance or elimination? Is 
change readily accepted or rejected? What type or specific agents have traditionally 
had the most influence on institutional, actor, and agential mediation? How have these 
factors been affected by conflict and crisis? How spread is the validity of different 
influences and what is the level of fragmentation?  
While there are no pneumatic and deciding pressures exerted which in turn means 
that any given choice may break any perceived pattern, it is argued here that by 
looking at the historic background it is possible to see where structural and ideational 
influences and institutions come from in the specific context. It is also possible to 
understand their influence over the formation of situational logics in a temporal sense 
as social norms and shared images take time to form and break down. With this said 
there is of course no guarantee that an influence has retained its historical influence 
and value in a social context but it at least provides insights on how the options of 
agents and actors are likely to form. Historical social mapping is however useful as a 
contextual backdrop for the analysis of the ‘now’ as it exposes trajectories and changes 
in social modes of interaction over time. It also concerns the distribution of resources 
in a more general way, that is to say the structural distribution of how much there is 
available in a given society.  
While Archer’s framework was found to be useful it also has two potential 
weaknesses relating to its applicability: 1) if applied at a too wide level it easily 
assumes a monolithic view of society with over-generalisations of shared interests and 
images resulting in the reproduction of erroneous assumptions of social interaction; 
and 2) the temporal perspective does not adequately address the issue of intervention 
or other sudden massive displacement of the social conditions for the production and 
performance of social institutions and interaction. It is thus judged here that social 
analysis based on the factors above provides a sufficient understanding of social 
context in terms of shared perceptions and diversity of interests and goals, but there is 
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also a need to further develop the framework in order to understand how externally 
generated intervention affects the conditions of a social context to produce 
unintended outcomes.  
 
Part II 
The problem of lacking contextual understanding was reflected upon by 
respondents in all categories during this research. For a state-centric approach to 
peacebuilding or other interventions, this has severe implications on whether it is 
viable or if the circumstances make it directly counter-productive, producing a zero-
sum game for a range of armed interest groups. The focus of this framework is thus on 
the engagement with the subjective ‘Other’ and in particular in terms of the 
interaction between the local context and outside intervention. A realistic engagement 
with local ideational and structural conditions is seen as a necessity.  
The strategies and debates surrounding interventionist projects such as 
contemporary international peacebuilding indicate a discrepancy between 
ideologically driven strategies defined and imposed from the outside on the one hand, 
and locally existing and legitimised value-bases and social structures on the other. 
While this has clearly been understood on some level62 it fails to impact sufficiently in 
strategy and practice. There is a discursive and practical understanding of social 
interaction that is predicated mainly on a Eurocentric state- and social order. This is 
perpetuated through international institutions, not as normative goals but as universal 
facts. Efforts in community-level peacebuilding can sometimes include a ‘training’ 
element where the ‘right’ value definitions are disseminated63 and where the subjects 
are conditioned into a specific type of social control structure. It generally seeks to 
incorporate communities into a state structure as it manifests itself in donor countries.  
An alternative approach with the same focus is to find already existing reformist 
elites discursively conforming to desirable values and to cultivate and intervene ‘on 
their behalf’64 as representatives of the entire population. It becomes a case of 
discursively advocating adaptation to local conditions but in strategy and intent trying 
to conform local conditions to an externally produced world view directly or by proxy. 
73 
 
This framework instead focuses on an analysis of on social interaction to provide an 
alternative point of view and point of departure. 
Migdal’s concept of social forces in competition is found here to be particularly 
relevant as a perspective of understanding the socio-political dynamics between social 
interest groups and forces, in particular in relation to the state. It is however argued 
that the model is not sufficient to explain the complexities of social interaction. The 
presence of multiple social orders and high levels of fragmentation requires an 
understanding of interest groups at a more localised level and how their situational 
logics, their constraints and enablers, are formed and actuated. Archer’s 
Morphogenetic framework provides a basis for this but needs further expansion in 
respect to the implications of intervention and what data is incorporated as well as 
how it is obtained. The view of social factors as subjectively formed and actuated 
represents the third major influence which is subjectivities of the ‘local.’ In this 
respect, the framework is heavily influenced by a sociological perspective and ‘fourth 
generation’ peace and conflict studies.  The subjective actualisation of structural and 
ideational institutions not only produces the situational logic of the local context but 
also the situational logic facing external intervention. A lack of understanding or 
interest in regard to these factors sometimes generates counter-productive and 
directly conflict-generating measures. 
 
Modes of mobilisation - Social Forces and Social Agents 
A precondition of social mobilisation is the existence of shared institutions. These 
are systems of rules within which people deal with one another and tend to change 
incrementally.65 In the context of for example externally driven democratisation 
processes, the problem of which normative set will win out has largely been wished 
away by assuming that ‘modern Western values’ would triumph in the end.66 By 
contextualising externally generated values and resources in the existing social order it 
is possible to explore how it potentially changes the situation and what situational 
logics the introduced changes are likely to produce in the long and the short term. It 
thus becomes a case of examining and understanding viability in relation to the local 
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reality instead of envisioning a tabula rasa67 that can be freely overwritten, or 
conversely expecting and assuming rejection by ‘the local.’  
As an example Taliban commanders in some areas of Afghanistan have allowed the 
re-opening of previously closed girls’ schools after local re-negotiations of the 
curriculum to go back to five hours of religious schooling per week rather than two.68 
This indicates a willingness to accept social change in response to aggregate social 
pressure from the local communities, but to do it on certain conditions that make it 
more acceptable to the corporate agent in the prevailing situational logic.  
Social institutions are systems of rules within which people deal with one another 
and tend to change incrementally.69 In the context of for example externally driven 
democratisation processes, the problem of which normative set will win out has 
largely been wished away by assuming that ‘modern Western values’ would triumph in 
the end.70 By contextualising externally generated values and resources in the existing 
social order it is possible to explore how it potentially changes the situation and what 
situational logics the introduced changes are likely to produce in the long and the short 
term. It thus becomes a case of examining and understanding viability in relation to 
the local reality instead of envisioning a tabula rasa71 that can be freely overwritten, or 
conversely expecting and assuming rejection by ‘the local.’  
There is however multiple social institutions actuated in any given society. In 
pluralistic and socially fragmented societies the diversity is likely to be even bigger. The 
research underlining this framework focused on social interaction in (post-) conflict 
environments and specifically on the formation of interest groups and social forces and 
their interaction. It is easy to perceive the agency of the individual as lost here but this 
is erroneous for two reasons:  
Firstly, the individual is present as part of a social agent but is not analytically 
interesting unless occupying a role. If a project is of such a nature that it affects the 
local interest formations and dynamics an individual is most likely either part of a 
primary social agent (resting interest) or a corporate agent (mobilised interest group) 
and thus part of the framework. As an individual it is of course perfectly possible to act 
in contradiction to the interest group at any time, but per definition that also means 
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that they are mobilised by another interest or demobilised in relation to the interest 
dynamics assessed. Interest groups are not static and nor are the views held by 
individuals but what is examined here is the formation of, and dynamics between, 
interest groups affecting social changes. Individuals deciding to remove themselves 
from an issue are no longer part of the analysis. In the context of wide-spread social 
conflict however, few individuals are likely to be detached completely from the 
multitude of interests that exist in any given social environment. The main limitation to 
understanding the context becomes the question asked rather than the answers 
available. ‘Are you interested in peace?’ is likely to generate one answer but can mean 
anything as could ‘would you like clean water?’ Actual interest formation begins to 
surface at questions such as ‘what would it mean to you if we built a well on your 
neighbour’s land’? By asking limited or the ‘wrong’ question, a superficial and largely 
irrelevant understanding becomes the foundations of strategy. 
Secondly, the individual is also represented in the framework as actors occupying 
roles given meaning socially. This can be any type of leader or function that requires a 
shared notion of responsibilities and expectations. An actor can make choices that do 
not conform to the ‘script’ of the role in the shape of its vested interests, but in doing 
so also stands to lose the role or change the meaning of it. If no longer fulfilling the 
socially generated meaning, the actor is no longer occupying the role and is thus 
largely irrelevant in the immediate analysis.  
 
Social agents 
Many societies in the world have some sort of base-line solidarity group in 
existence. It may not have an impact on daily life but remains in waiting to be actuated 
by social corporate agents or actors in order to mobilise support. It can be kinship, 
ideology, or any other notion of shared collectivity under which people are willing to 
be organised. In many parts of the Balkans, Central Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 
conflicts in recent years have displayed with emphasis that when the state loses its 
authority and control, networks along socially defined lines that maintain social 
coherence at localised levels will remain and possibly be exploited as mobilisers. This 
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gives rise to multiple social orders subject to their own internal competition for 
influence as well as competition between different interest groups and social forces. 
Such solidarity groups will sometimes share structural, ideational and institutional 
features and in other cases the discrepancies will be very large.  
Conflict can in this context be viewed in a number of ways including societal 
disintegration resulting from a ‘post-colonial bunching of people against their will’ that 
leads to separate political entities with few shared ideas of community.72 When the 
‘undergirding structure of shared reality’ collapses or fails to materialise, anomie and 
possibly conflict ensues at the contested fringes of social unity. With the breakdown of 
a larger unifying system, the smaller components of the system establish a relationship 
where their interests are competing against one another.  
At the centre of conflict is a fundamental clash of images involving the imposition of 
one’s own ‘reality’ on the ‘Other.’73 It is however not necessarily an exclusionist clash 
between two systems. It can also be viewed as an intersection between them where 
certain ways of perceiving each other are produced and re-enacted. The 
representations of social differences are changed or new ones generated,74 for better 
or worse. The result of a fragmentation and lack of cohesion at a central or common 
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geographical, or similar factors. The 
solidarity groups will vary in size and 
while in some cases focused on one 
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level nevertheless lays the foundations for narrow localised socio-political agendas 
with restricted ambitions beyond the immediate local context.75 While a state will 
normally claim authority over a territory, a solidarity group will primarily claim 
authority over persons.76  
This type of pattern is evident in both cases examined here. In the case of 
Somaliland, local conflicts around resources are the main generators of instability but 
have not caused any major conflict at the national level since 1997 despite different 
sub-state interest groups dominating the national political scene. In South Somalia the 
Islamist groups as well as those opposing them are largely drawn from geographically 
and kin-wise close groups. In Afghanistan the fragmentation and years of displacement 
and conflict have created a situation where local conflicts feed both off and on the 
larger conflict between the government/ISAF and multiple insurgency networks. In all 
three areas, it is primarily the solidarity group that forms the basis of organisation and 
the interests of that group that dictates immediate strategies and priorities. This 
generates different strategies (situational responses) within what on the surface 
appears to be common ideological groups.  
Locally based Taliban commanders and their fighters protect government projects 
in some areas while they will attack them77 in others. Commanders in some areas have 
also allowed the re-opening of previously closed girls’ schools after local re-
negotiations of the curriculum to go back to five hours of religious schooling per week 
rather than two.78 This indicates a willingness to accept some social change in 
response to aggregate social pressure from the local communities, but to do it on 
certain conditions that make it more acceptable to the corporate agent in the 
prevailing situational logic. There is however also other groups within the Taliban 
network who violently reject the education of women. Different sub-divisions of the 
insurgency social force network have different local agendas but may still be mobilised 
in pursuit of a shared but loosely defined goal. The local mobilisation for local issues is 
nothing new and has been commented on throughout history.79 
Concepts such as ‘civil society’ also take on a different meaning in such contexts, as 
it is in effect multiple social forces that address the state but are separate from it.80 In 
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Afghanistan for example the interpretative space, the social differences, and the 
uncoordinated influences from international institutions has according to some 
observers created a confusion surrounding the definition of the role and the 
composition of ‘civil society.81 With social forces and interest groups formed around 
solidarity groups rather than occupational or ideological factors, ‘civil society’ may 
exist but under very different conditions than in for example Europe. 
 
Social forces 
It is tempting to view social forces in very simplistic terms. The notion of the state 
as a unitary force vying for influence in competition with other unitary forces makes it 
much easier to engage and to make simpler plans. A basic assumption of state-centric 
peacebuilding is that as long as the state increases its influence over a passive 
population it will eventually ‘win.’ There are however additional considerations to be 
made since social forces, including the state, are usually comprised of several different 
interest groups and thus subject to internal fragmentation and friction.82 The 
interaction between these forces and locally relevant institutions produces enablers 
and constraints for all parties at all levels. This applies to the state, to insurgencies, and 
any other type of major social movement or local interest groups. Groups or alliances 
with a wider interest agenda that span larger areas constitute an influence on a larger 
scale than strictly localised interest groups and therefore need to be taken into 
separate account. This is especially true when engaging in liberal style state- or 
peacebuilding as it affects the viability and legitimacy of the state and its institutions 
that it has given such a central position in these strategies.  
The separation into different social forces necessitates a case-specific 
understanding of their consistency and durability. Some social forces are nothing more 
than temporary alliances between smaller interest groups that come together to 
maximise their impact and influence on a specific issue but that will come apart over 
time or another issue. Others are more monolithic and exercise well established and 
consistent control over their sphere of influence for an extended period of time. There 
are rarely absolute boundaries between the influences of different social forces and it 
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is not necessarily a case of the population being stuck between competing sides.83 It 
can instead be seen as local interest groups actualising the structural and ideational 
characteristics of a social force to gain its support. This perspective crucially 
acknowledges the agency of the local and its capacity for mobilisation in favour of 
locally defined interests. As much as it may disappoint the ideologists, the notion of 
universalism of values takes on a limited or even irrelevant role in such an 
environment. The meeting between different social forces trigger the situational logic 
of the local agents and actors but it is their responses that determine whether for 
example rejection, conflict, co-optation or hybridisation occurs. 
A social force can gain ‘social mass’ through size, capacities, resources, influence, 
and so forth. This framework makes a distinction between interest groups and social 
forces where the latter is regarded as clusters or networks of relatively aligned interest 
groups. The network of interest groups aligned in an alliance and loosely sharing the 
same end goal generates an aggregate sum of social, economic, and ‘cultural’ capital84 
that can be put at the disposal of the mobilising agent or actor at the heart of the 
social force. The agent is thus able to pursue an agenda of wider social change by 
virtue of its own social support and capacities originating in the diverse support base. 
The networks that become social forces can be the outcome of a large number of very 
diverse transactions of capital, be it of an economic, social, or human nature. The 
multiple solidarity- and interest- groups available in any given society provide ample 
opportunities for mobilisation and the success is often determined by the skills of the 
social agent or actor forming the wider social agenda to maintain loyalty and 
legitimacy.  
For the purposes here social forces are thus understood as interest groups, 
networks, or even networks of networks that have acquired enough ‘social mass’ to 
instigate and force significant social change or exercise significant influence. By 
examining the constituent and localised parts of a social force it is possible to begin 
excavating the multiple interests within and thus to examine the range and scope of 
their interests and motivations. This in turn reveals the localised dynamics and how 
these relate to the social force network and alliance formations. If engaging with them 
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it is necessary to understand the motivations behind each social force and their 
components as well as at what level of ‘competition’ their aspirations exist. 
Discussions in terms of national ambitions or loyalties with a locally oriented interest 
group are largely irrelevant. A more important question is what relationship in the 
local context triggered the social force actuation and alignment. Having investigated 
the multiple levels of social interaction and interests a context emerges that has its 
own social pressures, expectations and thus situational logics. This constitutes the 
social environment into which an interventionist project enters and where the 
outcomes of the interaction are forged.  
Some of the questions facing any potential social mobilisation are: who can use it, 
for what purposes, and to what degree of sustainability. Can just anyone mobilise a 
particular group with for example narratives of ‘the Nation,’ or is this privilege 
reserved for an authority recognised by the particular interest groups? In fragmented 
societies, what does this mean in terms of aspirations and geographical coverage of 
mobilisation? Can these interest group authority figures be permanently mobilised for 
a specific wider social agenda, or do they choose their responses on a local-referential 
basis conforming to the vested interests of themselves in their role and of the 
collectivity they represent? If representation and mobilisation is local and ‘the Nation’ 
is not a sustainable mode of mobilisation that facilitates reconciliation and unity 
between interest groups, is it then really nationalism or an empty discourse produced 
in response to the perceived expectations of an external source of resources?  
Debiel and Lambach have argued in relation to statebuilding that: ‘[l]ocal state-
building takes place in hybrid political and societal orders where rival actors of different 
origin reproduce their power and influence, perform governance functions, or 
undermine state-building and post-war reconstruction efforts. Their spaces and options 
for action are shaped by formal and informal institutions, but also through the 
construction of social realities and the sources of legitimacy that derive from shared 
mental models.’85 The shared image of the nation as a concept given meaning socially 
is thus necessary in order to mobilise on a platform of nationalism, a problem shared 
by political ideologies, ethnic sectarianism, ethnic, and other discourses. Authority 
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figures are given legitimacy by their capacity to command and control a particular 
interest group that they represent. They decide, alone or in collective decision formats, 
on what grounds to allow mobilisation in response to situational pressures. In the 
process of mobilisation the interests and motivations of mobilised groups can vary 
wildly and shift with the interest group and its designated actors. Under such 
circumstances a factor such as ideology is not necessarily a sustainable mobiliser but 
an instrument that can be used for temporary mobilisation to pursue other goals 
dressed in the correct discourse. It in no way signals loyalty to a particular cause but 
allows for a fully pragmatic switching of allegiances in response to perceived changes 
to the subjective local structural and ideational conditions. 
 
Modes of mobilisation: The state and other social forces 
The perspective employed here views the state as only one of several possible 
social forces trying to exercise a degree of control over a given territory in competition 
with other forces. Crucially however, interest groups in the population also exert their 
influence in the opposite direction and thus subject the intentions, agendas, and 
resources of social forces to pressures in pursuit of their own localised interests. 
‘Hearts and minds’, provision of political goods, and so on, are all sound-bites in the 
struggle to create a capacity for the state or any other social force to assert 
dominance. In cases such as Afghanistan the level of fragmentation has reduced the 
internal coherence of the apparent social forces and in such a pluralistic environment 
it is more viable to talk about interest groups within social forces rather than social 
forces themselves. This carries with it the necessity to focus on a lower level of 
interaction to understand the context within which agents and actors operate and 
relate their decisions. The reduced level of focus opens for a better understanding of 
the network formations that become social forces through aggregation.  
The state in post-conflict and conflict environments subjected to international 
intervention is not necessarily one social force vying for control but a network of 
different groups constituting a created rather than generated state apparatus. Groups 
within the state can be in competition for control and influence over its different parts 
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be it a ministry, the armed forces or a provincial appointment.86 The state is under 
such circumstances nominally vying for influence in society but much of the energy is 
put into asserting control over the state itself (political competition based on 
representation of support networks) or over attractive parts of the state apparatus 
(patrimonial competition for resource access). The population may be the prize to be 
won through influence but the state and any social force formations challenging it 
have to compete both with established local power structures and an internal 
fragmentation at the same time. While this internal competition is most often 
represented as simple corruption, it may be necessary to look at whether there is a 
state entity at all or a congregation of patrimonial networks intersecting in a 
constructed and imagined state apparatus. This could be indicative of a socially shared 
and legitimised image of the role of the state that effectively precludes any externally 
constructed ideal.  
For the purposes here two generalised types of social forces dynamics will be 
discussed. They are not absolutes but can be viewed as different elements of internal 
and external relations between a social force and wider society. It should be noted that 
one or all aspects of social force influence may be present at any time in a society, for 
example co-existing in geographical separation. In the one extreme the social force is 
seen as external to society and a resource platform to be accessed and manipulated in 
the pursuit of locally defined and limited interests and aspirations. The access to the 
social force or parts of it becomes the end game with resources and power directed 
back to the local context. In the other extreme a social force is seen as the vehicle for 
social change or influence, and becomes the site of intense internal competition for 
control. The capacities of the social force are then directed to this internal competition 
as well as competition with other social forces. In most cases however the truth falls 
somewhere in between these formats or be one or both.  
 
Social forces as ‘external’ to a local context 
It could be argued that there is a point when the state no longer is a means to gain 
wider social control and has become an instrument to instead affect local politics. The 
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social force, usually the state, is seen as far away physically and psychologically and 
has lost most or all of its loyalty, influence and support to more narrowly defined 
solidarity groups.87 The same is also true for non-state forces with a wider social 
agenda. While they, just like the state, may have an explicit goal of domination, the 
network sub-components such as interest groups vying for internal influence, may 
treat this as secondary to a local agenda. The aspirations of the interest groups within 
the social force are in such cases geared towards local politics rather than that of the 
wider social force. Examples include politicians forcing the location of development 
projects to their constituencies and feeding patrimonial networks or using the military 
access of the state or insurgency groups to settle local scores. The ‘greater good’ in the 
sense of a bureaucrat working detached from society for the good of all of society does 
not enter into the equation to any real or substantial degree. In an environment where 
political and social concerns are formed and pursued on a local basis the assumption of 
higher order mobilisation is highly questionable. The co-optation or subversion 
resulting from the meeting of completely different agendas is more than likely to result 
in a dysfunctional state when its resources are devoted to an array of sub-state 
aspirations unaligned and disconnected from a society-wide programme.  
Influence and co-optation can work in both directions between the social force 
networks and the solidarity groups. While the former will seek to influence and 
mobilise the latter, the decision to choose a side will be based on local collective-
subjective priorities and concerns.  A superimposed state framework that does not 
relate to legitimised models of power is highly likely to become seen as external to 
society and subject to local competition. It becomes a shared notion and expectation 
of sub-state social forces and their solidarity- and support networks that state 
resources can be appropriated for their own ends. The intents and purposes of the 
state construct are subverted for use in other agendas for example expressed in 
patrimonialism.  
In heavily fragmented societies it could also be argued that it is the case of local 
politics being acted out in the national or regional framework. There are strongmen 
and patrimonial networks competing for influence within the state but the political aim 
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is not necessarily linked to the state as a social force. The motivation can be local 
political or even personal issues and while the resources of the state are invited into a 
local context by some, the authority of the state is kept out.88 This type of relationship 
between society and state occurs when the social influence of the state locally is low 
or non-existent, but it is possible for the local competing interests to change their local 
relationships by accessing the state or other social forces as a context-external 
resource platform. 
 
Social forces as a site of competition 
Apart from social forces being treated as resource bases external to the social 
context there is also the case of them as means to an end, a tool for the purpose of 
exerting pressure on other social forces on a society-wide scale. In this type of 
situation the ambitions and agenda of the competing interest groups are for access 
and control over the means of power and the social force as a vehicle of domination 
becomes the focal point of a struggle. Control of for example the state does not 
however constitute control of society or even legitimacy within it. Institutional control 
merely provides another set of options for the agents and actors concerned and, by 
extension, changed situational logics for all interest groups. The surface dynamics that 
exist when a social force becomes a site of competition are quite the same as it is 
between parties and social groups in any system.  
When social organisation occurs along strong identity lines and with strong stake-
holders involved, political competition is a very intense process. The perceived stakes 
are often associated with survival and security discourses and the outcome thus takes 
on a completely different importance than the often more mundane issues of more 
affluent environments. The perception and prospect of domination by a competing 
group produces a security lens through which every action is viewed. The formalised 
means of political competition are thus incentivised towards ensuring domination and 
access for one’s own solidarity group or social force network through the structures of 
power, but also to neutralise the influence and power of other groups. Political 
competition ranges from using measures such as gender quotas to increase interest 
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group representation, via manipulation and voter fraud, to direct violence and 
mobilisation.  
While the idea of limited representation at the state level is not unique to this type 
of environment, the directionality of the state is. In many state polities there is an 
expected balance between the interests of local constituencies and the ‘good of all.’ In 
environments of high social competition and interest groups, the struggle between 
competing survival strategies easily centres on directing the state resources to the 
protection and benefit of the immediate solidarity-group through repression of others, 
rather than the ‘good of all.’ The fragmented nature of social control in such 
circumstances denies wider sustainable mobilisation.89 Support for the central state 
can be bought but can conversely also be just as easily lost to opposition or a 
competing social force. The support of the central state can also make local interest 
groups dependent on it for survival; but, while this may be true in a situation where 
the only major social force is the state, it is not true where multiple strong social forces 
are present. Thus if support runs out, or if your local rivals also find their own backers, 
there may be other sources to be explored like an insurgency network or even other 
states. In Afghanistan competing local shuras have been known to align themselves 
with the central government or the insurgency respectively or sometimes even both at 
the same time.  
 
The meeting of ‘the local’ and external intervention 
It does not matter where an interventionist projects occurs, it will be operating in 
the social and political environment provided by locally existing circumstances and 
conditions. A major international intervention into all tiers of society, both military and 
civilian, off-sets the situational logic for all but in different ways. It is important to 
understand both the local context and how the different interest groups relate to and 
affect the outcomes of this. Archer discusses the aspects of situational responses by 
social agents, but the nature of international intervention forces sudden and 
substantial changes in the basic elements of institutional and interest formation. It also 
potentially introduces external social forces with their own designs of domination over 
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local interests and interest groups in pursuit of a ‘national’ agenda, for example in 
terms of ‘state-building.’  
 
Internalising external social influences  
Social systems are in varying degrees open to outside influence, and thus not 
socially atomistic, because they are peopled. Constituting ‘parts’ exist independently 
but are realised by social agents who mediate the effect and shape they have.90 The 
discrepancies between what goods are available and actualised for the production and 
reproduction of situational logics creates problems when attempting to introduce 
sudden and extensive change from the outside. Intended to provide in some way 
within the target environment, but based on situational logics belonging to a 
completely different environment, interventionist project implementation will often 
adjust only where the situation offers obvious resistance such as violence or threats, 
thus shaping the situational logic of the project in a specific direction. In addition, 
adjustment often consists of abandoning a set of norms or goals rather than mediating 
them with locally held perceptions and values.  
The assumptions of ‘universality’ absolve the interventionist from having to engage 
with the local reality as values and ‘solutions’ can supposedly be freely transposed and 
imposed. This however separates the project from what the locally produced 
situational logics allow local agents to do and results in a disconnect that reduces its 
relevance and viability. It becomes subject to the local reality as a confrontational 
external influence and a challenge to ‘the local.’ Silence (non-opposition) or discursive 
adaptation (usually by accommodating elites) is taken as evidence of acceptance and 
sustainability. In reality however modes of resistance are employed more or less 
overtly to pursue interests under the situational logics produced by the change in 
conditions, altering the intended outcomes of the intervention. If a function or value is 
not internalised there is no sustainability and when the external influence and 
pressure is removed it will disappear or remain in a locally shaped and defined format 
as an unintended outcome. 
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The non-atomistic nature of societies means that both internal and external 
influences come together through actualisation by agents to shape how a society 
develops. However, the influence exerted by interventions through aid, coercion or 
force represents a completely different type of influence as it is introduced rather than 
socially actuated. A social context is thus presented with a de facto change in 
conditions rather than initiating it through normal social mechanisms. New material 
conditions are introduced from the outside that can change the patterns of dominance 
and balance in a society in a brief span of time but rarely the underlying modes of 
mobilisation and interest formations. Ideational goods introduced in a short time 
frame and actualised by an interest group or social force will also affect the 
interrelations between different social agents as well as the structures and roles 
present but just like changes to the material conditions it will be subject to the existing 
social dynamics. Whatever the nature and the scope of an interventionist project, the 
local interest groups have to adapt and re-adjust to the changes in conditions. The 
position taken here is that the more drastic the change in terms of social incongruence 
and time allowed, the more likely it is to generate tumultuous expressions of 
adjustment.  
The outcomes of intervention are just like any social change: unpredictable and 
there will be the unintended consequence of social interactions. In a relatively 
homogenous society it is perhaps easier to make more sweeping assumptions than in a 
context like Afghanistan where a lack of sustainable social cohesion at a country-wide 
level and a substantial weakening of traditional social institutions and structures in 
some areas have resulted in a fragmented web of multiple and very different social 
orders. Though usually less substantial, interventions into narrowly defined contexts 
follow the same logic; so the building of a well or the location of an irrigation canal 
may generate new conflicts between local interest groups as has been the case in 
Somalia,91 as well as in Afghanistan.92  
External influences that align with the interests of particular groups are inherently 
conducive to change since the alignment upsets the balance or undermines the 
distribution of resources, although not necessarily in line with the original intentions. 
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Thus it may for instance be profitable for certain groups with access to exploit any 
connection with distributors of foreign aid93 or military support which opens 
possibilities for that group that is not available to others. The situational logic of the 
rival agents and actors is changed in accordance with this change in resource 
distribution.  
Regardless of the intentions behind an intervention, the influx of new resources will 
change the situational logic for the social agents involved. While there may certainly 
be social agents trying to implement a fair and effective distribution of aid, there will 
also be social agents trying to do the opposite: to monopolise and control the new 
resources in accordance with more narrowly defined interests. The prospect of this 
seems likely to increase in an environment dominated for a long time by the logics of 
survival. With the introduction of external resources into a conflict situation, food aid 
can also be turned into a weapon by taking control of it and its distribution. It can 
serve to purchase support, create personal riches, and also to punish non-conforming 
social interest groups.94 The symmetry of a social conflict can be altered by providing 
support for one faction or the other but if one side receives support, other local 
interest groups may feel compelled to turn to other sources in order to be able to 
maintain their influence.  
There is also a substantial risk that the sudden injection of externally cultivated 
subjective understandings will produce rejection and opposition as it competes with 
locally held beliefs. There is a difference between for example long-term soft social 
influence as opposed to trying to set up a new political system based on externally 
framed values in a couple of years. The less time that is given for an existing social 
system to internalise external influences, the less likely it is to merge positively. By not 
understanding a particular social context it becomes very easy to alienate people even 
on a simple issue that in reality is a shared concern. Ideational goods are in a high 
degree dependent on their actualisation by agents. This means that values and norms 
need to be legitimised and internalised in order to gain any hold in a society, a process 
that is generally incremental and slow.95 Over the long term this is normal influence, 
but radical ideational change such as forced liberalisation over the short term is likely 
89 
 
to have tumultuous effects96 or at the very least meet with a certain level of resistance 
and co-optation.  
 
Situational logics 
The situational logics facing social agents and actors are generated within the 
constraints of material conditions and ideational and structural institutions. The 
actuated institutions shape the situational logics, but the situational logics also shape 
what institutions can be actuated. This is affected by outside influences in a number of 
ways ranging from a long-term soft influence to a sudden and huge impact such as an 
invasion or massive aid influx. The social reality that has been generated by ‘the local’ 
is thus altered in unexpected ways by an external influence offering new avenues for 
change. Yet external forces, while altering the situational logics, are also 
simultaneously subject to the context into which they intervene. Existing conditions 
and the external influx interact to produce new situational logics. In strongly pluralistic 
societies, the picture is further complicated by the presence of a multitude of 
ideational and thus institutional varieties, creating not only a conflict over present 
institutions but also between institutions and ideas. This reduces the degree of 
possible generalisations to a very local and narrowly defined level. 
Intervention may offset, destabilize, or even repress social structural and ideational 
conditions, but while material conditions can be off-set easily, structural and ideational 
goods are socially shared and produced, thus taking time to change. An example of this 
would be the sustainability of sub-clans in Somalia as the primary unit of solidarity and 
interest formation after the long and intense repressive ‘reforms’ of Siyaad Barre. It is 
more likely that pre-existing conditions will remain and exert their own influence on 
the externally produced and introduced ideational and material conditions, than it is 
likely that they will be completely replaced by external projects. Even when the 
outcomes of a project are ‘positive’ it is likely an unintentional effect as expectations 
of implementers and recipients are tied in with their own agendas rather than with a 
programme design97 and dependent on social actualisation, internalisation, and 
interaction.  
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Interventionist strategies work on primarily two different levels referred to here as 
the ‘benign’ and the ‘confrontational.’ The benign refers to the type of external 
projects that have no intention of affecting local stability but, usually out of ignorance 
and naiveté, do so with varying effects. However well-meaning the intentions of a 
particular project are, a negative outcome is largely the result of a refusal, un-interest, 
or incapacity to perform a contextually relevant consequence analysis. Thus as 
mentioned, while building a new well may seem harmless and benign it may spark 
local rivalry and violence depending on its location and exclusivity. Also, as has been 
the case in Somalia, it may change the nomadic patterns and thus lead to the long-
term erosion of grazing land, land encroachment, and increased conflict propensity 
between still nomadic groups and those that decided to settle in a previously 
communal area. In Afghanistan the well-intended Helmand Valley Project reduced 
productivity by 50 per cent per annum for the duration of 13 years due to flooding of 
the farmland. 7000 nomads were also encouraged to settle on what turned out to be 
useless land around Lashkar Gah.98 The examples of such unintended but contextually 
predictable outcomes is very long.  
In addition to the benign there are the cases of directly confrontational projects. 
Included in this is everything that actively seeks to change or transform the social 
environment militarily or by economic and other means. In the case of both Somalia 
and Afghanistan this has been employed as an active strategy with the state and other 
social forces seeking to use local struggles to gain representation and allies for their 
agendas. In Somalia, Barre for example sought to mobilise some clans against 
predominantly the Isaaq in the North. The United States has similarly allied itself with 
specific groups in both Somalia and Afghanistan who understand how to employ the 
counter terrorism and counter insurgency discourses to their benefit. In Afghanistan 
the current government, just like every ruler or government since before Ahmad Shah 
Durrani, has sought to enlist the help of some groups against others. The outcome in 
many of these cases has been that local rivals have sought out the support of social 
forces in opposition in order to reset the local balance of power and dominance off-set 
by outside intervention. The possibility of co-optation at all levels by all aspects of 
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interest groups, not just designated ‘spoilers’, is facilitated by the view of target 
populations as passive victims99 and seems to be largely overlooked by ‘externals’ of all 
types whether military or civilian. Based on the framework the sequence of 
peacebuilding intervention changing local context conditions can be described as a 
chain of: 
a) an influx of external resources changing the distribution, access-routes, and 
mobilisation potential for social agents leading to; 
b) the formation of new corporate agents from the primary agents, and the 
reconstitution and adjusting of existing corporate agents and relationships; 
c) the actuation of new or reconstitution of old structural and ideational 
institutions (actually or discursively) in order to meet the demands of the external 
providers of resources (for example democratisation100) that will be; 
d) generating roles that allow for the access of these resources or pursuit of 
interests (democratic reform, economic gain, control of the state) which; 
e) become a new focus of competition between agents and actors, often in social 
force networks, with vested interests or the intention of attaining access to these 
resources101 for locally defined objectives, leading to;  
f) a likely morphogenesis to an unintended format of social structures and 
ideational conditions such as dysfunctional democratic institutions running on 
patrimonial principles. 
This summary account of a potential chain of interaction and evolution of a social 
system is of course a simplified ‘ideal’ for demonstrative purposes. In reality, the 
reaction of vested interest groups will range between being eliminated and replaced 
by something new or seeking to eliminate the outside influences. Any and all 
responses are possible and while based on the situational logic in their own context, it 
does not necessarily have to be in line with it. With that said it is the situational logic 
and choices of the agent/actor that is of interest, not what the outside observer 
perceives to be the ‘rational choice.’ Popular groups have been known to organise 
around the principle of maintaining their difference in the context of ‘existing 
constraints’ in order to not be swept away by the forces of ‘modernisation.’102 This 
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type of self-aware resistance to outside influence is likely to increase the more there is 
a perceived confrontation with local ideational and material interests threatened by 
the outside influences.  
 
Subversion and co-optation 
Just short of open resistance is co-optation and subversion103 which can be framed 
in terms of a response to a demand from an international order for conversions to 
‘fashionable notions’ of liberalisation, pluralism, democracy, human rights, rule of law, 
good governance, and structural adjustments, all in order to secure foreign aid.104  
No society is fully homogenous in its ideas and opinions and there is always the 
possibility of finding people who will in word or action correspond to the ideals held by 
an outside agent. This can be done by for example ‘producing’ them over time in the 
context of a project and thus validating it, or by empowering and validating local actors 
if they acknowledge the ‘superiority’ of imported knowledge technology and ‘modern’ 
lifestyles.105 While it may be the case that specific social agents believe in the 
ideological positions they claim, it may well also be a means of gaining support. There 
are a number of problems related to this and it raises the question how contextual 
knowledge and understanding is generated when the views and priorities of the 
general local population should matter more than the views of small and select 
elites.106 Strategy based on an over-estimated level of representation will not only be 
misdirected and disconnected from reality but is likely to serve one specific group or 
network of groups that have learned how to discursively access the offered resources 
and support. It should be stressed that the use of terminology such as ‘subversion’ and 
‘co-optation’ is not employed here in a strictly negative sense. A ‘spoiler’ is only an 
agent or an actor that frustrates the interests of one or more interest groups. It is a 
subjective label that indicates dissent but dismisses its validity and thus ignores what it 
potentially means for outcomes. The terminology as used here refers to the frustration 
of the intents of the interventionist project, usually to the benefit of a social agent or 
actor and possibly though not necessarily at the expense of others. 
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The increasingly important role of the state in international peacebuilding is a direct 
example of a potential avenue of subversion. Outside agent(s) build institutions and 
‘local capacity’ in a pattern modelled on an ideal state. A number of ministerial 
functions are set up and allocated funds to perform to externally generated and 
defined expectations and benchmarks, ‘assisted’ by deeply embedded international 
technical ‘experts.’ The situational logics presented to the social agents in such a case 
thus relate to de facto created institutions that represent avenues of access to 
resources and/or power. While these may of course represent an opportunity for the 
disenfranchised to change social structures in their favour, it can also be a means by 
which the elites can preserve the status quo. By (mis-) representing values and 
expectations attached to the resources it becomes possible to access them.107 The new 
set of institutions has changed the conditions but not the priorities or modes of 
mobilisation of the social agents involved. 
The result is basically pseudo-institutions that are there in name but fill no real or 
alternatively a changed function from its intended role. It may be the case, as Chabal 
and Daloz have argued, that some states have never been properly institutionalised 
and separated from society,108 but this assumes conformity to the externally defined 
plan and format on the part of the local societies. Per definition, it denies the agency 
and the capacity for self-evolutionary moves towards a self-defined format of local 
structures and institutions. Viewing it from the perspective taken here it is rather the 
case that the institutions introduced to these societies are not in touch with the 
prevailing material and ideational conditions. The situational logics assumed in the 
intended functions of for example state institutions are discarded for situational 
responses generated by the actual contextual demands. The institutions are there in 
name but not in their externally presumed functions and have been co-opted by 
certain interest groups. In this process they have been given a new meaning in their 
local context as either external to society or sites of competition, or both. They may 
thus be technically working but under the contextual redefinition given to them by for 
example patrimonial networks, having been captured by social forces109 or interest 
groups. Public employment is exploited as a private resource110 and as part of a socially 
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tolerated form of power, accepted and expected by all agents engaging in contest for 
the resources.  
Social struggles are however not simply about who controls the state; they take 
place in multiple arenas of domination in which parts of the state may be a single 
social force in its own right in a field of, at times, conflicting social forces111 or even 
competing locally with interest groups. The situation of ‘weak states’ is an obvious 
illustration where a central state is incapable of projecting authority across its territory 
but aspects of the state may have considerable local dominance. 
It is very easy for an interventionist party to become just another interest group in 
competition over ideas or power either directly or through proxies, and the external 
agent and its proxy are thus perceived as stake-holding competitors in the local 
context. The retribution killings and ethnic cleansings perpetrated by returning 
Kosovar Albanians against Kosovar Serbs and Romani in the wake of military NATO 
intervention112 seemed to take the intervening forces completely by surprise as the 
internationally perceived agenda of the Kosovar Albanians was a discourse of 
victimisation and wanting to return without repression. While this was undoubtedly 
true for a vast majority of the repressed Kosovars, there was a demonstrably more 
sinister agenda shared by some. This example displays with exceptional clarity the 
potentially fickle nature of perceived bonds when it comes to intervention alliances 
but also how a skilled social agent can manipulate external resources in order to 
influence the internal dynamics and situational logics of a conflict. Similar manipulation 
has occurred for example in relation to American support to individual power-holders 
in Afghanistan where previously ousted warlords have been re-instated and gradually 
gained independence from their pay-masters to expand their control in illicit and legit 
markets. 
There is no guarantee that social agents and actors will accept new institutions and 
they may simply be the sphere where a small and exclusive elite of intellectuals share 
or pretend to share particular values while a majority of the population finds no 
legitimacy in the new system for a variety of reasons. This is best described as the 
result of discrepancies between value-sets where the elite represent radical reform of 
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some sort that lacks support from the wider population. The nature of the ideology in 
question is of less importance as a reform that clashes with socially shared notions and 
values is likely to meet with resistance. In Bosnia the democratisation process 
effectively turned into two separate states when it became impossible to reconcile the 
two major entities into one state, arguably legitimising and serving the interests of 
those pursuing ethnically separate enclaves. In Afghanistan, domestic reform steps 
taken by Afghan rulers throughout history in a Kabul increasingly detached from the 
demands and expectations of general society, have repeatedly met with violent 
resistance.113  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has provided a lens through which to examine social interest 
formations. It has outlined how interests and situational logics form in social contexts 
and how they interact with external interventionist projects to produce unintended 
outcomes. In order to understand the social context we need to focus on a number of 
factors such as ideational and material conditions, actuated roles and institutions, and 
modes of mobilisation for social agents and social forces. This allows us to not only 
understand how it relates to intervention but also at what level the relevant social 
interactions that determine outcomes take place.  
When stepping away from the assumptions of the strategies and literature in 
Chapter one it becomes possible to open an alternative route to understanding the 
social dynamics of interest groups, social forces, and interventionist projects. By 
reducing all social agents, actors, and social forces to subjects of very similar 
situational logics, the focus is shifted from how to overcome the challenges to one 
social force, such as the state, in order to conform the rest, to understanding how the 
situational logics develop that are facing all agents and actors. Because of the meeting 
of diverse and shifting interests, this interaction will produce largely unintended 
outcomes. In the end, the difference between social agents and social forces is one of 
potential and of aspirations. A social agent is an interest group with limited capacities 
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for impact and aspirations. A social force has wider aspirations and has acquired 
sufficient social mass to pursue them. 
We now turn our attention to the cases of Somaliland, Somalia, and Afghanistan in 
order to examine their social composition through this lens. The cases are intended to 
provide illustrative examples of the different local dynamics present in these societies 
and are not context analyses in the specific sense employed in this thesis. They are 
rather a mix between wide descriptive accounts of the actuated ideational and 
material conditions, and a series of snapshots of social interaction seen in relation to 
the factors identified in the framework as relevant. 
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Chapter Three – Somalia and Somaliland: In the Shade of the Meeting Tree 
There is a Somali saying that translates as: The prolonged presence of peacemakers 
in your camp is a curse. This seems increasingly and uncannily true in relation to the 
international effort to bring peace and democracy to Somalia. It does not however 
mean that the lack of peaceful progress in the South or the recent political deadlock in 
Somaliland are solely attributable to either the Somalis or the international 
community, but that these unintended outcomes are the result of the interaction 
between the different influences and interests they represent. Part of the problem is 
an internationally repeated perception of Somalia as a general state of anarchy when 
in fact it is the site of multiple social orders maintaining different aspects of 
governance,1 and where a wide array of localised interests are represented. The 
external resources have, in general terms, not been distributed in relation to this but 
have rather tried to forge a zero-sum end-state out of a series of misperceptions. 
Another part of the problem is that Somalia is an environment that has conditioned 
survival strategies for so long that the pattern is established, internalised, and not 
easily changed. It subjects external influences rather than conforms to them.  
This said there are also indications of some change taking place within the 
established situational logics driven by Somalis and on Somali conditions at a relevant 
level. This chapter discusses aspects of Somali social context formation but focuses 
mainly on the self-declared republic of Somaliland in the north-western part of 
Somalia.2 Somaliland has managed to transform from civil war between sub-clans into 
a multi-party democracy with a high degree of peace, largely on its own. Though there 
are residual problems, the difference in comparison with the South is striking. This 
chapter aims to provide an understanding of how interest groups are formed, how 
mobilisation occurs, how situational logics are shaped in the Somali context, and how 
it mediates external pressure.  
 
Actuated institutions and roles 
Situational logics develop in response to the conditions and influences provided by 
the environment and institutional actuation. Somalia largely consists of strong interest 
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groups formed by a long history of war, displacement, and natural disasters. A 
tradition of nomadic lifestyle and increased fragmentation in combination with a 
scarcity of resources has generated logics of survival that resonate in all levels of 
politics. There are a number of factors in Somali society that exert a strong influence 
over the social and political environment. These serve to shape and form the 
situational logics facing all social actors and agents, and while many could be pointed 
to, a few factors stand out as having exceptional influence in Somali social interaction. 
 
Guurti and shir  
The two most important roles in the Somali context are the elders, especially when 
actualised as a guurti, and religious representatives such as sheikhs. Guurti is a cross-
clan gathering of elders for deliberations and fills an important role in Somali socio-
political dynamics. The role of an elder is inherited3 and traditionally the intended heir 
would be trained for the role from an early age.  
Immediately after the Somali National Movement’s (SNM) victory in the North in 
1991, and during the subsequent relapses into conflict, the guurti acted as ad hoc local 
governments. They administered justice, mediated in disputes, managed militias, 
raised revenue and dealt with the international organisations active in their respective 
areas.4 The role of a clan elder is not the same as a chief. The structure is more 
horizontal than hierarchical, a relationship mainly expressed through the internal clan 
shir (councils) where all adult males can speak on economic and political affairs.5 The 
elder-system is stronger when the state is weak6 but while there are levels of authority 
within it, these are more functions of representation and negotiation than direct 
authority.7 This notion of not giving too much power to one man is explicitly present in 
Somali social metaphors indicating that if you do he will gather camels (mounted 
fighters) and go looking for more.8  
 
Religion 
Religion is an all-present feature but not necessarily as a political cause. Religion is a 
‘veil lightly worn’9 in both Somalia and Somaliland though adherence to religious codes 
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and lifestyle choices is socially expected. The widely shared institutions produced in 
the context of religion in Somalia are a moderate shariica (sharia) and Islamic codes of 
conduct that are deeply embedded within society.10 These are partly challenged in the 
South by more hard-line interpretations and influences. Most Somali respondents 
interviewed during the research brought up religion as a primary source of identity, 
but Islam has never been a sustainable political mobiliser in Somalia particularly not in 
Somaliland. The religious authority is important and shariica11 is not just a moral code 
or an influence on the judicial system. It can rather be seen as one of three actual 
judicial principles that are in practise in Somaliland today, the other two being secular 
law and xeer. The role of the religious man is thus potentially highly political if actuated 
by the parties to a conflict. Shariica is a constant influence and is constantly actuated 
by lawmakers, elders, and other agents and actors in Somaliland,12 and has a central 
role in the Islamist courts in the South. 
 
Social codes and practises 
There are several frameworks of law and governance that have been introduced by 
the governments of Somalia and Somaliland respectively. The weak nature of their 
implementation capacities however means that that they are easily rivalled and even 
surpassed by socially established and legitimised institutions. Foremost among these is 
the xeer which refers to the customary unwritten legal framework that regulates the 
reciprocal behaviour between clans of a specific area dependent on the deliberations 
of elders.13 In the absence of centralised institutions, xeer has been part of a system 
where kinship and collective social institutions has aided in preserving relative order by 
defining collective rights and responsibilities.14 It is largely responsive with almost no 
pro-active capacity but is based on a commitment to transparency and good faith.15 
Xeer is a dynamic concept, evolving through interpretation and adaptation, but the 
civil war in the 1990s presented situations beyond its capacity. Apart from the 
rejection of clan authority and impunity by some militias, there simply was no 
precedent for the scale of crimes and violations of social norms perpetrated in the 
war.16 
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The war with its mass displacements and refugee camps added additional stress to 
the pastoral environment and traditional social support structures as it is the clan that 
provides in times of hardship.17 Settlement patterns both in the rural and urban areas 
largely follow sub-clan or sub-sub-clan lines,18 and by extension so too does resource 
distribution, access, and control. This is the case in both Hargeisa19 and for example 
Mogadishu, where there is a social status division between pastoralist and craftsmen, 
geographical between different parts of the city, and a separation between different 
lineages.20 Consequently conflict, security, and social expectations are generated at 
this level as well. Returning refugees and other Diaspora groups create pressure on the 
territorial possession of the sub-clan and social friction. For example a major stress-
point and source of conflict is the higher levels of permanent settlements which have 
included the almost unchecked proliferation of waterholes. With the establishment of 
permanent water supplies the seasonal rotation that allowed the grazing land to 
recover is removed. As increasing numbers settle down and more land traditionally 
seen as communal is encroached upon conflicts increase. Any state attempt to 
regulate the proliferation both of waterholes and conflict is hampered by the lack of 
capacity by the formal judicial system. Instead, conflicts are often settled by or in 
cooperation with local authority figures like elders,21 or through religious arbitration.  
Land-based conflicts concerning grazing and water access rights are the main 
conflict generators and a point of competition between the traditional nomadic 
structures and the often illegal privatization of grazing lands and water.22 The 
exclusivity of the illegal land-enclosure will often be defended by force and can cause 
wider inter-clan conflict to erupt. One respondent suggested that as a result, the spirit 
of cooperation and collective responsibility previously present is increasingly being 
replaced by individualism, greed, mistrust, and competition.23 Though the move 
towards individual interests is seen as a positive by some, there is also concern what 
will happen if the influence of the elders weakens further.24 Traditionally, interests are 
pursued as clan interests in a reciprocal relationship25 to avoid conflict and facilitate 
distributive patterns. Land used to be divided among the clan by the diya-group but is 
now increasingly ‘hegemonised by those with money.’26  
101 
 
The increased focus on individual ownership has generated conflicts within clans 
and families.27 Deeds are sold for land that traditionally comes under the control of a 
specific sub-clan. Such deeds will often not be recognised locally and the state does 
not have the capacity to enforce them.28 There is a fear of such conflicts gaining 
momentum and spreading through the clan structures, widening beyond the localised 
rural nature it originates in and into the population centres.29 That said, in comparison 
with the situation during the civil war however, local conflicts in both Somaliland and 
Somalia tend to be relatively short, geographically restricted, and with low costs in 
lives and damage to property,30 mainly thanks to traditional social institutions and 
roles. 
 
Modes of Mobilisation 
The social network structures in Somalia generally do not conform to a Northern 
European understanding of social and political interaction. The sub-clan is the 
predominant social format and traced through the male lineage,31 and while other 
types of alliances appear these are often temporary and influenced by sub-clan 
affiliation or, for example, inter-marriage. Alliance building tends to be a response to 
the immediate circumstances32 and is fragile in nature.  
 
Clans 
Political and social actuation and mobilisation predominantly occur along the lines 
of the sub-clans and the institutional logic plays out in the social interaction between 
these interest groups. It has sometimes been claimed that the sub-clans have lost their 
importance33 but even a cursory examination of for example settlement patterns and 
local conflict resolution casts shadows of doubt over this. Political allegiance and 
identity start with the immediate family, then the immediate lineage, and then the 
clan family.34 This pattern of mobilisation has been evident in the resurgence of 
violence in Somaliland during the 1990s35 and continues to have a political role today. 
This does however not stop a social agent or actor from refusing to actuate these 
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institutions by conscious choice. Such a decision however also carries socially 
generated consequences. 
In Somaliland the residual authority of traditional institutions and structures have 
been able to constrain conflict and negotiate peace. They also supplement the state in 
the periphery without challenging it to any larger degree at the centre. This may well 
be related to the incapacity of the state to issue a realistic and sustainable authority 
claim to challenge the local authorities, therein reducing the necessity of 
confrontation. The relapses into war between 1991 and 1997 were often tied to the 
ambitions of the state colliding with locally formed interests; so as long as that does 
not happen, the need for demarcation is not really there. In the South the image is 
more complex but the social structures of clan are utilised by all to mobilise interest 
group formations and by extension generate social forces through network formations.  
 
Religion 
The strict adherence to Islamic rules is easily observed in the everyday life36 but this 
does not equate to mobilisation in pursuit of a shared, religiously defined, interest. 
There is little deep political and radical Islamism in Somaliland and even the Southern 
Islamist networks are comprised of multiple interest groups with diverse interests and 
modes of mobilisation.37 Their popularity and following is more the result of a series of 
responses to the social situation than a coherent ideological conviction. Foreign 
extreme Islamist elements including Wahhabi groups are trying to exert ideational 
pressure in for example Hargeisa38 and several madrasas funded by external money 
have been established. The Somaliland state is seeking ways to control them39 but it is 
unclear how successful this actually is. The pragmatic and fickle approach to alliances, 
the clannism, and the ability to draw outsiders into local feuds have generated an 
environment where the situational logics are shifting constantly. These situational 
logics have previously presented disincentives for example for international jihadist 
groups to establish themselves permanently.40  
The shariica courts of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in South Somalia maintained an 
enforcement capacity and enjoyed popular support in 2006 because of their ability to 
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create an element of security.41 Though their Islamist agenda gave the sheikhs a 
greater power than is traditionally the case, the ICU drew their cohesion and 
mobilisation capacity largely from their Hawiye kinship ties.42 The foundations of each 
individual court in the network were most often a coalition of clan elders, intellectuals, 
businessmen, and sheikhs.43 The pastoral tradition of Somalia has imbued society with 
a pragmatic outlook on situational logics as a matter of survival.44 Ideology thus takes 
on a subdued role in politics and in social mobilisation.  
 
Political ideology 
There are three political parties in Somaliland but in reality parliamentary politics 
can be said to largely reflect the shifts in interests and alliances between the three 
largest sub-clans of the Isaaq clan-family. There are only three parties allowed in an 
attempt to limit the number of parties rather than let party politics reflect the 
extremely pluralistic nature of society through candidate proliferation. As a result, no 
party is allowed that is based on clannism or religious ideology,45 but there is 
nevertheless a distinct element of clan affiliation at least among party supporters that 
sometimes lead to physical confrontation when clan and politics mix in the streets.46 
The original intention of having a new party vetting process to determine which three 
were the biggest with every election has gradually been discarded. Instead, the same 
three parties are now asserting themselves in the role as the only ones allowed.47 
Neighbouring Puntland has recently decided to adopt a similar party system in an 
attempt to force broader political coalitions between the sub-clans48 on which 
governance rests.  
The Somaliland House of Representatives is an elected body consisting of 
representatives coming from these three allowed parties49 while the upper House of 
Guurti has 82 voting members who are nominated from different clans for a six-year 
term.50 They are chosen by their clans which supposedly strengthen the ties between 
local clan politics and national politics. The explicit intention to link local and national 
politics however also makes it increasingly difficult to separate the two when pursuing 
any type of ‘the good of all’ agenda. Members of the house are to consult with 
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‘traditional heads of the communities’ when advising the government,51 thus providing 
a direct link to, but also for, localised interests. While this contributes to the 
domination of socio-political orders over the state, it is arguably also a reflection of a 
locally held perception of how politics should play out.  
There is at least discursively an on-going project of formal decentralization of the 
Somaliland state but there has been little progress despite widespread support.52 This 
is in part because of an unclear definition of what the term will mean in the specific 
context. Yet this process is considered important because of the historical experience 
with the highly centralized Mogadishu regime of Barre, as well as in respect to local 
socio-political structures. Potential issues that could cause conflict include taxation and 
equity, both of which are subject to clan-politics and risk being exacerbated by a 
serious decentralization of government. The balancing of clan interests at both the 
local and the national level is perceived as an obstacle to deepening the 
democratisation transition,53 but given the degree of clan-related politics at the state 
centre and the explicit linking of the upper house with traditional society, this concern 
seems somewhat redundant. The question is rather whether a decentralisation would 
not reduce the national implications of localised interests and politics. 
 
Modes of mobilisation: Social Agents 
The quintessential interest group within the sub-clan is the diya-paying group. The 
concept of diya can be translated as blood-payment that traditionally was made in 
livestock or goods but with changing settlement patterns and urbanisation can now 
also be made in cash.54 The diya group can consist of clans, sub-clans, or sub-sub 
clans55 depending on the size of the particular group. There is a point at which the 
group is too large to be a viable political unit and the diya-group is politically very 
significant. Diya is a particularly important social institution in the absence of a capable 
state as the diya-group provides both insurance and security. It is important to note 
however that since clan strength is a factor in diya, equality before the law is also 
subject to the relative strength of the parties involved and the mediators. There are 
also no insurance companies in Somalia and should someone accidentally cause harm 
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to property or someone else, the principle of diya provides the foundation for settling 
the issue. In order to be able to meet such a payment the individual is dependent on 
the diya-paying group whose members are bound to assume collective responsibility. 
The socially mobilised individual is thus presented with a situational logic shaped by 
the context which provides a strong incentive to maintain the connection to the social 
agent rather than act independently even on smaller issues.  
Within the immediate framework of the diya-group there is no room for individual 
interests56 and pursuing them produces conflicts and dissent within the group. This 
weakness can provide incitements for other social agents to move against the interests 
of the diya-group which discourages but does not prevent internal dissent. Similarly 
the diya-group provides social benefits such as economic support if livestock dies, or 
the starting capital of a newly married couple.57 Membership in the diya-group carries 
obligations and protection but also accountability and policing where none is available.  
An example of the diya principle in effect was the clan-based deydey groups that 
established themselves as local governments in the wake of the civil war. These groups 
largely preyed on other clans58 and enjoyed an uneasy support from their own diya-
groups as they also functioned as a protective militia.59 As the banditry grew worse, 
the diya function turned the deydey into a liability and it thus came to a point where 
they had to be stopped in order to protect the interests of the respective clans. At the 
1993 Borame Conference, the deydey’s political power was replaced by nominated 
local authorities60 and their military capacity was countered by their own elders. 
Where there was non-compliance it sometimes turned into such extreme measures as 
the deydey leader being eliminated to protect the clan.61 To a degree the proliferation 
of responsibility of security in clan-specific areas after 199162 may have set the stage 
for the deydey, but the same principles of collective responsibility also rectified this. 
 
Social agents: cross-clan alliances 
There are examples of cross-clan alliances in Somalia and Somaliland but they are 
not sustainable social mobilisation of unity as much as they are alliances of strength to 
address specific issues in line with specific interests. Businessmen have for example 
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shown a capacity for temporary cross-cutting alliances to influence the political or 
security situation in favour of economic stability. In Somaliland they contributed to the 
costs of peace processes63 and provided channels of communication between warring 
clans.64 In the South they have among other things hired militiamen for protection but 
also as a bid to demobilise the non-governmental militias.65 In 1999 leading Mogadishu 
businessmen decided to stop paying taxes to warlords and instead support the shariica 
courts which has been described as ‘a watershed moment’66 in terms of social order. 
The Diaspora and other social interest groups of Somaliland took on a significant 
supportive role in the shape of aid and investments in the peace processes of the 
1990s. When neither the government or opposition parties in the violence of 1995 
were interested in coming to the negotiating table, the Diaspora initiated a Peace 
Committee for Somaliland which would be disbanded as soon as the parties 
committed to dialogue.67 
Concepts such as ‘civil society’ that have a prominent role in international discourse 
are also interesting in relation to modes of mobilisation in Somalia, if primarily because 
in the Somali context they are so different from external expectations. The concept as 
such is completely imported and local NGO’s have according to some observers 
generally been ‘clan-based, have incompletely understood the concept of civil society’ 
and mainly pursued income-generation for themselves.68 While this breaks with the 
internationally pursued concept of civil society, it is also arguably the direct outcome 
of discrepancies between different models of organisation and social accountability 
held by local and international agents and actors. It does not however mean that 
society is not providing a check on the state, but it is less to keep it ’in line’ than to 
assert a level of autonomy towards it. 
 
Social agents: Bahawen – Women as a sixth clan? 
Another type of alliance that has displayed capacity for mobilisation and influence is 
that of women. Women are the majority in the Somaliland electorate at 55%69 and 
there are now a larger number of female-headed households. The gender-related 
division of labour in Somali society is reinforced by a machismo honour-code70 but 
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there are an increased number of female breadwinners.71 The exclusion of women 
from the decision-making process is recognised as a problem in the Somaliland 
constitution and there is an active discussion of the subject. Respondents of both 
genders indicated a conviction that women need to be included72 in the political 
process but that it requires a context-specific approach and discussion. It was argued 
that it needs to be framed in a Quranic and traditional framework within which the 
debate on gender roles can be held.73 One (male) respondent described the exclusion 
of women from the decision making process as ‘a contribution to retardation’ but also 
saw the ‘Western’ strategies as incompatible with local society.74 Barre’s ‘Scientific 
Socialism’ also employed the gender discourse which led to the association of gender 
issues with oppression and opposition to the traditional.75 The word gender thus has 
locally held connotations that provoke suspicion and wariness.  
There is also a conceptual issue in international strategies that see women as 
separate from society or at the very least as a common group with permanent shared 
interests and, in the context of ‘development’, as victims.76 This perspective 
completely ignores women as part of society sharing not only its norms and traditions, 
but also often the interests of their own solidarity groups.77 The role of women in 
Somali society is complex and Somali women have a dual allegiance through their ties 
to the clans of both their father and their husband. This has made it possible for them 
to act as messengers between clans in times of conflict and to exert a dual pressure,78 
but conversely also makes them subject to suspicion of possible treachery.79 The role 
of women is tied in with sometimes contradictory clan interests.80  
Women in pastoral societies should be contextualised as actors inhabiting roles 
with certain socially defined and generated functions and interests whose strategies 
are channelled by ‘cultural values, resources, and choices available in the social 
system.’81 There are conflicting images of the woman as a peacemaker with an active 
and strong capacity to influence,82 and the woman as socialised into a silence83 and 
invisibility in important decisions. That these discussions are present in Somaliland 
suggest an increased reflection on the issues in Somali gender relations. Though 
women may seem completely without power there are in fact examples of them 
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creating their own sites of resistance and influencing aspects of conflict. Among the 
more prominent is their role in reversing the approval of UNOSOM deployment and 
the 1992 Sheekh conference where women who were excluded from the proceedings 
hung microphones through the windows to hear what was said and stood outside the 
conference until all issues had been addressed.84 By listening in they were able to 
ensure that all the issues on the agenda had been discussed and also physically 
hindered delegates to leave as long as outstanding issues remained.   
The wider socio-economic structures of Somaliland are however changing as well 
and with it the overall situational logics produced for women. There is an increasing 
practise of the men working a fewer number of hours per day, partly due to the wide-
spread practise of chewing qaad. A late morning start of work is followed by the after 
lunch chewing sessions during the hot hours of the day. This has forced women to take 
a larger role in bringing income to the household.  
While it is an added burden as the women also take care of the household duties, it 
is slowly beginning to yield an increased influence and general acceptance of women in 
business and politics.85 Despite the majority of voters being women there were only 
two females in the House of Representatives in 2009. The respondents that addressed 
this explained it in part with reference to a traditional socialisation into believing that 
women are not good enough. There is however now also a female representative in 
the House of Elders, the guurti, which indicates a step in gender relations. The office of 
elder is traditionally all male without exception but the female elder was chosen to 
represent her husband’s sub-clan after he was killed in the October 2008 bombings in 
Hargeisa.  
According to some observers, women mobilise cross-clan and there is a shared 
notion of being the ’clan of women’86 within which they can create their own political 
space spanning across societal fault-lines when needed. While women in Somaliland 
and Somalia can and have mobilised as a cross-clan group87 it does not automatically 
follow that it is possible to treat ‘womanhood’ as a permanent primary interest group 
or ‘sixth clan’88 detached from the deeper social context.89 Though women have long 
played a ‘vital role in facilitating communication, mobilizing resources, and applying 
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informal pressure’90 this has occurred within the existing structures not in 
contradiction to them. In the realities of the scarce resources, and the post-conflict 
context, ‘womanhood’ does not provide protection or food.  
Women have nevertheless shown that they can, at least temporarily, mobilise from 
a position as primary agents to form corporate agents and pursue specific interests. A 
2001 report prepared for USAID indicated that women have been unable to mobilise 
as an interest group.91 This seems to be an overstatement considering the role women 
played during the 1990s peace conferences, but it is true in the sense of sustainable 
cross-clan mobilisation. To mobilise women within a diya-group would however be 
something completely different and substantially more sustainable.  
Women are part of society and society is formed around the sub-clan. Change 
happens in that context and as Somali women are showing, and the conflict parties 
showed in the 1990s, change not impossible to pursue. While it is possible from a 
‘Westernised’ perspective to focus on structural inequalities and injustices in gender 
relations in Somaliland, there are indications of a changing social, political and 
economic environment that perhaps should enjoy greater attention as a possible 
process of hybridisation. The current circumstances of Somaliland society are driving a 
gender emancipation of sorts92 that appears to have its own logic and legitimacy 
within the local context and appears to be seen as compatible with traditional 
society.93 
 
Modes of mobilisation: social forces 
Social mobilisation into social force network formations is sometimes dressed in a 
language of religion or ‘counter-terrorism.’ Regardless of the ‘cause’ support is most 
easily gained through kin-ship ties or by dealing with a sub-clan collectively in 
patronage patterns. Depending on the scale and geographical spread of the conflict or 
interest friction, increasing levels of identity mobilisation can be employed with 
varying efficiency. Islam has never been a sustainable political rallying point in Somalia 
but has been successfully used to mobilise against non-Muslim and external threats.94 
110 
 
Instead, clan affiliation is the not the sole but most prevalent factor in the formation of 
the Islamist groups, the government support groups and other social agent formations.  
Despite the pluralistic nature of the interest formations it is possible to mobilise 
larger cross-clan interest groups. If framed correctly there may be social cohesion on 
some issues for temporary alliances. The perception of an alliance of a cluster of 
interest groups generates counter-alliances in response. Such is the case of the Islamist 
and Sufi in the South and such was the case for the Hawiye, Darod, and Isaaq, during 
the 1990s.95 These are formations of convenience and when the external threat 
recedes it is likely that division along sub-clan lines will resurface as it did among the 
Isaaq in the North after the SNM victory in 1991.96 
While religion serves as a conflict generator or justifier in terms of for example the 
Sufi sects being targeted by Islamist-affiliated groups, the actual mobilisation occurs 
along clan lines. This is in part because of the relative ease of garnering support within 
these structures thanks to socially shared expectations and obligations, but also 
because of the geographical patterns of the sub-clans. Because of the tendency to live 
in proximity to kin the factors of clan and location become intertwined. As they come 
under attack, an incentive presents itself to band together in a temporary alliance in 
order to produce a stronger resistance to a common threat.  
The different levels of identity are readily used for wider mobilisation in response to 
perceived outside threats but these are not hard alliances97 compared to the diya-
group. The Isaaq clan-family united against Barre but is dominated by three different 
such clan factions who are in open competition with each other. Judging by history, 
there is no reason to expect such an alliance to hold beyond the immediate threat. The 
fluid nature of alliances also means shifting situational logics in the interaction 
between different social agents and collective accountability relationships requires a 
keen understanding of the on-going interaction and the evolving dynamics with other 
social agents. If a member of a diya-group has perpetrated a perceived offense against 
another group, the entire group of the offending party becomes potential targets for 
retribution. 
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Social forces: The Somali and Somaliland background 
Colonial rule resulted in structural differences between the North and the South of 
Somalia. In the north-west the British pursued a policy of indirect rule ‘light’ by 
incorporating elders and framing them in a new hierarchical relationship in their 
communities.98 This practise politicised and awarded external authority to elders, thus 
undermining its traditionally more egalitarian relationship to the community. It 
changed the vested interests of the role so that it no longer corresponded to its 
socially defined boundaries by introducing individualistic notions of power and 
hierarchical relationships. The role of the elder was however socially imbued with a 
more a representative role99 and the external intervention thus changed this 
relationship. 
While the British interests in Somalia were not linked to control of territory100 and 
population, the Italians pursued a policy of social engineering in the South.101 In order 
to do so the traditional structures had to be broken down102 while they at the same 
time had to provide extensive ‘indirect rule’ representation to administer the 
territory.103 The differences in social stability and coherence between the South and 
the North can possibly be traced to these different approaches to some degree. There 
are however different perceptions of how the respective policies of indirect rule 
changed the political role of clan elders104 that represented traditional authority.105 
Regardless, the introduction of a hierarchical relationship was certainly a change to the 
traditional consensus system of localised governance.106  
The initial integration of Somaliland with Southern Somalia in 1960 was under the 
umbrella of a ‘western’-style democracy that proved poorly adapted to the clan-based 
nature of Somali politics.107 While the discourse may have been nationalistic, the over-
riding principle of social organisation and support was still the clan.108 Widespread 
corruption and failure to meet the expectations of different sub-state interest groups 
bred deep discontent. In 1969 the Somali state was seized by General Siyaad Barre 
who maintained power with the help of superpower backing in a highly centralized and 
authoritarian system. While there was a clear mismatch between a Weberian state 
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system and a kinship-based society,109 the system introduced under colonial rule was 
often referred to in interviews with politicians and intellectuals during this research.110  
Traditional social structures were further challenged when, under a banner of 
‘Scientific Socialism’, Barre introduced massive literacy campaigns, gender equality 
drives, self-help schemes, and social development projects. His vision demanded the 
dismantling of traditional clan-based organisation, informal economic networks, and 
the socio-political order that many Somalis were dependent on. It was a case of deep 
social engineering where culture, religion, and social structures were targeted for 
reform or denounced outright. However clan-politics were being played out behind the 
scenes111 displaying its resilience. Even the professed enemy of the clan-system Barre 
increasingly had to rely on clan support to maintain power. Clannism was re-employed 
to fuel old animosities112 and divide opposition. In the North this increasingly turned 
into a confrontation with the sub-clans of the Isaaq clan-family when neighbouring 
Northern clans were mobilised against them.113 Clan identity thus resurfaced 114 as the 
main channel of political and economic security after a period of active repression. 
Those disadvantaged by Barre’s increasingly patronage-based policies turned to the 
informal economy,115 further weakening the state. Eventually wide-spread civil war 
broke out leading to the defeat of the Barre forces and the trajectories of the North 
and the South of Somalia became separated again. 
 
Social forces: the Somaliland state 
In 1991 the Somali National Movement (SNM) had won the war in the North and 
the Somali state structures had completely broken down. The north-western former 
protectorate of Somaliland declared itself independent.116 In the subsequent peace 
conferences, Somaliland adopted the beel-system,117 a conscious hybridization 
between ‘Western’ democratic institutions and traditional society.118 Instead of 
declaring war on traditional clan structures, the newly formed state tried to 
incorporate and fuse them with an imported format.  
The role of the elders and guurti is important as they are credited with much of the 
conflict reconciliation concerning thefts, killings, and land disputes in all regions of 
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Somaliland119 in lieu of effective state control. At the core of the beel-system was clan 
representation but the nomination process, highly susceptible to manipulation and 
power-sharing along interest lines, was a problem between and within all clan-groups. 
Problems included the unequal distribution of resources in the country and while 
pastoralists constitute a majority in the population, the urban representatives 
dominated the parliament.120 These are issues that have yet to be fully resolved.121 In 
response to a lack of educated and trained professionals under the clan appointment 
system, the country adopted a new constitution through referendum in 2001, the 
public vote confirming a move towards a more mixed system with an appointed House 
of Elders and an elected House of Representatives. The attempt to hybridise traditional 
institutions and a ‘Western’-style state structure appears grounded in recognition of 
the influence and power of the traditional structures coupled with a rejection of the 
policies introduced by Barre.  
President Egal stated in 1999 that some principles of the international community 
had to be accepted in order for Somaliland to gain recognition as an independent 
state.122 In order to be recognised internationally, the elite of the aspiring state thus 
perceived a need to respond to a new situational logic. The new country had to adapt 
to externally expected international standards123 starting with a unified national state 
structure.  
While Somaliland’s efforts have not achieved its goal of international recognition, it 
is clear that the political direction and transformation of Somaliland has occurred in 
response to a situational logic based on the perception and interpretation of 
international demands and internal interests. The attempt to develop a hybridised 
version of the state124 has met with varying degrees of success, displaying the 
influence of internal pressures on the process. Kibble and Walls have made the 
observation that the Somaliland constitutional ‘project’ has endured because it 
marries the perceived polarities such as those between traditional and ‘modern’ 
society.125 Though influences of international norms regarding human rights, gender 
issues, and so forth are present in the constitution, and actively discussed, it is 
important to remember that its explicit foundations are tradition and shariica.126 The 
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full hybridisation of these influences, especially the legal strands, is an on-going 
project.  
It may be tempting to assume that it is the influences of the traditional structures 
that are causing problems but considering the neighbouring, and non-secessionist, 
Puntland (north-east Somalia) this is not necessarily the case. Puntland is a purely 
based on clan structures but has managed to change its political representation several 
times. The system is explicitly ‘tradition based’ with elders electing 66 representatives 
rather than using a popular vote.127 While this has not been without problems,128 
Puntland remains intact as a political entity and has made moves towards a less 
autocratic style of governance. The clan system as a social organisational form is thus 
an ever present potential source of friction but also serves to constrain wider 
violence129 and disunity. Menkhaus has argued that it serves as a ‘midwife to emerging 
political orders’130 and thus, while in a process filled with friction, in the end it is also 
key to increased stability. In the case of Somaliland and arguably in other Somali-
dominated areas, it is precisely the institutions generated in the structures and social 
interaction of the clan-system that have provided the foundations for developing a 
peace and wider inclusive social framework. Conversely they are however also the 
base for the mobilisation of rival interests and exclusivist structures. In Somaliland the 
balance has largely been maintained between wide and narrow interests, while the 
situation is very different in Somalia. 
 
Social forces: the state as external to society 
All politics may be local, but this is especially the case in fragmented and war-torn 
societies. The Somali context is one of extremely localised politics that, while accepting 
and actualising some external influences, is able to subvert and co-opt attempts at 
social re-programming to produce an outcome that conforms to none of the original 
intentions.  In this context the modern state is testing to what extent it can assert 
social dominance, but if pushed too far the social system may at some point hit back131 
as it has done before. Examining the institutions, situational logics, and the formation 
of social forces and interest groups in the Somali context it is apparent that the 
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political focus of society is not primarily a society-wide engagement. Politics are local 
and intimately linked to the interest group with which the agents and actors are 
associated. In such a context even the state is itself external as it is intervening into an 
existing socio-political context of daily life in which it has no regular or accepted role.   
 
The state of the Somaliland state 
The Somaliland experience is particularly interesting for several reasons. The 
transformation from intensive war to relatively stable peace and wider political order 
has been a process that has managed to maintain internal legitimacy, to demobilise a 
large number of armed militias, and to counter and resolve outbursts of violence 
through traditional channels and structures. It has been a process to which the 
participants have largely stuck through the years resulting in a relatively stable but 
resource deprived popular democracy. There is a belief that stability will prevail as a 
result of the pride felt over the peace and the role of the elders,132 in addition to an 
ever-present ‘esprit of reconciliation’133among the Somaliland sub-clans.  
Since 2005 Somaliland has been able to exhibit most of the attributes associated 
with a democratic state.134 From a ‘Western’ perspective it may lack in different ways 
such as wider female representation,135 but on the whole it is an interesting example 
of what appears to be successful societal transformation without the ‘costly and 
ineffective’136 involvement of the international community. There is now a rising 
concern that the increasing outside assistance and involvement is creating a hand-out 
mentality of aid dependency.137  
The Somaliland state is in the Westphalian understanding weak. It has a clearly 
limited capacity and influence as a result of politics being intimately linked with clan.138 
As society is dominated by the sub-clan alliances,139 there seems to be an expectation 
that this is how politics are to be conducted at this stage though there is also 
discontent with the status quo.140 One respondent likened political support building to 
constructing a mobile phone tower in which case you need to distribute shares to the 
sub-clan in de facto control of the land. Political support is secured in much the same 
way (which explains the large cabinet)141 in a pattern that resembles that of the Somali 
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post-colonial state.142 Sub-clan representatives are appointed without an office as 
concessions by the President in a bid to build support143 by forging and managing a 
network of interest groups. While political competition does occur through elections in 
Somaliland, the perception is that it is largely a continuation of localised politics in a 
wider format with higher stakes. Control of the state apparatus is an end in itself, not a 
means to pursue a wider social agenda.  
The weakness of the Somaliland state institutions is evident in conflict settlement 
where traditional societal functions and religious leaders largely fulfil the role of the 
courts. Somali NGOs such as the Academy for Peace and Development have suggested 
that utilising the traditional structures in relation to land-issues and similar legal 
concerns may be a way of taking the pressure off the already weak central institutions. 
Traditional social institutions would ‘ensure the accessibility of effective dispute 
resolution mechanisms, synchronized with the norms, customs and language of the 
disputants.’144 The state would thus voluntarily surrender aspects of its own role and 
dominance to social orders that it has been unable to replace or effectively control. 
The legitimacy of the state institutions appears to be based mainly on a shared wish 
for it to succeed on some level rather than actual capacity and their real influence. The 
state was described by one respondent as the ‘child of the people’ that is shown the 
tolerance for mistakes and behaviour that a parent would show its child.145  
Politics are largely formed around clan principles and the coherence of the state 
and its institutions thus stand and fall with the willingness of the sub-clans to 
participate. Somaliland cannot afford to disregard traditional society as it is what 
provides cohesion and social control, and the interest groups of informal society are 
very much stronger than the state even in the urban areas. While it could be possible 
for the state and the market to provide alternatives to the functions performed by the 
sub-clan today in due time, it is something that should be viewed with a long 
timeframe. The clan as protector, insurance, social net, provider, and source of identity 
is not something that can be replaced easily.  
The Somaliland state, regardless of under whose control it is, does not constitute a 
well-defined social force in its own right vying for influence over society in competition 
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with other social forces. It seems to have become instrumental solely to gain 
international recognition rather than working for the people.146 There appears to be 
no real national plan beyond peace and recognition147 as an independent state which 
suggests that the aspirations are not really about taking the country in a specific 
ideological direction. The only unifying factors seem to be the wish for a maintained 
peace148 as expressed through the willingness of social institutions and actors to 
support the state even when it falters. The Somaliland state is certainly by the people 
but it is questionable to what extent it is actually for them. 
 
The state of the Somali state 
In the South, the state itself is even less of a site of competition for wider social 
influence. Access to the competition is restricted to selected elites of representatives 
vying for influence in an external process and format, backed by international forces 
and resources. It is also doubtful whether it could be said that there are any national 
politics in the South considering that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is 
trying just to keep the small areas they control from falling to the opposition. It is 
possible to make the argument that both states as well as the insurgency and defence 
alliances in the South are continuations of local political interaction mobilised by 
groups with a society-wide aspiration set. The different Islamist groups, the Sufi 
groups, the state, and individual interest groups all mobilise predominantly based on 
socially established patterns to become, or become part of, social forces. When these 
social forces clash it is a meeting between the society-wide agendas of a few 
supported by a multitude of local sub-interests with limited and local aspirations. Both 
in Somalia and Somaliland incentives are considered locally and trust is in short supply 
because of long fragmentation and war between interest groups. Any social solidarity 
group is therefore likely to be attempting to secure their own collectively defined 
interests rather than a society-wide gain. The exceptions, namely social agents with 
society-wide aspiration and agendas, can use this to accumulate social mass.  
The conflict between the TFG and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 is easily 
translated into clan terms. The TFG was led by Abdillahi Yusuf, like Barre a Darod clan 
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member and from the Puntland area, whereas the ICU was predominantly Hawiye and 
given cohesion precisely through the kinship ties.149 The language of security allowed 
the TFG to label the Hawiye population of Mogadishu as Islamists and terrorists in the 
name of the so called ‘global war on terror.’ While links to Islamist extremist groups 
should not be underestimated, overstating an Islamic ideological base or links to Al 
Qaeda can also alienate many Somalis of a more moderate nature,150 not from the 
social force they are accused of belonging to, but from the element labelling them. It 
becomes a form of solidarity unification against a perceived outside enemy where 
alignment is likely to occur along established and known patterns. 
The now dominant former part of the ICU, Al Shabaab, has displayed a capacity to 
recruit wider and to act politically rational by ‘Western’ standards but has no real 
incentive to talk to the international community. A good example is their distinction 
between political and humanitarian UN where the former, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Department of Security and 
Safety (UNDSS), and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), were 
designated enemies of Islam in a press release on July 20 2009.151 In the subsequent 
raids on the UN compounds in Baidoa only these three organisations were targeted, 
indicating a thinking organisation with motives beyond economy or indiscriminate 
targeting. It suggests a capacity to understand the necessity of the humanitarian aid 
for popular support, and the organisational command and control to enforce this. 
However, while it may appear on the surface to be a comprehensive organisation with 
wide aspirations and ideological drive, its strength is actually generated by the 
provision of stability and through traditional modes of mobilisation. 
Al Shabaab and the Sufi areas of Southern Somalia also provide excellent examples 
of offensive and defensive network alliances. The Sufi Ahlu Sunna Waljamaa mobilised 
across sub-clan divisions in order to resist Al Shabaab attacks. The organisation 
represents a collection of sub-clans with a Sufi interpretation of Islam that have been 
denounced and targeted as heretics by Al Shabaab. They signed a treaty of 
cooperation with the government on June 21 2009, arguably as a way of gaining 
additional support and protection by expanding their social force alliance. 
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Geographically close social agents were thus provided with a strong incentive to 
temporarily unite in response to an external physical threat. In order to further 
improve its capacities to resist the social force of the insurgent networks, it aligned 
with the state and tentatively joined that social force. 
The Islamist brotherhood Al-Ittihad decided in the mid-1990s that Somalia was ‘not 
ready’ for Islamic rule and initiated a long-term education plan to overcome clannism. 
The movement itself however also suffered from a low level of coordination and 
members would stay within their own clan areas. This pitted them against other clans 
and the interests of their own sub-clans as well as causing friction when outsiders 
came into leadership.152 Al Ittihad was thus as a social movement also fully subject to 
the established modes of mobilisation. 
 
Social forces as sites of competition 
With a society that is stronger than the state, local politics will dominate national 
politics as is largely the case in Somaliland. Several of the Somaliland respondents 
reflected on the political situation in Somaliland as one where the current leaders have 
lost sight of the vision and are pursuing their own narrow interests. The image of the 
politicians in the shade under the meeting tree could thus increasingly be replaced by 
an image of everyone reaching up for the fruits. Somaliland announced its 
independence in 1991153 and has since then been developing its own state structure 
and institutions with little outside help though the international assistance has 
increased in recent years. It is a multi-party democracy under development; and it is 
the fact that it has been an internal process of transformation rather than an 
externally applied one that is of main interest.  
While it has not resolved all issues, the success in comparison to for example South 
Somalia is very distinct.154 The international relative indifference towards the situation 
has had the effect of allowing Somaliland to resolve its problems without developing 
dependence on foreign assistance155 and allowed the local political and reconciliation 
processes to take their course without being controlled by outside agendas.156 Recent 
Somaliland social history is very much influenced by colonization, failed post-
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independence democratisation, and 21 years of military dictatorship. The Somaliland 
state is not a sovereign entity in the eyes of the international community, but nor is it 
de facto so internally. The state is fully subject to local conflicts and frictions, 
dominated by the interplay between the most powerful sub-clans and temporary 
alliances.  
The main reasons that politics remain a non-violent competition are the shared 
pride over the peace and the desire for international recognition. No one wants to be 
seen to break the peace event though this is not guaranteed to be an indefinite 
arrangement. Unlike the South however, Somaliland has addressed much of its 
reconciliation issues. Suggestions have been made for a similar set-up in the Southern 
processes that would support intra-clan governance and respond to the critical need of 
reconstituting governance at several levels, including traditional clan-levels.157 The 
Somaliland state formation is something of a curiosity in that it has managed to hold as 
a number of relatively coherent alliances between various sub-clans from different 
clan-families; however it remains questionable if there is a genuine society-wide 
agenda and what the outcome of the hybridisation will really be. 
 
The meeting of the local and external  
Somalia has long been subject to involvement and interventions from its neighbours 
and from global colonial powers. The country as it geographically looks today is the 
direct outcome of decisions made by colonial powers. Another inheritance from 
colonial rule is the structural differences between the North and the South or, possibly, 
between Mogadishu and the rest of the territories. There is cause to question to what 
extent the social engineering was successful beyond Mogadishu but the different 
approaches did produce separate institutional and agential conditions, and thus 
different social situational logics. There are different perceptions of to what extent the 
respective policies of indirect rule changed the political role of the elders they 
employed and what the outcomes of this were,158 but in both the North and the South 
the introduction of a hierarchical relationship was certainly a change to the traditional 
consensus system of localised governance.159 Seen through the perspective here it is 
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entirely possible that while the vested interests of the role of elders changed through 
colonial practises, the main institutions and logics did not necessarily follow. The more 
massive social engineering project in the South affected institutions, agents and actors 
at all levels of society thus producing a more substantial change but that does not 
mean it completely replaced established patterns; meanwhile the less vigorous British 
attempts to introduce social changes in the North met with such resistance that they 
remained attempts.160  
The Somali context is intensely political and while colonial practises may have laid 
the ground for the complex situation today, Somali society has actuated and 
internalised some of these influences and moved on. The structural and ideational 
conditions available for institution generation are thus very different from prior to and 
immediately after colonisation. Constant interaction at a sub-state level through trade, 
war, and marriage has developed a keen and very real political skill at highly localised 
levels. The external influences have an impact on Somali society but the outcomes are 
rarely the intended. Foreign extremist groups find much like the UN and other 
international organisations that their projects based on ideological positions are 
subverted and co-opted into local agendas through fickle alliances and discursive 
adaptation. The difficulties are exacerbated by the residual effects on the ideational 
and material conditions from previous experiences of foreign influence such as the 
interventions in the 1990s, the invasion of the South by Ethiopia in 2006, American 
bombings, and Islamist attacks and threats that all contribute to shaping the 
situational logics today. The current international engagement seems supportive of the 
local structures discursively but in the implementation on the ground, another picture 
emerges that correlates to the liberal peace agenda discussed above. This has 
obviously also been picked up on by the Somaliland population resulting in a less than 
flattering image of the internationals, their motives, and their sincerity.161  
The externally generated and controlled peace agendas have been manipulated 
from the start, not only by the Somali representatives involved, but by international 
interests as well. International discourses of ‘universal’ values and counter-terrorism 
have been adopted locally to affect the resource distribution in local issues. Even the 
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social mass of supposedly international Jihadist groups such as Al Shabaab is more 
linked to established modes of mobilisation than any global Caliphate or aspirations of 
destroying ‘the West.’  
Because of the prevailing conditions and situational logics, any interventionist 
project in Somaliland or Somalia becomes a resource base that can be accessed by 
groups with means of control in pursuit of local interests. This has to be considered 
quite normal in an environment largely shaped by survival strategies focused on the 
immediate interest group. At the same time regional international parties compete for 
influence in Somalia but there seems to be a demarcation line between regional 
powers vying for influence over the government and movements vying for influence 
over the population, reflecting perhaps the different ideological aspirations and modes 
of control. While local Somali interest groups are hi-jacking ideological projects for 
their own purposes, there may also be a risk that ideology slowly hi-jacks the Somali 
conflicts. As these influences become entrenched positions in a mix of old animosities 
and new ideological discourse over time the conflict spectrum will be further 
complicated. If that happens, local and larger conflicts will most likely increasingly feed 
into each other and the problems become increasingly irreconcilable.  
There is currently substantial international involvement in Somalia where the World 
Bank and the UN have developed a Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP). According to the programme they bring a mix of ‘capacity, neutrality, credibility 
and technical expertise.’162 This is a bold claim to make, especially for the UN as it has 
a negative history in Somalia with for example the July 1993 killing of up to 73 elders at 
a claimed peace meeting in Mogadishu. While the number may be disputed,163 it is the 
locally held perceptions that matter and though carried out by US forces, the bombing 
was referred to in the North 16 years later as a UN action. This indicates a shared 
negative history through which all current interaction is filtered. The UN has also taken 
a political stance in the South which rhymes very badly with self-proclaimed neutrality. 
The UN operations in the South in the 1990s generated much negative shared history, 
affecting the UN’s credibility and trust in Somalia today. The involvement of then UN 
Secretary General, but former Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister, Boutros Boutros-
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Ghali was further complicating matters as it was seen as a direct continuation of 
Egyptian interests in Somalia.164  
In addition to this the deployment of an international fleet to stop piracy while 
illegal fishing fleets from several nations are emptying the Somali waters165 also adds 
to the anger. It would seem that any project initiated by the UN is starting from a 
distinctly less optimistic point than the RDP indicates the case to be. One international 
respondent explained that certain UN agencies lacked credibility to such an extent that 
the connection to the UN had to be expressed in a reduced profile in project 
implementation. The organisation’s logo could simply not be displayed on projects 
anymore.166 The RDP specifically mentions the resilience and social organisation 
capacity of Somali society and advocates for a rule of law ‘drawing on the strengths of 
the existing traditional, sharia and secular systems.’167 In reality the programmes seem 
more driven by assumptions and political agendas along ideological lines than a serious 
attempt to understand and build on local existing structures. One international who 
did feel that adaptation was necessary bluntly admitted to projecting one image for 
the donors while doing something very different on the ground in order to be able to 
get anything done at all.168 Implementing organisations also seemed to be subject to 
political pressure to pursue certain objectives and prioritise not so much the actual 
situation but what is perceived as politically important in the donor countries. A Somali 
respondent working closely with internationals noted that ‘ideas about the local needs 
are often donor driven and lack connection with the local realities’169 while an 
international worker described how projects corresponding to donor-driven value-
bases were prioritised in selection for implementation.170  
Some of these projects also seem to lack realistic time-scales and how thoroughly 
they are thought through, stopping short of analysing potentially negative outcomes to 
the situational logic where they are implemented. The outcome of some international 
projects in Somaliland risk developing further the stress put on society and producing 
negative situational logics in the interaction with the local conditions. One Somali 
respondent observed that ‘[w]hen the international community gets involved there are 
conditions and demands that cause friction.’171  
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A common perception advanced by respondents was of most support going to the 
South and little ending up in Somaliland. Much of the humanitarian aid destined for 
other areas, such as Puntland and Ethiopia, is unloaded in Somaliland which 
exacerbates this impression. This information then spreads, reinforcing the opinion 
voiced by several respondents that the money intended for Somaliland ends up in the 
pockets of the international organisations.172 This produces a range of situational logics 
in response to a perceived discrepancy in terms of interests. It generates resentment 
and hostility that can eventually be manipulated by social agents to gain social mass 
and provoke violent responses to the foreign presence.  
The clash between locally shaped and internationally produced logics are so great 
that there are concerns that social mapping and capacity analysis were done at a 
minimum level and that projects were failing because donors insisted on imposing 
their will.173 This discrepancy between donor-driven projects and the on-the-ground 
reality has generated a perception among some that ‘the West’, as an accumulated 
system with different social dynamics, is interrupting the hybridisation process of 
Somaliland,174 and that the internationals are there to corrupt their values and 
society.175  
 
How situational logics are seen and approached 
A few examples have been chosen to illustrate how internal conditions and external 
intervention interact to produce unintended outcomes in contrast with how local 
agents and actors choose to engage with the context. The first concerns the 
Somaliland peace process compared with the UN self-perception as being an impartial 
broker of peace. The second focuses on how the proliferation of watering holes has 
affected the local conditions and how local NGOs work with the issue of gender equity. 
The final example is a focus on co-optation and subversion in the space of interaction. 
 
Building peace the Somali way – the situational logics of reconciliation 
The north-western clans in what today de facto constitutes Somaliland were 
engaged on different sides during the civil war which left a considerable amount of 
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tension and mistrust. The peace processes of the 1990s are a source of deep pride in 
Somaliland and represent a very strong situational influence where no one really wants 
to be seen as the one who broke the peace. The level of reconciliation displayed is 
impressive and the continued legitimacy of traditional structures rendered the 
weakness of the state in a Westphalian understanding of little importance. The 1991 
Grand Conference of traditional elders in Burco did not settle all grievances but did 
manage to terminate active hostilities and create a common political framework that 
endorsed reconciliation, independence and a two-year transitional government with 
representation from clans outside the largest of the clan-families, the Isaaq.176  
The peace did not last long and in 1992 fighting broke out quite possibly in response 
to the initiative by the government to disarm the militias and create a new national 
army,177 combined with transferring control of local revenue bases to government 
control.178 The government was trying to assert itself against local interests of the 
various social agents. At the subsequent Burao peace conference it was instead agreed 
that all clans would be responsible for security in their own areas.179 The clan militias 
were a source of security in relation to other sub-clans but also had revenue schemes 
that benefitted their solidarity groups. The localised nature of benefits and the 
composition of the militias quickly cemented the nature of the conflict along clan 
lines.180 In 1993 it was estimated that there were 50,000 armed militia-men that 
needed to be demobilised with ports and airports being particular points of 
contention.  
The SNM vision for the newly proclaimed Somaliland had been a rejection of the 
inherited central state model and an open acknowledgement of the clan system as the 
root of political stability, social cohesion, and economic activity.181 In their two years of 
government they however failed to consolidate and establish any significant control 
and function. There were public protests against the outbreaks of violence in 1992, 
organized and carried out largely by women and as a result elders from all regions 
convened to mediate182 in a guurti that managed to negotiate a ceasefire. This 
facilitated the 1993 Grand Borame Conference which lasted for five months and 
involved 150 voting elders and an estimated 2,000 participants.  
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The peace negotiations were undertaken within the framework of the established 
clan structures and on a highly localised basis conformed to locally legitimate formats 
and addressed locally defined issues. Framed as an inter-clan struggle rather than a 
nationwide bi-party contest, the deadlock became manageable and resulted in a 
number of local peace discussions,183 facilitating a large reconciliatory conference and 
subsequently starting a process of adaptation to international norms. The conference 
also agreed on a peaceful transfer of power from the interim SNM government to the 
civilian Beel system.184 However, new fighting erupted in 1994 in a series of smaller 
localised conflicts also referred to as the ‘Brothers’ War.’185  
Until 1996, there was little progress in the various peace talks and it was only after 
five months of deliberations in Hargeisa that a peace agreement was reached. This 
included a provisional constitution and a decision to move towards a multi-party 
democracy after a transition period that ended in 2001186 with a referendum that 
would formally approve the constitution and a move from the Beel-system to a multi-
party democracy.187 While the peace conferences did not resolve all conflicts, the 
breaches of the peace have been very local, limited in scope, and usually break out 
among sub-sub clan groups in accordance with old stress-lines. Some have raised the 
question whether Somaliland’s relative success is based on the dominance of one clan 
family, the Isaaq, but this is not a correct image of the clan-family dynamic. The fact is 
that there are deep rifts between the Isaaq sub-clans and that they compete for power 
and resources.188 The outbursts into violence between Isaaq sub-clans in the 1990s 
actually contributed to the willingness and trust of the minority clans189 as it reduced 
the fears of Somaliland being an Isaaq project.  
The Somaliland peace conferences are an example of how social pressures influence 
political developments and conflict. The situational logics facing the socially defined 
actors were dynamically shaped and influenced both inside and outside of the 
conferences. The latter was made possible by an aggregate social pressure being able 
to form in proximity to and direct response to issues being addressed. A major factor 
affecting the process of reconciliation is the traditional financing of peace conferences 
where one clan or group of clans will pay for the costs involved and host the 
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conference. On occasion, for example in Borame in 1993,190 this has meant hundreds 
of people turning up and having to be fed which puts a strain on the economy and 
resources of the host clan. Through the tradition of reciprocation it is understood that 
the next meeting will be hosted by the opponents and there is thus an economic 
incentive that generates a situational logic in favour of progress and a strong 
disincentive for unnecessarily prolonging the conferences.191 Nevertheless, the 
principle of consensus means that these conferences will often take a long time, 
sometimes months.192  
Another factor that was mentioned in interviews was the proximity pressure. Peace 
conferences are open to all men and, at least in Somaliland, increasingly to women. 
This means that an aggregate social pressure is generated as large numbers of people 
will travel to the conferences to make their voices heard. Local conflicts and grievances 
between sub-clans that threatened coherence and stability were identified193 and 
addressed individually under an explicit prohibition of discussing national issues. By 
gradually solving local differences it was possible to eventually hold larger conferences 
that were not derailed by interests and animosities generated in the local spaces of 
socio-political interaction.  
An important foundation of the reconciliation which was employed in each of the 
Somaliland peace processes was the principle of xalaydhalay.194 This is a concept of 
forgiveness which is used when the costs and reparations are deemed incalculable195 
or so massive that reparations become unrealistic. Instead of seeking compensation 
and perpetuating the conflict, an agreement is made to forfeit all claims between the 
parties to the conflict in the interest of reaching a peace.  
 
UN peace brokering 
The Somali approach to peace and reconciliation reflects the pragmatic norms 
present in much of Somali society.196 The strategies of the UN as an external 
peacemaker on the other hand are interesting as a contrast in attitude, approach, and 
contextual anchoring. In Somaliland the elders initially decided to allow UN troops 
during the early 1990s intervention, but they were pressured and swayed to change 
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this decision by women who had mobilised in opposition. The policies and operations 
in the South under UN flag are likely to have strengthened the resolve of the North 
that it would be better to deal with their problems without foreign intervention. The 
view of the external peacemaker as a party to the conflict is reflected in a discussion 
about the possible UN presence where an elder reportedly asked what clan UNOSOM 
represented.197 This illustrates that politics are indeed not only local but directly tied in 
with the socio-political frames of reference of the population.  
It is worth reflecting on the Somali peace-negotiation factors in relation to the 
international conferences arranged to address the conflict in the South. Apart from 
crucial parties to the conflict not being invited, the conferences have been held outside 
of Somalia, at the expense of the international community and away from the social 
pressure of proximity and participation or presence. The traditional incentives for 
closure and agreements have thus been removed, effectively eliminating the 
facilitating mechanisms built into Somali peace-making, displayed in the Somaliland 
peace negotiations. It seems there has been an assumption on the part of the 
international community that there is a common interest in an objective peace and 
that this could be sought in an externally created and controlled environment. This 
assumption largely ignores the historical and regional context shaping the social 
influences and reflects a common over-estimation by outsiders of to what extent local 
political actors ‘own the conflict’ and share the external perceptions of ‘peace.’198  
The tradition of consensus decisions within Somali culture makes for very long 
negotiations but by holding them locally and being open to all interested a social 
pressure is accumulated that affects the delegates. By contrast of course, by removing 
selected delegates from their accountability groups and placing them in a luxurious 
environment with all expenses paid you remove several of the central situational 
incentives to resolution.  
Focusing on a state level agreement rather than low level conflict resolution leaves 
the interest groups intact and antagonistic, primed to assert locally defined interests 
under a wider umbrella negotiation. The international interests have chosen to by-pass 
the local conflicts and negotiate a state solution in line with the near obsession with 
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format and substance. What happens is that the state and the external resources 
becomes a prize to compete for under zero-sum conditions, rather than a means to 
govern. 
 
Building conflict - changing the situational logics by constructing wells 
The proliferation of mechanical wells and underground water deposits created to 
counter the water shortage has reduced nomadic movements which in turn has 
increased grazing land deterioration. The practise began under colonial 
administration199 but continues today in accordance with international strategies for 
aid and development. Already scarce resources are thus made scarcer in an attempt to 
counter the shortage of another resource, suggesting perhaps a limited consequence 
analysis. The propensity for geographical cluster settlements of sub-clans means that a 
new well also constitutes a shift in local power relationships. Despite this, projects 
addressing the illegal encroachment of land are often rejected favour of projects 
corresponding to a liberal value agenda200 although land-based conflicts are now the 
primary source of social conflict in Somaliland.201 According to conversations with 
international aid and development workers in the course of this research, land 
conflicts are seen as too complicated to deal with. 
 
Somali NGOs and the issue of gender  
Somali NGOs in Somaliland are working within the social conditions to affect them 
not by confrontation, but by contribution. There is for example a Somali-run training 
programme to teach young women to vocalise their issues in order to break the 
socialisation into silence.202 This approach stretches over a three year cycle aiming to 
let Somali women define issues relevant to them and eventually to discuss possible 
solutions to them.  
There is also a project with female ‘peace councils’ that meet and debate parallel to 
the all-male traditional shir, a project that has been well received according to the 
female Somali organisation that designed and implemented it. A point was made of 
approaching the elders first to make sure there were no misunderstandings of the 
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purpose and role of these councils, indicating the importance socially accorded to 
traditional structures. They have gradually gained a voice in clan affairs primarily as a 
parallel structure being consulted or sometimes invited to participate, thus 
overcoming a participatory obstacle gradually and by proven value rather than through 
legislation and workshops. Despite the funding running out, the councils remained 
active and similar projects were being considered in 2009.203 A female researcher 
reported a similar relationship with her own sub-clan that increasingly consulted her 
on issues facing the solidarity group.204 These accounts seem to indicate a changing set 
of social conditions and situational logics on the issue of gender relations. Yet it is a 
change that is taking place in ways and spaces of interaction relevant to the 
perspective of Somali women themselves rather than a ‘universal’ agenda. It uses the 
local conditions as a platform rather than seeking to eliminate the existing social 
structures and replace them completely. 
 
Unintended outcomes of interventions 
The external involvement on all sides in the South also provides opportunities for 
Somali communities there to engage international resources in what in reality are 
usually local conflicts.205 Thus Jihadist volunteers, American strike fighters, Ethiopian 
troops, and other outside influences can be manipulated to play a role in local conflicts 
by employing the relevant discourse. One practise to discredit rivals is for example to 
spread rumours that they are ‘fundamentalists’206 and thus making them targets in the 
‘global war on terror.’ Somalia was invaded by Ethiopia in 2006 in a limited 
intervention with international backing in support of the TFG. The intervention ended 
two years later with the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops; the leader of the ICU, Mr 
Ahmed, being selected president of the internationally recognised and supported 
government; and the Islamists of the Al Shabaab militia taking over the temporary 
capital of Baidoa while the parliament and government was in Djibouti. In 2010 
Uganda was targeted by Al Shabaab in retaliation for its troop presence in the AU 
forces in the South207 where the AU ‘peacekeeping’ troops are also actively involved in 
the fighting208 between the Darod and Hawiye respectively dominated sides.  
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The international position has been to generate peace and prosperity from the top-
down and from the outside, manifested in a succession of internationally backed and 
failing governments with no empirical legitimacy and close to no territorial control. The 
discrepancies between the local reality and outside programmes also provide 
opportunities for misuse in other ways. For example the UNOSOM demobilisation 
projects in South Somalia in the early 1990s were used by militia leaders to pay for 
housing and food for their fighters209 thus sustaining their fighting capabilities. 
Situational outcomes are thus largely unrelated to specific projects and more to how 
local agents actualise and use the resources projects represent.  
The same problem is faced by international Islamist groups trying to establish a 
presence and influence in Somalia. The Somali brand and application of Islam is 
distinctly in conflict with a more political international Jihad, and external involvement 
is frowned upon while also generating expectations of local benefits in exchange for 
acceptance.210 Given these problems, and the ever potent presence of the sub-clan 
and the diya group, the social mass of the Islamists does not seem to be connected to 
ideological fervour as much as to established social modes of mobilisation. 
The balances and arrangements created between social interest groups are easily 
off-set in unintended ways by outside intervention. A new power relationship that will 
require settlement; an enclosure on communal lands creates new frictions that will 
need resolution; and an outright invasion or threat against a clan, and thus 
geographical area, generates a defensive logic of alliance-building. This has been the 
pattern in the violence in the South of Somalia and in the relapses into conflict 
suffered by Somaliland in the 1990s. Political interests and aspirations seemingly 
follow the same pattern today and the notion of even the pre-1991 Somali state as 
exercising any meaningful everyday authority beyond repression in the rural areas of 
Somalia is contested.211 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to explain how interest groups and social forces form in the 
Somali and Somaliland contexts, and how this relates to the outcomes of 
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interventionist projects. The complex and largely opportunistic nature of Somali social 
interaction provides some aspects of possible generalisations, but the shifting nature 
of alliances means that the relevant social dynamics are dependent on a subjective 
local context that often includes geographically distant solidarity members, for 
example the Diaspora. The same opportunism also means that actuation is extremely 
subjective on a case to case basis. The Somali case presents clear examples of the 
challenging of, and resisting against, social forces by local interest groups. In the South 
there are multiple social forces making violent authority claims in the local contexts 
while in Somaliland the process has largely been peaceful since 1997. In both cases 
however, local interest groups are able to assert a relative degree of independence 
reflected in their strength in relation to the social force capacities. 
The strong orientation towards the immediate solidarity groups has meant that the 
alliances entered into as different social forces are largely fickle and temporary in 
nature presenting a tableau of possible options awaiting actuation by different interest 
groups. It also means that the social forces themselves are, through the accumulation 
of diverse motives and interests, largely external to the immediate local context. The 
established modes of mobilisation provide routes around this issue as the social 
divisions along clan and sub-clan lines have conditioned and incentivised certain 
patterns of alignment. These are however not absolutes, nor should they be 
considered sustainable and stable foundations of peace as evidenced by the example 
of the competition within the Isaaq in Somaliland.  
The internationally controlled peace processes in the South are clear examples of 
the discrepancies between interventionist assumption and Somali situational logics in 
that they have completely detached negotiations from where accountability and social 
pressure is accumulated, as well as failed to address locally relevant issues before 
addressing large ideological and social force concerns. The Somaliland peace processes 
were by contrast largely successful in stopping overt violence and promoting a level of 
reconciliation thanks to the locally accumulated social pressure that shaped the 
immediate situational logics for the involved representatives. 
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Somaliland has displayed a relatively high level of success despite meagre resources 
and a decidedly weak state structure. Factors such as the small population size, 
territorial size, and the polarization against the South may have contributed but 
predominantly, social functions have been able to control outbreaks of violence. In the 
Somali and Somaliland contexts the diya-group is the constant unit of social 
organisation actuated in the local social dynamics. Occasional wider mobilisation will 
seemingly occur but usually in temporary alliances of convenience, able to gain social 
mass by drawing on local conflicts but conversely also drawn into local conflicts by 
interest groups. Instances of actual and widespread social change are not that 
common in the Somali context and the Somaliland transformation constitutes the 
clearest example. When President Egal declared that Somaliland would have to adopt 
some international norms it was as an instrument to gain recognition internationally. 
However, because of changing social conditions some of these changes are being 
realised slowly and incrementally. A notable case is the role of women who are gaining 
increased recognition on the political scene. This is at least in part due to the work of 
Somaliland organisations that apply cautious and consensus-dependent strategies of 
change in relation to existing structures of power. While not surrendering to them, 
they acknowledge and work alongside them to display what contributions can be 
made, thus allowing time for changing dynamics to be internalised as part of shared 
interests. The institutions that develop and are actuated locally are directly related to 
the structural and ideational conditions. Somaliland has made an attempt to hybridise 
internally legitimate structures with externally generated formats in order to meet 
internal as well as external demands. 
The case of Somaliland also has particular interest because it allows the removal of 
completely external sources as the actual drivers for reform. The decision to transform 
the social context was made at a social force level but also approved by referendum 
and carefully addressed through multiple localised negotiations. Yet many of the issues 
facing Somali and international social forces are still present in Somaliland indicating 
that the interaction between social force aspirations and relevant social contexts 
produce unintended outcomes even when intentionally being hybridised. 
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In light of this chapter it is possible to see that the capacities and aspirations of 
social forces in Somalia and Somaliland are intimately linked with the acceptance and 
actuation by local interest groups. Rather than relying on abstract ideological 
constructs to attract support, social mass is acquired through established modes of 
mobilisation and along existing social dividers. Social force projects are external to 
these contexts even when local interests are expressed through them. In such cases a 
social force controlled and directed by narrow interests will provoke defensive 
alliances in response for protection and for competition in favour of alternative and 
conflicting agendas. The outcomes of interventionist projects are ultimately decided at 
a highly localised level where relevant social interaction occurs, unlikely to conform 
fully to either the interventionist agenda or local interests. In the end, the relevant 
decisions are made in the shade of the meeting tree. 
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Chapter Four – Afghanistan: In the Shadows of Mountains 
The case of Afghanistan, in some respects, offers an even more diverse and complex 
picture than Somalia. There a number of groups with separate social constructs and 
images shaping their institutions and structures. The inter-relations of these groups are 
regulated in a ‘complex fabric of interlaced social and local categories’1 that are 
subjectively actuated. While sharing some traits through years of mutual influence, 
some of the differences are substantial. There is also division and diversity within 
various ethnic or other groups, based in part on geographical location and access to 
resources. This results in the formation of interest groups along a wide variety of 
identities, interests, and allegiances. War, natural disaster, and government policies 
have forced population displacements in the past which continue to generate conflict 
where groups have been resettled and in areas where refugees are returning.2  
To further add to the complexity, there are also issues of religious diversity and 
integration between the predominantly Sunni population and the Shia minority. Given 
this diversity and the multiple levels of social organisation there is reason to give some 
serious thought to the idea that there is ‘no such thing as an Afghan’,3 and that it is 
predominantly in the Diaspora that Afghanistan melts into one homeland.4 Years of 
war have cultivated an opportunistic mobilisation of identities and a corresponding 
selective disregard for them. Aspects of Afghan ideational and structural factors and 
the institutions they create will however be discussed in order to illustrate how these 
factors influence and shape the situational logic facing different groups. The process of 
understanding where socio-political power and influence is situated is thus a complex 
task with a highly localised applicability. The Afghan experiences of external 
interventions have a long life; in the South of the country the shared memories of two 
19th Century wars means the British are still described in derogatory terms5 and that 
the current conflict is framed as simply picking up where the previous left off. This 
chapter will not attempt to detail a specific social picture of Afghanistan simply 
because there are so many. What it will do is to relate the aspects identified in the 
framework, to Afghan socio-political interaction today as well as in history. 
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Actuated institutions and roles 
Afghanistan is a patriarchal and patrilineal society6 and for all the peoples of 
Afghanistan kinship has been an essential means to mobilise political and economic 
resources.7 Though the international interests in Afghanistan and Afghan government 
officials like to advertise a range of claimed social changes, there is cause to view much 
of it with scepticism. Traditional values and religion play an important role in the 
worldviews of Afghans8 even though the social patterns have changed to some degree 
over time and through decades of large-scale conflict. What were previously relatively 
stable modes of organisation in terms of identity and stratification9 have now been 
further diversified and become more fluid. Strategies of survival are forged out of a 
number of sources such as ownership of land, flocks, and cash; seniority; family 
connections; political and economic relationships with outside forces; and Islamic piety 
and charisma. These factors are defined and distributed by the social relations 
established through for example kinship and religion.10 Established modes of 
engagement are echoed in the example of the practice of ministers replacing staff with 
their own solidarity networks on appointment.11  
 
Shuras and jirgas 
Traditionally, local leadership was exercised by the elites of khans or by maliks - the 
village and tribe headmen12 in councils. Two terms with slightly different origins are 
used here to describe this council of power-holders within a solidarity group: jirga and 
shura. They have similar functions13 though a shura has permanent members and a 
jirga is traditionally convened ad hoc in response to a specific issue.14 The shura is also 
more hierarchical than the more egalitarian jirgas, but the terms are increasingly used 
interchangeably.15 A jirga can also be called at the national level (Loya Jirga), and an 
institutionalised Loya Jirga has been the highest representative body of the Afghan 
state since the 1920s.16  
The prevalent form of village politics in was and is centred on competition between 
leaders17 who use kinship ties and wealth to cultivate followings.  A leader and his 
influence were and are defined in competition with other leaders and local rivalries are 
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continued even when belonging to the same political party.18 Following the gradual 
shift in power relations since 1978, the traditional khan has given way to a new 
generation of power-holders who rely more on coercive capacity to maintain their 
power.19 The commanders who emerged during the jihad and the civil war were able 
to develop an autonomous economic and social base but they soon fell into the same 
patterns of behaviour as the khans before them.20 In addition, many local communities 
also saw the jihad as an opportunity to expand their local autonomy.21  
In the wake of the fall of the Taliban regime, many of these commanders regained 
control in their local areas but their power is often better understood as having 
influence over one or a number of shuras rather than having direct administrative 
functions. It should be remembered, however, that there are individuals and groups 
that have become so independently strong that they are able to act with impunity in 
relation to shared norms and laws22 when local groups are not able to challenge them 
directly. Under normal circumstances, local councils will settle and mediate in disputes 
as well as organize economic cooperation, such as water sharing or land use.23 In rural 
areas where the government’s reach is weak, councils also perform a vital function as 
the ‘first line’ of justice.24 Estimates vary but they generally tend to hold that between 
8025 and 90 per cent of what would otherwise be court cases are instead handled 
locally by jirgas or shuras26 in a pattern remarkably similar to that of Somaliland. It thus 
largely replaces the official justice system which is generally considered to be corrupt 
or at best ineffective.27 From a state-centric perspective, it may be problematic to have 
other systems that are filling in for the state. The fact is, however, that if the 
government does not have the capacity to deliver a functioning judicial system, social 
order requires some form of alternative structure.  
 
Religion 
Around 99 per cent of the Afghan population are Muslim,28 of which around 80-85 
per cent is Hanafi Sunni and the remaining is Shia.29 Islam constitutes a source of 
values and ethics, and it is through this framework ‘that the peasant tries to 
understand the foreign visitor.’30 While other influences such as secular law and for 
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example pashtunwali may be used as the source of legal and social codes in some 
circumstances, sharia is ever-present in slightly different forms as moral and legal 
guidelines that exist independently of the state and transcends divisions between 
identity groups.31 Ahmed Rashid claims that few Muslims observe the rituals of religion 
with such piety as Afghans.32 While this may be unfair to other Muslims, the presence 
of religion is clear in daily life and makes it a potentially powerful mobiliser. The 
thorough penetration of everyday life is central to the ideological perspective of 
Islamism which seeks to address all parts of life in order to protect Islam from outside 
influences.33  
The most common religious leader is the mullah who traditionally belonged to the 
village rather than a nation-wide body of clergy. Among the eastern Pashtun, who 
largely resisted the expansion of Islamist influence, the mullahs have more been seen 
as an occupational group than as part of the tribe. The role of the mullah contains 
vested interests that were traditionally supposed to be detached from earthly political 
competition and the mullah represented a congregation, not necessarily a particular 
interest group. In this context the role as teacher and prayer leader is respected but 
interference in local politics carries the risk of being shunned.34  
Traditionally, it has been the case that the mullahs would have no authority beyond 
the social boundary of their congregation,35 but the role of the mullah varies. Among 
communities aligned with Islamist groups the mullah takes on a more political role. 
This has put some of the Taliban mullahs and commanders on a collision course with 
community elders. Not only are they younger, they also represent a competing interest 
backed by an alternative source of authority36 that challenges that of the elders. While 
the Taliban has had a strong support base amongst the village mullahs, the conflict 
between Sufism and the Taliban brand of jihadist Islamism has led to pockets of 
resistance among Sufist mullahs in Paktia and Khost provinces where the clergy was 
still hostile to the Taliban in 2006.37 The role of religion is complex in Afghanistan and 
the associated roles and institutions are simultaneously part of, shaping, and subject to 
the local environment. 
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Social codes and practices 
Pashtunwali is a collection of local tribal codes but has a number of primary themes 
such as hospitality, bravery, revenge, asylum, and honour.38 There is plenty of debate 
about the importance of honour in Afghan society and conduct. Some observers 
accord it a great deal of importance and penetration of Afghan social behaviour. The 
accuracy of this can certainly be disputed on a number of grounds such as the 
observable reduced importance of traditional values over decades of war and 
displacement. In addition the notion of collective honour has always been stronger in 
some areas and defined in different ways between different groups. It is highly 
debatable to what extent codes such as the pashtunwali are actuated on a regular 
basis today and the adherence to a traditional tribal identity varies across territory and 
depending on situation. In addition, it’s sometimes localised and always dynamic 
nature means it should be understood as an idealised concept rather than an 
absolute.39 With this said it is also the case that every Pashtun ‘knows his tribe’,40 
meaning that he can identify and potentially be mobilised along his lineage.  
The notion of ‘honour’ is a much referred to part of Pashtunwali. Much of the 
discussion around this tends to treat it as an objective and collectively agreed notion. 
In reality it is highly subjective in content, meaning, and actuation. The interesting part 
is whether honour is referred to at all in a specific context and thus potentially 
actuated as a mobiliser by members of different social groups. Traditionally honour 
has been linked to defence and control of namus, consisting of ‘woman, gold, and 
land.’41 The concept of badla demands retribution against the offender or his 
immediate solidarity group.42 At least elements of this notion of honour are actuated 
in social interaction through discursive reference. In the end honour does exist socially, 
ready to be subjectively actuated either as an absolute or as a convenient justification. 
 
Modes of Mobilisation 
Afghan society, like any other, consists of a number of social categories to which an 
individual may belong simultaneously, and sometimes despite inherent contradictions 
depending on the context.43 A few of these modes of mobilisation will be highlighted 
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here in order to indicate the depth of complexity. As Jabri has pointed out the Taliban 
are usually framed as ‘the’ force to be reckoned with while ‘the rest of the Afghan 
population is reduced to a depoliticised bio-political mass in need of rescue, and hence 
denied political agency.’44 This diversity calls the notion of a meaningful ‘Afghan’ 
identity, understood as a solidarity function for sustainable intra-social unity and 
mobilisation, into question. Interests and solidarity groups are framed in terms of 
kinship, occupational, geographical or similar nature and occurs in different formats 
depending of the location and context examined.   
 
Ethnic and tribal groups 
There are five major ethnic groups in Afghanistan; the Pashtun (45 per cent); the 
Tajik (25 per cent); the Uzbek (10 per cent); the Hazara (10 per cent); the Aimaq (10 
per cent), and an additional number of smaller groups. 45 These ethnic identities can, 
depending on the situation, be used as higher order mobilisers as exemplified by the 
forced population moves by Abdur Rahman and his mobilisation of Ghilzai Pashtun 
against the Hazara. Some Islamist groups have also been known to use ethnicity as a 
factor in mobilisation.46 The largest ethnic group, the Pashtun tribes, are 
predominantly in the south and the east. While the tribe remains a factor in 
mobilisation, its’ comparative weight as a political mobiliser varies. There are however 
examples where even large solidarity groups have been faced with situational logics 
produced in the feedback between social institutions, and the interaction of social 
agents and actors.  
The Mangal tribe provide one such example of repeated coherent mobilisation 
among the Pashtun that is most likely an outcome of the material and ideational 
conditions in their immediate environment resulting in socially shared and established 
mechanisms of interaction: in 1959 a resource conflict over trees led to an exodus of 3-
4000 Mangal Pashtun to Pakistan after an Army officer intending to mediate was shot 
by a Mangal tribesman. In order to escape state retribution against the tribe, the 
Mangal left Afghanistan but returned in 1960 following a general amnesty.47 The social 
implications of that one hot produced a situational logic facing the Mangal as a social 
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agent rather than an individual with a rifle. They have also acted as a largely coherent 
political unit in the current conflict. In 2003 they implemented a self-initiated opium 
cultivation ban and organised a defence against the Taliban but with little to no 
recognition from Kabul and the international forces.48 After apparently false 
intelligence was provided to NATO forces, several night-raids were executed against a 
group of elders and as a result the Mangal turned from pro-government to pro-
insurgents.49  
While traditional divisions may sometimes become obsolete, they are often still 
present implicitly and influence how alliances will form.50 In the North there were 
massacres in both directions between Pashtuns and other groups that took on a 
distinctly ethnic quality prior to and after the beginning of the 2001 intervention. 
Retaliatory attacks were exchanged and after the Taliban were driven away there were 
pogroms against the isolated Pashtun communities.51 Ethnicity is usable as a mobiliser 
but requires an external coherent threat to produce meaningful internal coherence. 
Like the clan families or sub-clans in Somalia, the level of unity is unlikely to be 
sustainable when the specific threat recedes or possibly even while it remains. 
The term qawm52 will be employed here meaning an interest group with a solidarity 
aspect and is thus seen as a building block for social forces mobilisation. Qawm is at 
the core of social organisation and denotes any communal solidarity group based on 
for example kinship, religious group, residence, or occupation.53 All meaningful social 
activity within the qawm is regulated by a shura or jirga,54 but because its power relies 
on moral pressure, the developing culture of impunity can weaken its influence.55 In a 
larger population centre each qawm has its own mosque and elders tied in with the 
neighbourhood it controls.56 In relation to public elections it is often the case that 
voting is decided not on an individual basis but by the local strongman or through 
communal discussion within the qawm. Such deliberations within solidarity groups can 
go through several rounds.57  
Some translate qawm as ‘tribe’ but this is not how it is used here. The term ‘tribe’ is 
better reserved for qawms that are strong on traditional customs,58 and a ‘tribe’ is 
most often not a corporate or political unit59 in its own right because it becomes too 
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large. The qawm comes under the influence of socially shared norms and rules as 
villagers ‘oscillate’ between the local power-holders and the mosque,60 or external 
alternative sources of power enhancement. As in so much of Afghan society there is 
variation in different areas when it comes to the principle of the qawm. In particular 
the Shiite Hazaras are socially more geared towards a more individualistic basis of 
organisation.61 Among the Farsiwan and Tajik groups there are no tribal structures and 
the qawm is an association based on residence or place of birth whereas the Aimaq 
groups have various tribal identities.62 In times of crisis such as the jihads of 1928 and 
1979, these more narrow groupings were superseded by transcending ideological 
mobilisation, but will still make themselves known throughout the wider political 
organisation63 or social force. The immediate security of the Afghans during the many 
years of war has been dependant on local networks and assistance.64 
 
Religion 
Islam has been used alone as a mobiliser but has also bled together with the party 
politics of the mujahidin predominantly in Peshawar during the 1980s. Even the PDPA 
leader, Najibullah, would often invoke Islam in his public speeches despite 
representing a distinctly atheist ideology. His government also provided funds for 
mosques, religious schooling, and paid the salaries for 16,000 mullahs.65  
Even secular power holders stress the importance of Sharia and Islam over 
tradition66 but this does not mean that Islam is a sustainable source of mobilisation 
over local interest formations under normal circumstances. Outside of normal 
circumstances however, there is greater potential for such mobilisation, and the 
Soviet-Afghan war and the following internal conflict resulted in massive population 
displacement.67 In the refugee camps in Pakistan the Islamist groups found a 
recruitment pool of youth at least partially disconnected from the social control and 
structure of traditional structures and authority.68  
The uprooting and separation from the Afghan social context created new potential 
patterns of mobilisation and social organisation among the refugees.69 Ethnicity and 
tribe still however played a role, exemplified by people tending to organise themselves 
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around these factors in the camps70 to the extent possible. While party affiliation may 
have determined which camp a family went to, the extended family was not dissolved 
by the camp. Yet traditional authority lost some of its grip to the Islamists influence. 
The bond of socialisation having been broken, the environment shapes the logic of 
actuation differently for those that stand alone and without protection in a violent and 
often unforgiving environment. There is no doubt that the umbrellas of religion and 
party politics as social force network mobilisers increasingly blended and, with the 
Soviet withdrawal in 1989, gained importance. Their components however, were still 
the more narrow interest groups something that is still evident in how politics are 
played out in Afghanistan. 
 
Political parties 
The role of political ideology in forming actual polities in Afghanistan is contested. 
Barnett Rubin suggests that ideology has been but a ‘thin veneer on a traditional 
political culture of clan and kinship that the bearers of ideology could never be divorced 
from’ and that all support mobilization follows this pattern.71 Though ideological 
projects have been introduced under the banners of Nationalism, Marxism, or 
Fundamentalism mixed with Islamism, the persistence of communal groups as the 
basis of mobilisation and interest formation is displayed by the forms they have 
taken.72 The mujahidin was a multi-platform resistance that mainly consisted of four 
types of networks: ulema, Sufi pirs, khans, and Islamists.73 The primarily political 
parties, mainly Islamists, were organised in three main patterns: multiple loosely 
structured parties opening local fronts; a dominant party seeking to absorb 
ideologically unconvinced persons (Jamiat); and Hizb-i Islami which was a relatively 
homogenous party.74 Around Kandahar the resistance was mainly based on the tribal 
network of the Durrani tribe.75  
During the jihad against the Soviet Union a typical mujahidin group would consist of 
a commander and a small group of men linked by a local social network. While this 
could sometimes be through a madrasa, it was more often through qawm affiliation 
and a patron-client relationship.76 Qawm, rather than ethnicity, was usually enough to 
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also explain politics and feuds within the resistance according to Olivier Roy.77 In the 
beginning of the resistance, most fighters lived at home and fought to force out the 
government and Soviet elements from their ‘space of solidarity’, in effect the area 
within which the specific qawm was given social meaning. The eventual need for 
outside weapons and support drove local commanders to seek affiliation with 
externally based leaders78 and political parties that had a wider power base and social 
impact. The commanders would usually belong to a political party but most fighters 
owed their allegiance to their commander based on social networks.79  
Wholesale incorporation of already mobilised social interest groups also spilled over 
into selective distribution of resources and inter-qawm feuds.80 The major exception 
was Hikmatyar’s largely Pashtun81 Hizb-i Islami (HiG) where party loyalty to at least 
some degree superseded loyalty to local commanders. Hikmatyar built a highly 
secretive and centralised organisation recruiting largely from educated urban 
Pashtuns82 but a number of traditionally organised fronts also fell under the umbrella 
of HiG. The party was around 75 per cent Pashtun but Tajik and Uzbek fronts affiliated 
themselves with it in order to obtain weapons and to differentiate themselves from 
their local rivals.83 In the South, party affiliation was also largely based on which party 
would provide the necessary weapons and resources.84  
The re-traditionalising of the mujahidin after Soviet withdrawal resulted in a series 
of political games along traditional lines intended to enhance local standing rather 
than pursue national aspirations,85 with notable exceptions, as the major parties 
fought over Kabul. However, the victory of the mujahidin as well as later the Taliban 
was framed as a victory of Islam giving the mullahs increased influence and possibly 
laying the foundation for their continued support.86 Yet even the current insurgency 
has been argued to be largely comprised of ‘disenfranchised compatriots’ related more 
to ‘tribe’ than ideology.87  
In the case of the new political parties, research in late 2008 has shown that while 
their leaders see liberal principles as an ‘important part’ of Afghanistan’s political 
future, none see the current conditions as a sufficient foundation for their 
introduction.88 Political parties of both religious and secular nature have been present 
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and many were the outcome of the educational shift experienced during the ‘New 
Democracy.’ The core leadership for all sides in the war leading up to the Soviet 
invasion, the resistance, and the subsequent civil war, were all drawn from the 
generation entering the educational system at that time including Najibullah, 
Hekmatyar, and Massoud.89 The state-level political game today has taken two 
distinctly different directions. One is the small segment of Afghan liberals in the 
executive backed by the international effort, and the other is the national assembly 
which, prone to special interest politics and manipulation, represent a ‘[...] stronghold 
of dissent, Afghan style [...].90 There are a number of parties and groups involved 
either on the government or the insurgency side and political parties still follow a 
client/patron relationship pattern.91 The nature of mobilisation means that support-
bases are negotiated with local authority figures and incorporate entire social interest 
groups. While this may seem an easier model than attracting individuals, it also makes 
party and other social forces more exposed to the potential fallouts of dissent. There is 
a vast difference between losing the support of an individual or that of an entire 
interest group or block of interest groups. Keeping key actors under social control, 
happy or intimidated, becomes essential. 
 
Modes of mobilisation: social agents 
The many years of war and confrontation has generated a large number of localised 
conflicts that have a separate life from, but are strategically intertwined with, the 
ideologically generated ‘umbrella’ conflict between the state and the insurgency. The 
network character of these two latter social forces means that while acquiring support 
from the local they are simultaneously affecting and being co-opted into these local 
conflicts. Thus when one group aligns with the government or the international forces 
their local rivals are likely to seek support from the opposing side and vice versa.  
Every Afghan is linked to the past through lineage but also has a conscious 
belonging to a larger identity set.92 The Afghan population is divided among a number 
of fault-lines and different strata of identity, among them ethnicity, language, 
sectarian, tribe, and spatial distribution. The social system is built on communal 
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loyalties that focus on the local rather than wider inclusive groups.93 While there is a 
conscious identity of being Afghan this does not support internal unity and peace as 
evidenced by the internal struggles raging even when mobilised against an external 
enemy. 
It is important to note that while the modes of mobilisation discussed here are 
active there is also violence and interest mobilisation occurring within qawms and 
other interest formations, all the way down to intra-family feuds.94 One underlying 
cause is land disputes that erupt in part because of the weak government authority,95 
while another source of fighting is old animosities.96 When faced with an outside 
threat groups tend to unite on a pragmatic basis but temporarily and to a limited 
extent.97 The decision of a qawm to support a particular side at a particular time does 
not follow any strict ‘tribal logic’98 and is instead a pragmatic decision in response to 
the logic at the time. The situation and logic are distinctly different for the young 
fighters recruited in the madrasas of Pakistan.  
While it can certainly be said that government and insurgency alike make use of 
local conflicts to mobilise support, the agency of the qawm in question remains largely 
unexplored. It is suggested here that the qawms are just as apt at using the discourse 
of the insurgency, the government or the coalition in order to affect local conflict. One 
example of local agency of the ‘situated’ as opposed to the ‘external’, is that local 
Taliban fighters in areas such as Uruzgan, Helmand and Zabul ‘re-tribalised’ control 
from heavy-handed external fighters in 2008.99  
The informal institutions are strong in parts of Afghan society and have a capacity to 
adapt themselves but more importantly to co-opt and subvert external imposition. The 
idea of gender quotas was for example picked up on quickly and subverted by the 
politically active Afghans in order to build bigger power blocks for themselves.100 When 
the UN produced a media campaign to present the work they were doing, the 
unprepared Afghan participants responded with terminology and language straight out 
of the UN brochures.101  
Language issues, Eurocentric notions of interaction and motivation, as well as a 
failure to understand the hidden power relationships were mentioned as factors 
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making international agendas susceptible to manipulation by Afghan interest groups 
pursuing their own agendas.102 This is not to say that this is something negative in 
itself, but simply points out that the intentions of the local can clash with the 
intentions of the external as donors also tend to stick to their own individual agendas 
and priorities regardless of the local context.103 The results are unintended and 
arguably often dysfunctional products of uncontrollable situational logics. The agency 
of social agents to form and pursue interests in accordance with their own subjective 
priorities should not be underestimated or arrogantly dismissed in favour of notions of 
objective ‘universality.’ 
 
Women as social agents 
Women cannot participate in the public life of the mosque or the village councils 
but have other ways of participating in both politics and religion.104 The control by men 
over women is exercised primarily through the practises of purdah (physical 
segregation from all but the closest family males105) and chadri (veiling). The extent of 
these practises varies between different groups and between rural and urban areas. It 
should be noted that conditions of thirty years of war in addition to normal social 
change have created variations in this with particular discrepancies in for example 
Kabul. The possibilities for women to participate are changing slowly but primarily in 
terms of the state guided by its own situational logic produced by its dependency on 
external resources. Female parliamentarians who have been too outspoken have been 
threatened by colleagues and the constitutionally guaranteed quota is being actively 
ignored.106 The combination of the role as a woman and other roles with potential 
power has produced threats and violence against such women. Journalist Hamida 
Osman receives threats on a regular basis by night from a Pakistani telephone number 
but has also been threatened by law enforcement personnel when asking ‘too many 
questions’ about attacks in Kabul.107 The role of a journalist in the Afghan environment 
carries its own constraints as does the role of women. A female journalist must 
negotiate sets of constraints attached to each role and arguably a third set produced 
by the combination. While change may be happening in terms of gender roles through 
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constitutional mandate, breaking the social mould as a woman carries risks, 
exacerbated by asking pointed questions. This particular situational logic is likely to 
condition silence and conformity, and currently precludes women as social power 
holders outside of the state structures and to a certain degree, even within them. This 
is not to say women are without social influence but that their influence at this point in 
time has to find or establish alternative routes than the formal structures of power. 
 
Modes of mobilisation: social forces 
The pattern of Afghan social force mobilisation has been to rely on ‘buying’ or 
otherwise securing dependency networks in return for support. This patronage pattern 
has expressed itself as a historically consistent strategy of co-opting maliks108 and 
commanders. At the same time, local power-holders have tried to co-opt for example 
state resources to achieve their own localised agendas ranging from authority to 
survival and security. The vast new resources made available as a result of the war 
against the Soviet Union destabilised relations between the qawms and in order to 
access these, local power holders would sometimes join the enemy of their enemy109 
in a purely pragmatic logic that was not seen as treachery.110 If their local rival joined 
one side, a group would join the other in order to accommodate the new structural 
asymmetry. 
This system of patronage runs through Afghan society at all levels and establishes 
networks of reciprocal obligation.111 The local khan system was mainly a traditional 
patronage with increased access to the state system112 on the one hand, but based on 
a local authority claim113 on the other. The mode of operation and positioning has 
arguably been continued under the rule of commanders and other local power 
holders. Depending on how resources and power are used the relationship with the 
local population could be described as an ‘asymmetrical reciprocity.’114  
A useful model to illustrate the relationship between the communities and 
commanders is Giustozzi’s model with the commander at the centre with a number of 
‘vassals’ under him. One rung below the vassals is the vavassors (district leaders) who 
in turn control the village leaders.115 Through this network of influence villages are 
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likely to come under a coercive influence and have to respond to the situation in 
accordance with the logic presenting itself. However, the qawm is a social network 
whereas the village is a territory. A commander cannot take over the qawm in the 
same sense as the physical village. Power is instead dependent on keeping the network 
components under his influence either by providing advantages or through coercion. 
The qawm on the other hand can penetrate social force networks at all levels by 
choosing actuation in accordance with the situational logics.116 
 
Social forces: the state as external to society 
Afghan history contains a number of reform attempts originating in Kabul. The 
conditions under which they were made and the social responses hold interesting 
clues to social interest formation and situational logics in Afghanistan where 
‘modernization’ has been a state driven project from the start.117 There are some 
attempts at wide-ranging social reforms that stand out and that have remarkable 
similarities with the discourse employed in the international effort today. A brief 
historic review of the reforms shows a pattern of state-society interaction that places 
the state as firmly separated from society rather than a part of it. 
Abdur Rahman Khan, dubbed the ‘Iron Amir’,118 came to power in 1880. His 20 year 
rule has been described as ‘internal imperialism’119 as he gradually sought to spread 
the influence of the state beyond Kabul. However, while he sought to increase the 
control, penetration and efficiency of the state, he did not seek wider social reform.120  
Despite this, between 1881 and 1896 there was not a single year without often 
multiple uprisings. The longest single rebellion lasted between 1888 and 1896 in 
Badakhshan province.121 Abdur Rahman responded with mass executions and 
deportations122 and in order to break down the tribal and feudal system that provided 
the support foundations for his enemies he forced migrations of predominantly the 
Ghilzai Pashtuns to the North.123 The resulting scattered population patterns of these 
groups are still present124 and are a source of enduring local conflicts.125 By removing 
the tribal Pashtuns from their support areas and placing them in an environment made 
hostile by land encroachments and ethnic friction, their immediate concern became 
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unity along a Pashtun identity rather than revolting against Kabul. He thus managed to 
create enclaves of allies within the non-Pashtun areas.126 Abdur Rahman also 
mobilised the Ghilzai against the Shiite Hazara who were plundered, enslaved and 
displaced,127 and appointed loyal governors who were given free reigns as long as they 
sent conscripts and taxes back to Kabul. By drawing new provincial boundaries 
traditional tribal groups were split up and any sign of discontent was immediately put 
down. A provincial government system was also established that partially eroded tribal 
power.128 He did however not manage completely and while opposing its usage, also 
manipulated social segmentation129 to widen support bases. His real power rested on 
the Army and with its support and under its protection land was sold and resold with 
no regard for traditional communal ownership.130 At his death in 1901 he had achieved 
a high degree of indirect control over most of the country,131 but under the rule of his 
son, Habibullah Khan, the mullahs regained much of their influence that had been 
repressed.132  
Following Habibullah’s murder in 1919, Amanullah Khan rose to power guided by a 
Mahmud Tarzi, a catalyst for modernization influences.133 Tarzi, a critic of both 
international imperialism and domestic lack of progressiveness, became popular with a 
‘tiny class’ of Afghan intellectuals.134 The obstacle of progress was determined to be 
the alienation and illiteracy of the ‘peasants.’135 Amanullah initiated a series of 
reforms: raising the civil service salaries to counter corruption; removing the veil 
requirement for women; opening co-educational schools; starting an education 
programme for the nomadic tribes; and he tried to force all people in Kabul to wear 
‘Western’-styled clothing whether visiting or living there.136 He also came into conflict 
with the border tribes who lived by smuggling as he tried to impose and collect a 
customs duty.137 Under his reign a new urbanised social group developed that was 
separated from the qawms of ‘Afghanistan proper.’138 This urban political space was 
influenced by ‘Western’ values that were ‘more imagined than real’ and as the political 
centre moved away from the rest of society it generated a conceptual ‘traditional 
society’ as a pole of opposition.139 Tribal elites also started sending their sons to Kabul 
for education140 as a way of accessing the resources of the state. From 1924 and 
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onwards the consensus between state and society was broken as it had relied on 
mutual indifference.141  Nadir Shah became king in 1929 after having marched on 
Kabul twice but been forced to give up because of his Army broke up in internal blood-
feuds.142 He did not depend directly on the khans for a power base but under his rule 
they were granted extensive autonomy.143 Renouncing Amanullah’s reforms, his own 
were cut short by his assassination in 1933.144 The period between 1949 and 1952 has 
been described as a failed democratic experiment under Prime Minister Shah 
Mahmud. A free press initiative led to increasingly harsh verbal attacks on the 
government and on Islam, finally triggering a crack-down that did not in fact provoke 
society-wide protests.145 The demands and expectations raised during this period gave 
voice to a small minority of educated and urbanised reform-minded elites but did not 
resonate with the general population. The mullahs and maliks were more responsive 
to the local concerns of their respective qawms than agendas formulated among a few 
in Kabul.146  
In 1953 Daoud Khan took over as Prime Minister and held that post until 1963.147 
Daoud was a Pashtun nationalist,148 which brought him into confrontation with 
Pakistan over the ‘Pashtunistan’ issue, but was also pursuing large-scale state-planned 
economic development supported largely by the Soviet Union.149 In 1959 on the 
second day of Jeshn (Independence week), the wives and daughters of the officials on 
the podium appeared unveiled before the crowds, echoing reforms similar to those 
that had brought Amanullah down 30 years before and openly challenging the 
tradition of gender separation. Daoud had prepared the confrontation with 
conservative elements well. He had a staff of advisors who were religious scholars with 
‘Western’ legal education who went over every suggested reform to examine if it 
violated Islam. While previous small steps of introducing women into some work 
spaces had met with little to no complaints, the official unveiling met with angry 
opposition. Daoud replied that if the complaining mullahs could point to where in the 
Quran purdah was advocated, he would reinstate the rule in his family.150 During the 
period 1965 to 1973 there were increasing clashes between Islamist and leftist radicals 
leading to a temporary closing of Kabul University in 1971.151 The modern education 
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system had produced an elite separated from their kin-groups and from most of 
Afghan society.152 Daoud mistakenly believed that his foreign-trained security forces 
were now strong enough for him to challenge the tribes and the religious 
establishment,153 an experiment ended by the coup in 1978.  
The so called Saur Revolution had grown out of discontent on both sides of the 
political spectrum. Foreign funded state-building had begun to erode the traditional 
patterns of social control154 and produced resentment. Religious traditionalists were 
also opposed to the modernization programmes and the centralization of authority 
threatening autonomy in the provinces. The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA) on its part was unhappy with an increased distancing from the Soviet Union 
which weakened its position.155 Subsequent to the revolution, the Khalqi faction of the 
PDPA tried to destroy all potential challengers for social control.156 They introduced 
sweeping reforms aimed at agrarian reform, literacy, and strengthening of the state 
machine.157 Repressive responses to dissent led to the disappearance of an estimated 
50-100,000 people.158 Kabul largely relied on co-opted local representatives159 outside 
of the administrative centres and the PDPA reforms, operating along lines of 
traditional in-fighting,160 forced the qawms to choose between leaders they shared 
much with locally or leaders who represented an alien ideology.161  
The Parcham faction of the PDPA elite developed a client network across clan and 
ethnic boundaries while the Khalqi faction of the party had tribal and clan networks as 
a support base.162 The Communist regime had from the beginning managed to gain 
support from Pashtun groups through the tribal structures but was thus also pushing 
other social groups into opposition.163 The uprisings were as much against the 
increased state penetration as it was against Marxism.164 Organisationally local revolts 
would spread in a solidarity group pattern and end where the influence of that group 
ended165 in response to local government actions.166 Resistance first erupted in 
Nuristan167 and the government used pre-existing grievances to mobilise a part tribal 
counter-militia.168 By 1979 the resistance had generated larger insurrections that were 
crushed169 but the unstable situation eventually led to the Soviet invasion170 and a 
range of Sovietisation programmes. After 1981 around 75 per cent of Afghanistan was 
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effectively under the control of the resistance except when directly challenged171 at 
which time they would temporarily cede an area and wait until the Soviet army left it 
again. By 1989 all Soviet troops had left in an orderly retreat172 and in 1992 the country 
entered a phase of intense civil war between rivalling factions nationally, and multiple 
contests for dominance at local levels. This state of insecurity allowed the social force 
network of the Taliban to successfully contest for control of the state apparatus and 
gain wide support from the population. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the 
Nabibullah regime held but withdrew to the population centres to secure supply 
routes and concentrate on a defensive war.173 They were given a two year warning 
prior to the Soviet withdrawal in order to prepare their defences without Soviet 
assistance174 and came to rely largely on local networks of power and coercion.  
The government used militias to project authority into the rural areas and in 1991 
the militias of Nadiri (Hazara) and Dostum (Uzbek) were deployed to the South to fight 
the Pashtun Hekmatyar and the HiG.175 All of these commanders relied on established 
modes of mobilisation. Hekmatyar has been known to recruit along both ethnic and 
pan-Islamic lines,176 and Dostum’s alliance networks were strengthened through an 
exploitation of local rivalries.177 Exploiting already existing rivalries, the Andarabi 
militia of Juma Khan was used to disrupt the supply routes of Massoud and the Jamiat-i 
Islami.178 The Andarabi were first allied with Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami (HiG) who 
shared the same interest179 but opposed the government. By not attacking the 
government and occasionally attacking Massoud, the Andarabi managed to balance 
their role and maintain local independence.180 As long as Soviet assistance kept Kabul 
functioning, the centre held but as it dissolved the remaining components of 
Afghanistan turned out to be a number of ‘hyper-armed networks of power.’181 When 
the Taliban started to emerge in 1994 Kabul was controlled by the largely Tajik Rabbani 
government and the rest of the country subject to an array of larger and smaller 
warlords and shuras.182 
In the post-2001 administrative system a tendency of local competition developed 
among government affiliates,183 an obvious repetition of a historical pattern. It was the 
case during the jihad against the Soviet invasion and during the war preceding the 
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Taliban rise to power. When Karzai was installed to lead the country he chose to co-
opt strongmen and warlords into central government and sub-national administrative 
units.184 The Karzai government has little authority outside of Kabul and is limited by 
various power-holders, held back by special interests and a lack of capacity.185 
Establishing a good relationship with the government or the Americans has been a 
road for aspirants appointed to official positions in provinces where local support has 
been weak,186 thus reinforcing the patronage dependency. Karzai employed this 
system with great efficiency in 2009187 aiming to accommodate allied local interest 
groups.188 Patrimonial expectations on the state, seen as an outside resource,189 is a 
thus a prominent mode of mobilisation for wider social support. This has been 
replicated time and again by social forces as well as in more narrow social spheres and 
interest formations. These alliances are highly unreliable190 but the practise itself will 
take a long time to change.191 
The internally and externally driven attempts to reform the country socially have 
generally met with resistance and revolt. Seen through the framework employed here 
these reforms have been externally driven by interest groups (Kabul elites) trying to 
mobilise and consolidate into a social force. They have been constructed outside of, 
and imposed on, the local political realities, most often by a state elite disconnected 
ideologically from society. Opposition to reform is strong among conservative tribal, 
regional ethno-linguistic, and religious leaders while at the same time many ‘Western’-
educated, urbanised Afghans have tended to underestimate this regional leadership 
and its strength.192 True to this, the current discourse largely mimics the reform 
attempts by Afghan rulers in history. The state is in the Afghan context largely an 
outsider intervening in local political dynamics, patterns and conflicts. These dynamics 
also reflect back on the state and old practises of nepotism, bribery, and kick-backs 
have made themselves felt across the board193 as the state has long been subject to 
the patronage support of the qawm.194 The pattern of Afghan state power has been 
that when it loses its outside revenue, it loses control and regional power-centres 
emerge to challenge it locally195 if it was ever present there. 
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Social forces: the insurgency as external to society 
The insurgency in Afghanistan is not reducible to the popularly used term ‘the 
Taliban.’196 Instead it is rather a network of networks at the core of which is the 
Kandahari Taliban and the leadership shura under mullah Omar. The reasons for 
joining the insurgency vary and it is not always clear-cut how strong the alliances and 
affiliations are. Conflict and local competition has been known to erupt197 far from any 
ideological unity or shared purpose solidarity. The Taliban first became known in 1994 
by going into confrontation with Hekmatyar’s forces from HiG and then warlords 
around Kandahar.198 Having taken Kandahar they were soon rapidly expanding through 
volunteers joining the movement. As they grew in numerical strength and social mass 
their ambitions expanded to become a national agenda,199 and they gradually began 
challenging the established order of large and small warlords, commanders, and 
traditional leaders, gaining increased popularity by providing law and security.200 It is 
at this point that the movement found its momentum as a social force expanding on 
the back of social agent alliances, networks formed through fulfilment of subjective 
and locally defined interests. An early and continuing strategy directly linked to this 
was the exploitation of local conflicts. The Taliban are generally well informed and 
have been able to use these conflicts to spread their influence,201 sometimes 
welcomed by elders seeking their support against rivals.202 The integration of local 
causes into the wider insurgency remains a strategy,203 as does the practise of 
marrying into powerful families for mutual protection.204 They thus emulate the 
patronage strategy employed by the government; supporting the impression that 
social force mobilisation in Afghanistan occurs in relation to existing and pre-mobilised 
interest groups rather than individual recruitment strategies. It is not so much the 
actual movement growing through these strategies as the network of allied groups 
expanding which is a significant difference. By gradually attaching social interest 
groups to their movement through political brokering, the interest group has been 
able to gain social mass and become a social force but is conversely also dependent on 
being able to maintain its influence over the networked groups.  
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It is also not the case of the Taliban being a Pashtun movement though this is a 
quite common way to portray it. An erroneous notion of a stereotyped Taliban 
movement with the international community focusing on one particular ethnic group 
plays into the hands of the Taliban and other insurgent groups.205 The Taliban have 
been known to recruit from other groups than the Pashtuns and multiple ethic groups 
have been involved in the movement from early on. There are even indications that 
Shiite groups are now re-establishing links with the Sunni Taliban.206 Support for the 
movement has also been reported among marginalised Tajik groups in Bamiyan and 
Hazaras have been recruited in Ghazni. There is a pattern of groups marginalised 
locally joining the Taliban207 that is further facilitated by actions by the international 
coalition forces, the Afghan government and its local representatives.  
In some areas where multiple shuras have been in competition with each other, the 
government and international forces siding with one shura has generated a logic for 
the others to seek support from the insurgency. By extension, local conflicts thus fuel 
the wider ideological social force contest208 but the Taliban, the government, and the 
international forces also act as enablers in the local context. The situational logic 
shaped by changing local conditions and outside pressures incentivises the interest 
groups to seek alliances on the outside. 
Conversely the insurgency is also largely external to society in the sense of strategic 
goals and agendas. In the early days the Taliban explicitly denounced any aspirations 
for power and ruled by a multi-headed consensus leadership but this gradually turned 
into an introvert and centralized leadership that failed to understand the variety and 
substantial differences between different parts of the country.209 Like the governments 
before and after them the ideologically based Taliban made sweeping assumptions 
that gradually detached them from Afghan society, necessitating repressive control in 
lieu of active support. The Taliban codified and extended the practises of a rural 
support base into urban settings210 where attitudes were more influenced by external 
values.211  
The village mullah and the ulema was the heart of the Taliban movement in its early 
days and it grew out of a pre-established network of madrasas.212 This does however 
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not to suggest that the cause of the conflict in Afghanistan is a clear cut rural-urban 
asymmetry grievance. While the Taliban were and are a rural based movement, it also 
opposes many of the rural traditional institutions, such as pashtunwali.213 From 2003 
onwards the Taliban expanded their recruitment outside of the madrasas through for 
example kinship mobilisation. The recruits were thus coming mainly from the clergy 
and from the enlisting of local community support.214  
There are seven main structures of the insurgency: the Islamic Movement of the 
Taliban; the Haqqani and Mansur networks; the Tora Bora Jihad Front; the HIG under 
Hekmatyar; small Salafi groups; and local commanders.215 There are also other groups 
who seem to have entered the Jihad quite autonomously,216 as well as signs of open 
discord between some of the networks.217 The insurgency coalition can be described as 
a ‘fragmented series of shifting tactical alliances of convenience.’218 It has been said 
that the Taliban by 2006 was a ‘complex opposition alliance’ consisting of ideologically 
driven madrasa students (the core); a second ring of genuine jihadists provided by 
village mullahs and driven largely by Xenophobia (also core); communities and 
opportunists (the largest group); and an outer ring of mercenary elements.219 The 
groups at these different levels have actuated different institutions, have mobilised on 
different grounds, and thus face very different situational logics. In an incident in 2006 
in Uruzgan, local farmers reportedly took part in an ambush orchestrated by the 
Taliban purely for the fight itself.220  
There is enormous potential for local leaders and their followers to join any 
network221 depending on the incentives and disincentives for a particular response at a 
specific time. Organisationally ‘core’ fighters spend around one fifth to half of their 
time in a frontline environment. Local recruits on the other hand are mobilised only 
when operations are in their area222 and tend to avoid behaviour that can spark long 
enduring blood-feuds223 of a qawm nature. The Haqqani network initially recruited 
based on tribal affiliations, later expanded during the jihad, and is now built on a 
combination of tribal and ideological loyalties.224 Haqqani was able to maintain a 
relatively high level of violence in areas populated by his Zadran tribe by relying on 
kinship ties and established madrasa networks225 but has gradually expanded by co-
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opting local commanders. It is also the most ethnically diverse group and seems to be 
the one most accepting of foreign volunteers.226 
Because of the different situational logics, it is useful to distinguish between 
‘external’ and ‘situated‘, in reference to the local environment in which the subject is 
based or operational. While the Taliban have, in some areas, targeted state-run 
schools and forced their closing, they have taken care to not oppose education as such. 
They have instead focused their discursive opposition on things like mixed gender 
classes, unveiled girls in school and the new curricula. They have also targeted schools 
funded by or readily identified with the government. When the British left Musa Qala 
the Taliban did not object to the re-opening of a school and instead declared in 2007 
that they would be opening schools of their own, first for boys and gradually for 
girls.227 Several local insurgency groups have displayed a capacity to change their 
attitudes to girls’ schooling and even female employment228 in response to popular 
demands from local constituencies. These local populations are primary agents in their 
context and necessary for the mobilised corporate agent, in this case local Taliban 
groups, that in turn responds to the aggregate pressure generated. Insurgency groups 
in Loya Paktia have for example approved the training of midwives that would be 
allowed to work with a male family member travelling with them.229 A former Taliban 
interviewed for this research spoke in appreciative terms of a ‘Western’ NGO that was, 
according to the respondent, running twice as many clinics in the country as the 
Ministry of Health.230 An Afghan official excitedly explained that a Taliban commander 
in the Herat area had issued a ‘letter of protection’ stating that the Islamic Emirate 
would not ‘create problems’ for the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) projects in 
the area.231 Another official claimed that the Taliban in Helmand had issued letters of 
protection for all NSP projects except schools and roads and that they monitored, and 
held accountable, the contractors.232 These are all suggestions that the Taliban either 
centrally or locally understand the importance of responding to the local population. 
The social forces injecting themselves into the local context are thus subject to the 
local situational logics in the shape of aggregate social pressures from primary and 
corporate agents. The Layeha or rulebook of the Taliban contains rules of conduct233 
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that clearly reflect an understanding of the necessity of regulated interaction. On the 
other hand there is also the interpretation that the Taliban’s success in getting support 
is less about them conforming to population demands, and more about them being 
fast, ruthless, and efficient,234 particularly in relation to sharia courts. In either case it is 
dependent on localised social agents. 
 
Social forces: the state and the insurgency as sites of competition 
The state, from Kabul down to the district level, appears largely disconnected from 
society now, as it has in history. At the national level it is discursively pursuing a liberal 
reform agenda sponsored by international resources. Like preceding reform attempts 
it is largely separated from the local realities in which a majority of the population tries 
to survive and through which they form their understanding of what is happening. The 
Afghan state has largely existed in the social periphery trying to move itself to the 
centre, but at the district level there are often clear problems with exercising any 
sustainable and meaningful ‘state power’ in the communities. The state instead relies 
on local power brokers to provide that influence. Historically, shifts in power generally 
lacked a wide popular base and the development of new state institutions and a new 
education system generated a Bourgeoisie that owed its existence to the state but was 
not readily accepted by society235 outside of Kabul. Edicts and laws imposed on the 
local from the outside have tended to be met with resistance and sometimes violence. 
Legitimacy is complicated in Afghan politics and most political conflicts at the national 
level have originated in attempts by elites with foreign support to gain control of the 
centre and the country.236 The state has historically tried to use Nationalism, Islam, 
and Tribalism as modes of mobilisation in order to gain legitimacy and achieve a wider, 
sustained support.237 The current attempt is instead centred on a ‘Western’ liberal 
agenda coupled with references in part to the three prior modes. While the central 
government did to some extent manage to increase its levels of control in the 
hinterland through a provincial and sub-provincial bureaucratic system prior to 1978, it 
rarely extended far beyond the ‘few paved roads.’238 At the end of the first Anglo-
Afghan war the British installed the puppet regime of Shah Shuja and the Soviets did 
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the same with Karmal in 1979 and Najibullah in 1986. Whatever their previous 
standing in tribal and local politics, their external imposition by force meant immediate 
discrediting239 and the lines of demarcation between the state and society were 
essentially only blurred in Kabul.240  
The Communist regime eliminated the political elite in order to replace it with a 
form of government and ideology that was alien to Afghanistan.241 The pacification 
strategy was aimed at neutralising the rural areas and often relied on exploiting 
conflicts within and between qawms. It thus returned to the manipulation of social 
segmentation in order to establish influence,242 emulating the historical patterns of 
state-society interaction. The government was represented, and still often is, in 
administrative centres that are physically separated from the villages and the spaces 
where communities gather such as the mosque. Outpost-like, they are the primary 
sites of contest and interaction between state and society243 relevant only when 
actuated by social agents.  
The insurgency can be broken down into two main categories: the ‘core’ and the 
‘local.’ While the ‘core’ is ideologically trained and motivated with socially wide 
aspirations, the ‘local’ are recruited locally and fight predominantly for locally defined 
interests.244 This has produced a high degree of interpenetration between the local 
and the larger conflicts.245 While the Taliban are pursuing national agendas, their 
affiliate groups pursue localised goals through local operations246 contributing to an 
accumulated strategic effect. However, over time even an externally recruited and 
ideologically motivated fighter is increasingly drawn into, and subject to, the local 
situational logics. In order to avoid the development of a local power base the Taliban 
have kept their commanders and shadow governors on rotation.247 This practise is 
however not shared by the more static Haqqani and Mansur networks248 that also 
have more locally constrained aspirations. Given the occasional in-fighting it could be 
tempting to view the insurgency as a site of power struggles, but the internal fighting is 
rather about asserting control and independence within the network. The fight is to 
retain a status and level of control, not for control over the insurgency itself. Thus the 
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insurgency is not really a site of competition for control as much as it is a struggle for 
internal autonomy. 
 
The meeting of two externals: the state as a proxy for external interests 
The current government and parliament structures of Afghanistan show signs of 
trying to adapt a largely external set of institutions to the historical, religious, and 
social contexts of the country. While the levels of efficiency could be discussed at 
length, a more important note is that it is an implicit acknowledgement by both the 
government and the external backers that the assumed ‘universality’ of the system is 
challenged locally. Signs of an urge to find legitimacy have been there from the start 
with the international convening of ‘jirgas’ to legitimise a process that was externally 
driven. There are however also clear signs that the international influence runs deep 
and it would be astonishingly arrogant to think that this went unnoticed. Apart from 
the very obvious manipulation, a confrontational style between Karzai and the 
international backers continues to create headlines and commentary, not the least in 
relation to the alleged voter fraud during the 2009 presidential election.249 Seen 
through a lens of interest formation and patterns of social force mobilisation in 
Afghanistan throughout history, the ‘fraud’ however seems logical. This is not to 
suggest that it is ‘fair’ or ‘just,’ but that election ‘fraud’ is set in relation to rules that 
were written for modes of mobilisation currently not internalised in Afghanistan. They 
can of course become socially internalised and legitimised eventually but they are not 
there now.  
Corruption of an externally generated system in terms of vote buying or -rigging 
through the support of specific community power holders, bares remarkable 
similarities to established forms of social force mobilisation. Because these practices 
occur within a different institutional system that does not recognise these methods as 
legitimate, they are indeed corrupting the integrity of the latter, but it does so by 
following a situational logic that is socially generated. Likewise, disadvantaged groups 
are able to challenge the status quo through the new system and for example gain 
seats in parliament. This does however not necessarily indicate social acceptance of 
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this change in established power relationships and patterns of dominance. There is 
also no guarantee that issues arising from this will not result in overt violence. 
In Afghanistan the political reality is not formed at the national level but in the 
villages and the valleys of the country. It is there it is decided who joins what network 
for how long and for what reasons, and the small conflicts at these local levels feed 
into the larger one250 facing the country. In the South the associates and allies of Karzai 
have for example systematically driven rivals over to the Taliban by marginalising 
them.251 There is also an obvious external expectation and pressure on Afghanistan to 
conform to a model rather than to form a system of its own. The situational logic of 
the dependency relationship thus puts the Afghan government in a position where the 
majority of the domestic support base mobilise and form interests based on socially 
shared and legitimised principles, but the external sources of security and authority 
demand a different mode of mobilisation and legitimisation. The interaction between 
the two sets of interests and institutions produces unintended outcomes on both sides 
of that divide. The interaction is a point of stasis or change but in a social context such 
a point can span generations. The similarities between the Afghan constitution, the 
Somali proto-constitution or ‘transitional federal charter’, and the Kosovo constitution 
are clear indicators that the international ‘guidance’ was very influential when all were 
written252 and that conformity to external expectations is demanded regardless of the 
conditions for it and the likelihood of a positive outcome. 
 
The security forces and social logics 
The social situational logics and geographical challenges of Afghanistan run through 
the state project and are exemplified in the situation surrounding the security forces. 
The Afghan National Army (ANA) faces a number of issues relating to ethnicity and the 
memories of atrocities committed between factions. In the South, the large presence 
of Tajik officers has created problems; exemplified by the 2005 reported refusal of 
Tajik commanders in Kandahar (Pashtun heartland) to speak Pashto.253 The Afghan 
National Police (ANP) on its part has an abysmal reputation for corruption and 
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inefficiency and may at this point be doing more damage to the relationship with the 
population than helping it.  
One response to the lacking reach and capacity of the Afghan security forces has 
been the multiple attempts at forming local pro-government militias in a strange echo 
of recent times and distant history alike. It seems that this type of plan seeks to 
replicate the modes of social force mobilisation that are prevalent in Afghanistan in an 
attempt to extend government reach. The various Local Defence Initiatives (LDIs) 
works on the principle that by giving employment and responsibility to villagers they 
will no longer support or tolerate insurgents.254 The Afghan Local Police (ALP) is the 
latest in this line of strategies and seeks to formalise the relationship more.  
A potentially crucial problem related to the arbaki-style255 militias is the removal of 
their traditional mobilisation basis. Instead of being an honour and social expectation, 
the payment scheme of these groups relates their formation directly to the provision 
of funds, something that has proven itself to be highly unreliable.256 When the funding 
stops, one is left with a number of armed and trained individuals whose ‘human 
security’ has become reliant on state supplied resources that they are no longer 
getting. This was the situation after the fall of the Communist government and it is the 
situation in Iraq with the ‘Awakening’ movement.257 Also, there have been several 
occasions of local jihadi commanders, and presumably non-jihadist local interest 
groups, subverting for example the Auxiliary Police programme (ANAP) for resource 
access258 and local government and non-government power-holders getting their own 
militias set up and legitimised as part of programmes.  
While the militia strategy may make sense in a short-term military perspective, the 
logics guiding the choices of the international forces and the Afghan government 
operate based on conditions and assumptions substantially separate from the logics 
guiding a community in a rural part of Afghanistan.259 Inherent in these initiatives is 
that they are hard to do without ‘picking sides,’ something that has become the case in 
several areas.260 It opens these strategies to co-optation and subversion for local 
purposes further exacerbated by over-generalisations,261 misunderstandings,262 and 
over-romanticising of singular, and in the wider Afghan social context, largely 
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irrelevant social features.263 One example is the practice of external forces ‘assisting’ 
the local partner group in solving ‘local problems’264 in order to gain trust. The strategy 
of choosing sides locally has already been used by the Taliban. It has occasionally 
generated substantial problems for them as the reverse side of that strategy is that 
other local rivals are antagonised.265  
The modern centralised state has been an artificial construct in Afghanistan and 
reform programmes have been met with revolt in most cases. The only relatively 
successful reforms have been the repressive regime of Abdur Rahman and the very 
careful and slow reforms under Daoud in the 1950s and 1960s.266 Wider political 
power has traditionally been sought mainly by two groups: the notables within the 
social structures who sought to preserve the social order as it stood, and the 
intelligentsia who sought social reforms or revolution. This arguably now also includes 
religious actors. For most others the objective has been to insert their qawm influence 
into the state structures at a level corresponding to their own perceived importance267 
in a fully pragmatic approach to the prevailing situational logics. 
 
The Meeting of the Local and External  
Some of the military aspects of the intervention in Afghanistan have in many cases 
strengthened the connection between the Taliban and the local interest groups268 and 
irrevocably become part of the local situational logics. Examples include practices such 
as the CIA buying the support of local commanders269 that began in 2001. This is 
arguably self-defeating in the longer term as it exacerbates the insecurity for local 
social agents in the rural areas270 thus generating clear incentives to support the 
Taliban even for the ideologically unconvinced. It has empowered some local power-
holders at the expense of others and the communities themselves.271 Even groups who 
have previously supported of the government are reacting in increasingly negative 
ways.272 Operations based on bad intelligence and resulting in deaths or 
imprisonment273 also feed the insurgency274 and have led even former left-wingers to 
move closer to the armed opposition on purely anti-American grounds.275   
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As the conflict has progressed, people disgruntled and displaced by government and 
coalition actions have become yet another pool of potential recruits for the 
insurgency. For example, the Afghan term majburi Taliban means ‘forced Taliban’ and 
indicates insurgents that have joined out of necessity of circumstances or because 
their families were killed in airstrikes or raids. Yet such support can sometimes be the 
outcome of something as simple as low-level misunderstandings or erroneous 
assumptions, like employing an interpreter who is antagonistic towards the groups in 
the area of operation.276 ‘Bad tips’ are frequently used as a weapon by local interest 
groups to get the different social forces to target local rivals.277 There are also 
examples of government officials trying to use international forces to eliminate local 
rivals in business ventures278 and interpreters inserting or withholding information to 
produce ‘useful’ intelligence. The perception of corrupt and inefficient governance and 
justice system is then capitalised on by the Taliban who have appointed shadow 
governors and run sharia courts279 to offer ‘alternative’ options.  
The ebbs and flows of local support work the other way as well and the organisation 
of the Afghan insurgency is in reality multi-facetted with different levels and degrees 
of separation. It is a network of interest groups of varying sizes, some of them also 
networks in their own right, but the movement has been able to maintain relative 
cohesiveness280 through relative autonomy. It is not unheard of that local 
commanders, have been replaced with Kandahari core fighters when they have been 
‘too soft’ on the population281 but external fighters have conversely also been 
excluded from some areas by local groups when they have been too hard. In some 
parts of Paktia province, local insurgency commanders have for example reportedly 
asked Arab volunteers to leave in order to not alienate the population,282 and in 2009 
in Uruzgan province ‘external’ fighters were not allowed in some areas at all by local 
decision.283 To discount Afghan popular political agency is a severe mistake. 
 
‘Development’ and ‘Modernisation’ – Reform from the Outside 
From the mid-1900s the international involvement increasingly took on the shape 
of aid and development projects as the superpowers competed for influence. One such 
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example is the Helmand Valley Project between 1946 and 1953, consisting of two 
dams and an extensive canal system. Aiming to ‘reclaim’ arid land it was fraught with 
resistance among the peasant population and ‘bureaucratic folderol,’284 but it also 
suffered from its own weaknesses in planning. No plans were made to prepare the 
local population for how to deal with the sudden increase in water levels and access. 
The resulting water-logging of fields remained 19 years after the project’s dedication 
and agricultural production dropped to 50 per cent for that time. Also part of the 
project was a settlement plan aimed at creating communities on the newly created 
farming lands. After completing a cluster of purpose-built villages outside Lashkar Gah 
and the settling 7,000 nomads, it was discovered that the land was not fit for 
agriculture due to high salt levels and an unsustainable layer of topsoil.285  
The reforms of the post-1978 Communist regime were in turn based on large 
ideological assumptions and immediately generated resistance.286 The reforms were ill 
conceived and implemented,287 sometimes taught in rural qawms by outsiders, often 
under forms that were humiliating to elders288 and thus ended up alienating them. The 
literacy campaign was largely political indoctrination portraying European and urban 
lifestyles in a positive light,289 but it was the gender issues that would spark revolt.290 
There was little actual opposition to teaching females but men teaching girls and 
mixed gender classes were too much.291 The reforms were ideologically framed rather 
than pragmatic and increased the level of state incursion into the village292 thus issuing 
a direct challenge. The current post-conflict programmes in Afghanistan have so many 
similarities with the ‘modernisation’ projects around the 1950s293  and the Communist 
programmes that followed, that they must seem like strange repetitions from a local 
perspective. The actuation of their meaning is in part the result of collective memories 
of the past, a past of failures and negative consequences, leaving little room to wonder 
at local scepticism towards these programmes. 
 
The ANDS  
The current manifestation of country-wide development is found in the Afghanistan 
National Development Strategy (ANDS), formally launched at the International 
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Conference in Support of Afghanistan in Paris on June 12, 2008.294 The ANDS is on the 
surface a relatively adapted strategy stressing, for example the role of Islamic 
principles, culture and lifestyle as well as equity in access to resources as ‘overriding 
considerations’ that are ‘critically important to any intervention.’295 The ANDS was also 
developed on a multi-level platform of ‘local consultations’296 but nevertheless soon 
slips into the language and perspectives of international interventionist projects 
elsewhere. It focuses on the state as a vehicle for the delivery of political goods,297 
supplemented by a private sector,298 to meet goals set by conditions of institutions 
such as the IMF and the World Bank.299 It also envisions the state as being in 
competition with other forces for influence over ‘the population,’300 therein reducing 
the latter yet again to a mass lacking agency and interests. Viewing the benchmark 
goals of the ANDS it comes across as an over-optimistic carbon copy of similar 
strategies with short timeframes, emphasising for example gender and security reform 
and a focus on the central state and government. The level of Afghan ‘ownership’ of 
the strategy can certainly be called into question considering that it was written in 
English (later translated into Dari and Pashto) by international ‘experts’301 and seems 
to serve the interests not of all Afghans as much as those politically favoured by the 
international interventionist project.302 As Tadjbakhsh has asserted, the ANDS and the 
development plans before it serve to promote a liberal peace agenda,303 not one based 
on local context and priorities. 
 
The NSP 
‘Western’ style democracy is only meaningful if society identifies with the state and 
the political entities move beyond ‘political theatre.’304 One attempt to do so in 
Afghanistan is the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), representing a ‘citizen-based 
approach to state-building.’305 This programme is modelled on a number of 
international projects as a way to generate participatory ownership, increased 
solidarity between society and state, and to facilitate peaceful interaction.306 Falling 
under the control of the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) it 
is sponsored by international agencies and works with implementing partners from 
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international NGO’s and companies.307 Central to the NSP are the Community 
Development Councils (CDC) that are the local representative body of the communities 
in charge of overseeing the allocated money and determining what it will be used for. 
The NSP is present in around 70 per cent of the country and 22,000 CDCs have 
overseen 49.000 projects with a claimed success-rate of around 95 per cent.308 The 
NSP is also an attempt to align and coordinate international assistance within an 
Afghan context rather than being externally driven and managed.309  
While it has shown some success and is presented as such by international donors 
and implementing partners310 as well as Afghans,311 there is also critique raised, 
though hesitantly, in response to problems within the programme.312 Some 
community representatives support the NSP projects while also claiming that the 
projects had generated conflict in their communities and that it had ‘brought 
confusion to the people.’313 Such critique concerns for example lack of sustainability,314 
fraudulent road projects and well projects, and allegations of corruption.315 The 
problems raised by the community were described as things of the past that had been 
solved316 but it seems this perception is not shared everywhere. The issues, and the 
denial of them as problems, have implications for the situational logics relating to 
support and success of the NSP. If discontent is left unattended it may well turn into 
resentment. 
This is in direct contrast with the official discourse of how the programme has 
‘recreated ownership and contributed to reconciliation and trust between fragmented 
groups.’317 The NSP has social audit mechanisms to counter fraud and according to one 
official, money is never touched by anyone else than the CDC’s.318 But another 
community observation was that the money allocated was in some places split 
between the five strongest families locally who could then use it for their own 
projects.319  
Despite the problems, at the time of the research there had developed a 
‘consensus’ to make the CDC’s the official village councils,320 thus also bringing them 
into direct competition with existing shuras in some places where the two did not 
overlap. Though some see this as ‘structures of accountability and participation [...] 
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emerging from the bottom up,’321 it is not unlikely that such a move can create a 
similar problems as have previous attempts to ‘choose sides.’ The move is not coming 
from a community-anchored decision but a decision in Kabul to ‘upgrade’ the CDCs 
based on the positive reports of the overwhelming success of the programme. That 
reporting however contains cause for some doubts. It remains to be seen what the 
outcome will be if the CDCs directly challenge local power holders. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the aspects of the multiple social realities of 
Afghanistan. The complexities of the case are evident in the available modes of 
mobilisation as both historic and contemporary evidence suggests that interests are 
generally defined and produced locally rather than at a society-wide aspiration level. 
This reflects a political dynamic that is predominantly local as well. There are currently 
two major social forces in the shape of the government side and the insurgency; but 
they are both expressions of ideological and state-centric social forces in a context of 
multiple and localised interest groups that understand how to access social forces in 
order to meet local subjective needs. Both are dependent on a range of political 
networks and parties that in turn themselves are generally comprised of multiple 
interest groups. The social forces acquire social mass not through tantalising socio-
political programmes, but through socially established modes of mobilisation. This 
separates the larger social forces from their respective and shifting support bases by 
layers of locally determined motives. Ideological decisions and actions at the centre 
thus have relatively little impact at the local level unless actuated locally by choice or 
imposed by force. 
There seems to be little reason to diverge from the observations made in the mid-
1980s that the Afghan state was external to society and a resource base for local 
interest groups accessing material and authority resources.322 Removal of the ‘higher 
order’ ideological conflict will most likely not bring peace because local conflicts will 
continue to bring insecurity to the population.323 The priority of local conditions was 
the case during Alexander, Abdur Rahman, the PDPA, the Soviet occupation, and it is 
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the case today. The state and the insurgency share the feature that their influence and 
support is based on networks of networks324 joined loosely together in more or less 
fickle alliances. Much of the motivation for local interest groups to join either or both 
sides can be found in local grievances and conditions producing situational logics that 
confront the local qawms daily.  
As foreign troops, workers, government representatives, or ‘external’ and ‘situated’ 
insurgents operate in these contexts they are subject to the situational logics even as 
they change them through fighting or building a well. The presence of a lingerie shop 
on a corner in Kabul and of ‘Afghan Fried Chicken’ (with armed guards)325 indicates 
that external influences are internalised or at least capitalised on, but Kabul is only 
Kabul. ‘Afghanistan proper’ as Dupree called it, is a multitude of local realities of which 
almost none correspond to the Kabuli situation. It is a fallacy to make broad 
assumptions about motivation and drives in the Afghan context, let alone frame it as 
‘just’ a part of a global war on terror or extremism precisely because of this 
diversity.326  
Apart from the often cited regional and national issues there are a multitude of 
localised conflict reasons. Local confrontations over resources, religion, or ethnicity327 
arguably generate a more immediate insecurity for Afghans though they also feed into 
and off the larger conflict agendas. The fragmented and diverse nature of Afghanistan 
means that change, much like politics, is a highly local and highly subjective matter. 
The large and complex international intervention in turn means that it inevitably 
intersects with Afghan society at multiple levels and produce small, largely 
unintended, but accumulated outcomes across the board. These spread through the 
social networks and are actuated as justification or mobilisers by social actors and 
agents with wider aspirations. The social engineering inherent in the intervention 
relies on notions of legitimacy and representation that simply do not correspond with 
a wider Afghan social reality. Using the state as a conduit it becomes one external 
force using another external force to attempt to reach into the relevant social space. 
The massive introduction of resources and influences, combined with both military and 
civilian interaction in the villages, has produced temporary changes in the local 
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situational logic but it is doubtful if it has produced any changes in the interest 
formations and modes of mobilisation. It appears that the pattern for social force 
mobilisation throughout history and in the contemporary conflict has been of 
patrimonial networking in order to gain social mass.  
The relevant socio-political level is that of the qawm as employed here, which 
handles all its issues including the vast majority of legal concerns through the actuated 
institutions of the shura or the Jirga. The state is mainly external to society and the 
ideological projects of the different social forces play a reduced part in the choice of 
who to side with. The decision is instead pragmatic in response to the situational logics 
formed at a highly localised level. The agency of the interest group to align or shift 
alignment in accordance with subjectively pragmatic decisions is central to Afghan 
social force mobilisation. It is necessary for a social force to constantly maintain its 
support network through the means and capacities at their disposal. As the social 
forces seek to use local conflicts to expand their own influence, they simultaneously 
change the local situational logic for the involved parties, incentivising rivalling groups 
to seek alternative support elsewhere. At the same time local groups are quite adept 
at adopting the discourse of social forces in order to advance their own position and 
standing in relation to their rivals. Thus local and higher order conflicts feed into each 
other to continue the spiral of violence.  
As in Somalia, Afghan interests form locally and are shaped by situational logics 
generated by subjectively actuated institutions and roles. In the interaction with 
outside intervention from various social forces the outcomes will generally be 
unintended. The pattern of social interest formation in Afghanistan is like a fine mosaic 
that requires a very fine brush. Attempts to use the broad brush of Nationalism, 
Communism, and Islamism have failed and the current roller of liberalism has 
provoked a similar response as its predecessor. While the language of interaction in 
Afghanistan has changed and while discursive adaptation for resource access328 may 
form a perception of Afghan politics taking place on a national scale, it largely takes 
place locally and in the shadows of mountains. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
The objective of this thesis was to answer the question of how social contexts form 
and how they interact with interventionist projects to produce unintended outcomes. It 
has done so by exploring examples of sustainable mobilisation in the multiple social 
realities of Somalia, Somaliland, and Afghanistan, and how the dynamics between 
these interest groups and social forces have been shaped by the ideational and 
material conditions. It has sought to explain how local social agents and external 
interventionist projects interact to produce unintended outcomes guided by the 
situational logics available at a given time, in the relevant context.  
Chapter one examined the central tenets and underlying assumptions of 
international strategies of peacebuilding. The cross-cutting nature of the international 
peacebuilding task as it is currently employed was held to mean that these strategies 
largely reflect the assumptions present in military projects as well as ‘pure’ 
development or aid projects. The argument was made that the strategies commonly 
employed today are based on assumptions of the primacy of the state and of the 
universal nature of a set of values, translating into a focus on both the format and the 
content of the state. It was found that the current strategies were insufficient to 
perform as intended because they were based on assumptions and generalisations 
created in social contexts external to the social realities in which they were applied. 
Because they were external they were defined as interventionist projects entering into 
an already existing social context and subject to, while also changing, the conditions 
and situational logics of that context. In order to understand social contexts and how 
intervention related to them, an alternative perspective was needed that was not 
dependent on notions of the state or ‘universal’ values, and which sought to combine 
theoretical strands sensitive to the local, with an analytical structure that facilitates 
applicability. 
Chapter two introduced such an alternative framework for the analysis of social 
interest formation and interaction with interventionist projects. It was based on two 
main theories and multiple additional influences to provide a foundation for a context-
specific understanding of relevant social interaction. In order to provide a mechanical 
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framework for separating and making sense of the data the Morphogenetic model was 
adopted. This allowed for the structuring of how social logics and interest groups form 
over time in response to material, ideational, and institutional conditions that precede 
them but also dynamically evolve through social interaction. Margret Archer’s 
Morphogenetic theory provided a framework for understanding the formation of 
interest groups but needed the contextualising of them as components of social forces 
and in relation to interventionist projects. Migdal’s ‘State in Society’ perspective of 
social force interaction was employed in order to understand the social dynamics 
among interest groups and social forces. However, it was argued that ‘social forces’ 
should be defined as formations with the capacity to have society-wide effects by 
having acquired enough ‘social mass.’ Thus the state can be such a force if it has 
enough support and power but is not necessarily so, and an insurgency is similarly able 
to make a wide impact or not depending on its own ‘social mass.’ The ‘norm’ was 
found here to be a network of networks able to mobilise under a common cause on a 
less than permanent basis, in less than stable alliances. The notion of social forces 
vying for influence is useful but needs to be clearly detached from the state-centrism 
its language conveys. Though Migdal’s conceptualisation of state and society relations 
and competition provide the arena of this competition we also have to include the 
‘reverse’ agency of the individual interest groups in relation to social forces including 
the state. The relevant agency is thus found to be situated at a lower level of 
interaction than the social force vs. state framework. The population is simply not a 
passive mass of disinterested victims without agency as pointed out by Jabri.1 It is 
instead for example able to generate multiple sites of resistance and co-optation 
within the boundaries set by the material, structural and ideational conditions.  
A particular focus was put on the modes of mobilisation for social forces and 
interest groups, and the formation of situational logics facing them. It was argued that 
social agents were interest groups mobilised to pursue a shared social interest. In 
order to gain enough social mass to pursue wider aspirations, groups so inclined 
needed to attract more members or enter into social alliance networks. The state, 
insurgencies, and similar entities were considered social forces that interacted with the 
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social interest groups. Depending on social composition the social forces could be 
perceived as external to society or as a site of competition for control over the social 
force and by extension a wider social context. The actuation of different institutions 
and social structures were considered subjective in nature while determining the 
available situational logics it is also dependent on the same logic. The agent, or indeed 
individual, is not free to choose at will but constrained to socially available and viable 
options. 
Chapter three examined the conditions in Somalia and Somaliland. It was found that 
in both cases the most crucial social unit was the diya-group which provided physical 
and social security through informal xeer agreements. The role of elders and the 
institutions of guurti, xeer, and sharia provided social mediation and order under 
‘normal’ circumstances, but that massive disruptions such as war necessitated 
functions of forgiveness such as xalaydahay. Colonial powers had come and gone, the 
repressive social engineering of Said Barre had been successfully resisted, and foreign 
interventions endured. Through all this the sub-clan and the diya-group had remained 
the most meaningful level of social mobilisation and interaction. In the case of Somalia 
it was argued that the government as well as the insurgency group and the Sufi 
defensive alliance were all predominantly mobilised on these foundations rather than 
ideological convictions. International Jihadist and liberal forces were accessed and 
used in order to continue local issues at a different level. The discrepancies between 
Somali situational logics and international strategy were found to be obvious in the 
failed peace processes held physically away from all the factors incentivising progress 
and resolution in the Somali context. 
The Somaliland transitional process was held to be of significant importance by 
comparison because of the high level of internal control as opposed to international 
intervention. This provided an opportunity to examine social change driven by internal 
initiative and given indications of popular approval through a referendum. While 
Somaliland exhibits remarkable success in terms of brokering and maintaining the 
peace as well as moving to free elections, its hybrid format has not produced the 
outcomes declared in its intentions. The diya-group is still the most relevant level of 
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social interaction and mobilisation largely occurs along the established lines despite a 
three party rule intended to break that cycle. In the end, Somaliland is definitely ‘by’ its 
people but has some way to go before it becomes also ‘for’ it. The external format of 
the central state is weak in the Somaliland context but supplemented by traditional 
roles and institutions where it has no capacity. This however also means that the state 
is fully subject to the active participation of sub-state entities in a supporting role. It 
also carries with it that the state is seen as external to society and an arena for the 
continuation of sub-state friction rather than a social force in its own right. In both 
Somalia and Somaliland the state was thus held to be mainly external to society and 
subject to socio-political interaction at the relevant level rather than the other way 
around.  
 Chapter four examined the case of Afghanistan. While there are many differences 
between the Afghan and Somali environments, certain elements are shared. Among 
the more important are the prevailing states of conflict and the pluralistic nature of 
society. In the Afghan environment it was found that modes of mobilisation were 
mainly focused on a narrowly defined interest group herein referred to as a qawm. The 
importance of the qawm as a political unit guided by a shura is apparent when looking 
into the modes of mobilisation for social forces in the country.  
Afghanistan is a diverse country on many levels that calls the notion of a meaningful 
‘Afghan’ identity, understood as a solidarity function, into question. Interest and 
solidarity groups are framed in terms of kinship, occupational, geographical or similar 
natures and occur in different formats depending of the location and context 
examined.  The many years of war and confrontation have generated a large number 
of localised conflicts that have a separate life from, but are strategically intertwined 
with, the ‘umbrella’ conflict between the state and the insurgency. The state and the 
insurgency, both external to society, constitute state-centric, ideological projects that 
seek to draw on local interests to increase their social mass. They both rely on 
networks of networks of social agents where the vast majority of network component 
groups, never really leave the area defined by their social boundaries to fight. Instead, 
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local interests were held to be the main motivation behind aligning with either side of 
the conflict or in some cases with both.  
The network character of these two larger social forces means that while acquiring 
support from the local they are simultaneously affecting and being co-opted into these 
local conflicts. Thus when one group aligns with the government or the international 
forces their local rivals are likely to seek support from the opposing side and vice versa. 
The symbiotic relationship is subject to the agency and active decisions of the qawm 
and it is at this level that relevant social interaction and mobilisation happens. The 
complex nature of the international intervention at all levels meant that accumulated 
unintended outcomes were produced simultaneously and actuated as shared 
memories. It has been relatively easy to manipulate either side into taking action on 
the behalf of one’s own interest group. Thus airstrikes, night-raids, and ‘renditions’ are 
strategies on one side, and improvised explosive devices, assassinations, and 
executions are on the other, in what in reality are frequently expressions of locally 
generated issues. 
Afghanistan is a highly conservative country. The wide reform attempts by various 
Afghan rulers provided some interesting perspectives on the implementation of 
change in this context, but also displays that the central state has throughout history 
been external to the local contexts of ‘Afghanistan proper.’2 The two comparatively 
successful attempts at social reform were those of Abdur Rahman and Daoud 
respectively, though the highly repressive nature of the former may not make his the 
most positive of examples. The careful approach of Daoud seems to be the most 
successful historically but like most of the reforms thus far have had little lasting effect 
on social interaction.  
 
What it means 
While the positionality and subjectivities of the analyst cannot be completely 
removed an effort must be made to reduce their impact and employ a measure of 
reflection.3 This hopefully allows for a sufficient contextualisation of strategy to 
facilitate local mediation, re-negotiation, and internalisation without imposing major 
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social engineering projects in order to make a society conform to externally generated 
and defined concepts by coercion. There has been a tendency, supported by different 
activist organisations, to promote the power of normative ‘universals’ of benign 
behaviour through abruptly changing systems of shared knowledge and meaning 
within a social interest-group. Apart from coming very close to a very self-centred 
notion of definitional ownership, this simplistic notion of the role of the social 
environment and agency must be predicated on a nearly total freedom for the 
individual to make decisions without repercussions in the social sphere. It thus 
overlooks the interplay between situational constraints and social interests.  
The theory development of this thesis has sought to add a perspective on social 
interaction and conflict that is a middle-road between abstract theory and concrete 
practicality. Norms and ideology are aspirations, not facts of the day upon which 
strategy can be constructed and the basis of engagement should be a critical and 
reflecting analysis. Strategy can work towards certain ideal goals but never assume 
that they exist or that they are objectively ‘universal.’ The presented framework 
focuses on understanding the existing social context as it stands and not how a 
particular group wants it to be. It however also acknowledges both the complexities of 
social dynamics on the one hand, and the need to make some generalisations in the 
interest of applicability on the other. 
By shedding the central assumptions of international relations theory and 
combining it with a sociological perspective it becomes possible to explore the location 
of actual agency and relevant socio-political interaction in social contexts. At the heart 
of the analysis the actuated modes of mobilisation emerge as key to understanding at 
what level and to what aspirations relevant socio-political action take place. They 
provide significant indications of how interests form and are pursued, as well as how 
social mass is acquired. Crucially, the patterns on display in the cases are significantly 
different from those of the established range of different ‘Western’-style democracies 
in terms of both social organisation and political coherence. 
In all three locales engaged in this thesis, interests form at highly localised levels. 
They are generally pursued as limited aspirations relating to the socially defined 
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boundaries of the agent. Temporary wider alliances occur but usually as a general 
alignment, as a means to pursue a short-term objective, or as a defensive alliance. 
When the interest or threat subsides, these social forces are likely to break down along 
the original social fissure lines. Social forces may seem more sustainable on the surface 
but are in these environments networks of networks of interest groups. These groups 
have a range of reasons for their alignment and while some may commit fully to one 
’side’ many can shift alignment on a locally subjective pragmatic basis.  
Solidarity factors, shared identities, geographical proximity, or external threats all 
serve to provide potential bases of permanent or temporary mobilisation. Such 
decisions will however be made by relevant social agents in line with the emergent 
situational logics deriving from the subjectively actuated structural and ideational 
institutional conditions.  In environments like Somalia and Afghanistan this means 
examining dynamics at a highly localised level because while the social force networks 
must rely on the support of local groups their presence also constitutes an intervention 
into the specific social context and off-sets the local balances for good or bad.  
The localised nature of incentives also means that the agency of the social interest 
group predominantly plays out at this level. Population-centric approaches, human 
security, rights-based approaches, and other strategies do not in fact depart from the 
local socio-political dynamics in these environments. They depart from an idealised 
and largely self-constructed image of the ‘human being’, how things ‘should be’ and 
how people ‘should behave’ according to specific ideological lenses. This allows 
peacebuilders and other interventionists to hold a (post-) conflict society to standards 
most ‘Western’ nations have problems conforming to and to make demands in the 
name of ‘universal’ ideas. The state and society as envisioned in many of these 
strategies does not in fact exist outside of the idealised images actuated by 
international interventionists. ‘Local’ is confused to incorporate highly differing social 
realities and the state is treated as the vehicle to reach the population. This 
understanding of social interaction is in stark contrast to the realities of many places 
and arguably sets up a foundation for failure.  
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In the cases examined local strategies have included co-optation of externally 
designed projects in order to pursue locally defined agendas and struggles. This seems 
to largely be facilitated by situated agents focusing on local interest formations and 
local issues while external interventionist projects refer to largely altruistic and 
utilitarian ideological notions of ‘universal’ political or religious values. Through simple 
adoption of the discourses associated with liberalism, Islamist jihad, and other political 
agendas, the ‘external’ can be accessed as a resource base in order to gain an 
advantage in the local context. It is as Vayrynen notes, that when employing a needs 
discourse in a conflict resolution setting there is a risk that the participants adopt the 
language of needs theory in order to justify their actions but that this happens is in 
itself not proof of these needs.4 Any planning disconnected from knowledge of the 
local realities is likely to be a) more easily subverted and/or co-opted due to failing to 
connect or gain legitimacy and; b) more likely to be viewed as confrontational by the 
‘local’ even if considered benign from the perspective of the ‘external.’ In order to gain 
access to the support or resources needed, discourse adaptation serves as a powerful 
tool, be it militant Islamism, liberal values, democratisation, or something else. Thus 
while local aspiration groups feed into the capacities of the social force networks by 
seemingly aligning with their agendas they will also detract from their capacities by 
actually pursuing their own.  
With this said these modes of mobilisation and the pragmatic responses to 
situational logics are of course not exclusive. There are groups and individuals who 
mobilise on alternative grounds, who throw in their lot with one social force and 
remain true to it, for example on a purely ideological or idealistic basis. The question 
thus becomes one of relevance to the shaping of situational logics and sustainable 
social mobilisation to affect social change. While these, what we might call ‘free 
agents’, are present in all three case studies, their potential impact is arguably limited. 
The greatest potential is in Somaliland but they are at the present very constrained 
there as well by the prevailing conditions. These are the people who consider 
themselves above or outside of the dominant system and who argue the progressive 
nature of their position. They are often the cultural or intellectual elite but while their 
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voices may be articulate and heard by external actors, their actual social weight is 
usually light.  
It could be possible to make the argument for seeing the ideological core of the 
Taliban in this light, but they are mobilised as an interest group of limited size and are 
like the government, as discussed, dependent on the network mobilisation of other 
interest groups to gain social mass. Because social interaction is dynamically changing, 
as per the framework, the actors and agents may well accumulate enough social mass 
to become a factor in the future. But like normative ‘universals’ it is not something 
that should constitute a de facto foundation in the present. Change takes time and has 
to be internalised.  
In Somaliland the overt violence was overcome by incremental localised peace 
negotiations between relevant parties through legitimate formats. Yet Somaliland has 
some way to go before the interest formations and modes of mobilisation are likely to 
change to reflect the intentions expressed in the constitution and the referendum. In 
Somalia old animosities at local or higher levels have remained and are now present in 
the mix between sub-clan interests, clan family loyalties, political ideology, and 
religion. The international intervention entered this context as an established party to 
the conflict, a heritage of the 1990s, and furthermore on the side of one of the social 
forces involved.  
In Afghanistan local interest groups are increasingly subject to predatory or 
repressive actors able to assert their roles through social force backing either from the 
state, the coalition, or the insurgency. They are able to forge de facto roles as local 
commanders or officials that are imposed on the local communities. The situational 
logics produced contain disincentives that have immediate implications for survival. 
The more complex an intervention is the more points of interaction producing 
individual outcomes there will be with potential and uncontrollable knock on effects. 
The mode of engagement also affects the outcomes and by engaging through from the 
top down, intentions are filtered through interaction at every network level before 
reaching the relevant socio-political context where actual decisions of actuation are 
made. This is further exacerbated when discourse, associations, meanings, and 
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language are not shared. The message passes through layers of interests distorted in 
small ways until breaking through completely reshaped even before interaction even 
begins with the relevant parties. This carries both positive and negative potential 
aspects from the interventionist project’s point of view as it may subvert intentions 
but may also adapt them to a more suitable format. It will nevertheless produce 
unintended outcomes. Direct engagement with the relevant socio-political context 
produces other challenges. The format of engagement itself may overlook local 
dynamics, producing unintended outcomes of insecurity or resentment. 
A social agent’s decision to align occurs in response to the situational logics 
produced in interaction with subjectively actuated institutions and the conditions of 
the immediate environment. It is mainly at this level that relevant social outcomes are 
generated in the examined cases. ‘Relevant’ is to be understood as relevant to a 
majority of the social agents and actors, not to the aspirations of the interventionist 
project, although the former obviously has implications for the latter. Abstract 
ideological aspirations as well as practical projects are thus considered on their merit 
in the immediate local context, not in the sense of a ‘greater good’ or ideological 
alignment. This does not mean that it would not be possible to introduce ideological 
priorities, but that the conditions and situational logics do not incentivise their choice 
over immediate, local concerns. An environment of long-standing social conflict, 
survival needs, and strong interests often linked to violence narrows the focus of socio-
political interaction. The subjective nature of perceptions and the limited socio-
political aspirations involved at this level means that incentives and disincentives are 
judged locally. The localised focus also excludes social forces from the normal decision 
making, therein making them external to the relevant socio-political context. This has 
implications for conflict as well as for building peace. 
There is a distinct discrepancy between the format and contents of state-centric 
interventionism, and local priorities in conflict environments. Both Afghanistan and 
Somalia are examples where externally driven peacebuilding through state-building is 
clearly out of touch with the conditions as they stand. Even Somaliland, an internally 
initiated and driven process of transformation, remains under the influence of local 
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priorities though arguably at least has popular support and some momentum. 
Somaliland is also the one of the three that has managed to build an actual peace by 
addressing local issues first through socially established and legitimate formats. It has 
thus realised that before issues of state can be resolved, conflicts have to be addressed 
at the level where politics actually play out. 
It is thus also not possible to generically determine what are peace-conducive 
actors or actions outside of the specific context. Objectively speaking, a social agent 
that has strong potential repressive capacities locally may for example constrain the 
behaviour of others and enforce a negative peace without resorting to force or threats 
because the distribution of resources shapes the possible responses. It may of course 
also be perceived as a challenge to other social agents and encourage a violent 
competition. Precisely because of the unpredictable agency of the local social agents, 
peace as well as conflict becomes about specific conditions at a specific time. The 
opportunistic nature of much of the social logic in Somalia and Afghanistan means that 
all social agents can be conduits of peace or conflict at the same time. What then are 
stabilising factors? The perspective presented here leads to the conclusion that just 
like destructive tendencies peaceful social behaviour has to be sought primarily at a 
local level.  The reconciliation of social forces means very little if local interest groups 
are really fighting over local matters instead of wider ideological agendas. The local 
antagonism and violence remains in place to seek new justifiers and social force 
alliances. A highly localised style of peacebuilding would take time, be very expensive, 
and extremely complicated. There is however no evidence in history that 
peacebuilding and state-building were ever supposed to be quick, cheap, and simple. 
That is be worth bearing in mind. 
 
Possible weaknesses and critiques 
A possible critique of this framework is its reductionist nature but it should be 
remembered that the objective was not to generate a fully comprehensive account of 
social interaction. It brings together three theoretical positions in order to provide a 
sufficiently comprehensive narrative that emerges from the local context but framed in 
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such a way as to allow for applicability. While it is acknowledged that this is not ideal it 
is argued that it is necessary for the intended purposes. 
A second possible critique is that this framework lends itself to instrumentalism and 
justification of intervention by acknowledging its existence without rejecting it 
completely. While this is a possibility it also requires a conscious falsification of the 
data or misunderstanding of the framework in order to avoid a repetition of the same 
failures that are already being repeated. By using subjectively pre-defined values the 
analysis can be swayed to reflect a specific narrative and the systemic demand for 
operational rules results in an ‘imposed technology.’5 There is however also a risk of 
local agents anticipating and complying with external expectations through a self-
representation guided by perceptions of what demands are legitimate. The actively 
sought ‘local knowledge’ is thus newly produced through project activities, making the 
project contextually adapted6 on paper, but disconnected from the local social 
realities. These risks should be reflected upon in data accumulation. True to the 
framework actors can choose to ignore the disincentives of failure in order to pursue 
an ideological view of the world in terms of universals or similar. It is however hoped 
that someone may find it a helpful and useful perspective in order to avoid negative 
outcomes and achieve lasting results. However it should also be considered that the 
perspective here suggests that social engineering requires a degree of actual 
acceptance on the recipient end. Outcomes of unaccepted transformative projects are 
more likely to become unintended hybrids, recognisable in name only and 
dysfunctional when compared to the functions originally intended by their instigators. 
While the focus on context-sensitive adaptation may be perceived on the surface as 
a repetition of the principle to ‘do no harm’ (DNH), it is not. The perspective developed 
here shares many of the positions of DNH but despite the insights and 
recommendations made in 1999 little has changed and it is likely that the same will 
happen to literature that becomes abstracted beyond usefulness. Where DNH is 
largely a practical set of advice with little theoretical foundation, other current 
theoretical developments threaten to become theoretical points with little practical 
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applicability. Applicability requires the capacity to utilise both theory and practical 
lessons while also mediating between them.  
No society is atomistic and that all interaction at all levels introduces change to 
some degree. ‘Harm’ in the sense of changing or affecting the existing social context is 
thus per definition always done whether by satellite TV, seemingly benign aid and 
development projects, or invasion. Aid, as Anderson argues, becomes part of the 
context and risks feeding into and exacerbating conflict.7 It can of course also provide 
positive impact or be intended as non-political, but is never ‘neutral’ in its outcomes.8 
A weakness of DNH that this thesis seeks to rectify is the lack of anchoring to local 
perceptions in the suggested framework. The analysing aid worker is expected to take 
some arguments at face value, primarily ‘justice’-based ones, and question others, 
effectively making it an aid-based strategy for social engineering. DNH offers no way 
for the analysis to contextualise and understand how local dynamics develop and how 
they relate to the external project. The purpose of this work is to provide a framework 
for understanding this and how they are changed by, but also change, the outcome of 
interventionist projects even when these explicitly intend to ‘do no harm.’  
Yet another possible critique concerns generalisation and extrapolation. The case 
analyses presented herein cannot be extrapolated as ‘ready-made’ to any other 
context and the cases contain a multitude of social ‘realities’ that all generate their 
own local context within each case. In this sense the framework is weak but does not 
on the other hand seek to be a generalised tool. What it aims to do is to argue and 
provide a platform from which to approach context-specific analysis where the level, 
scope, and location of a particular project determine the level of analysis. It thus 
generalises the perspective of the approach but not at what level relevant social 
interaction occurs or how that social interaction looks.  
The responses of the local in relation to external actors and agents are expressed in 
different ways relating to the context and thus the analysis must also adapt. While the 
social analysis and strategies are never fully transferable between social contexts it is 
possible to use the same framework of analysis across social differences. The point is 
that it needs to be responsive to local subjectivities over ‘universals,’ to let the ‘local’ 
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speak rather than ascribe solutions, and not ‘speak at’ on behalf of externally defined 
priorities. 
The issues pertaining to sources and language mentioned in the introduction should 
be commented on here. It is felt that the mechanisms for controlling the negative 
effects of being reliant on secondary sources and interpretations have been largely 
successful. The primary method of validating this has been by observing reporting and 
research on the respective cases as well as discussing aspects of it on return visits to 
Afghanistan.  
 
What does it add? 
The framework developed here is an original way of approaching these issues as it 
breaks with the ideologically-driven assumptions and prescribed measures, but 
without raising a flag of relativism or becoming so abstract it loses touch with the 
ground realities. Any intervention into a socio-political context is a political act per 
definition, even if it does not intend to be. Off-setting the social balance of the context 
is unavoidable and these balances must therefore be understood. This is not in order 
to completely avoid affecting them as that is impossible, but rather to understand the 
dynamics and potential outcomes of the interaction. The simple assertion is that the 
larger the discrepancies are, the more tumultuous the outcomes are likely to become. 
The framework blends perspectives from international relations with sociological 
understandings of socio-political interaction to facilitate context understanding while 
raising a warning that grasping the dynamics of a context does not mean controlling 
the outcome of one’s interaction with it. It is thus a bridge between the sociological 
preoccupation with social interaction and the international relations focus on 
interventions based on Universalist assumptions, realist motives, and idealist 
justifications. In doing so it adds to the understanding of the local conditions and 
instances of hybridisation, real or perceived, in the social contexts of the cases. It also 
raises issues with the optimistic accounts of outside influence, romanticisation of the 
local,9 and the images of a passive population of victims. 
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The framework furthermore seeks to add a separation of how interest groups and 
social forces are understood. By defining a social force as having enough ‘social mass’ 
to affect society-wide change it becomes possible to differentiate the accumulative 
interest groups and their separate goals and agendas rather than seeing them as one 
unit. Thus insurgencies, states, and international coalitions in Afghanistan and Somalia 
are all social forces, consisting of interest groups that do not necessarily share the 
same strategy or agenda other than in very loose terms. These groups inhabit social 
realities largely separate from each other and the ideological discourse of social forces. 
The act of analytical separation is an attempt to force analysis to acknowledge and 
engage with the multiple layers of interests present. 
 While drawing on and seeking to contribute in small ways to critical fourth 
generation peace studies, this work stands on its own. It moves in the same direction 
but on a parallel track aiming to provide a constructive rather than deconstructive 
framework. By combining international relations and sociology it becomes possible to 
acknowledge the reality of intervention without necessarily judging intent, but also to 
perhaps avoid the worst of the unintended outcomes based on ignorance and 
arrogance. It also allows us to break free from the damaging effects of adopting the 
assumption inherent in the central supporting literature of strategy today. Academics 
and policymakers may debate the moral justifications of intervention or not, but it is 
meanwhile happening at various levels in all societies. In the societies focused on here 
this is particularly true and has immediate effects on the lives of a great number of 
people. The framework thus avoids the question of justification and is perhaps more 
relevant for practical applications than moral arguments.  
If we accept the premises of this framework to be true then we also accept that the 
strategies of the addressed interventions contain assumptions that are incorrect and 
impacting the three environments in a number of negative ways, not by intention but 
from being out of sync with the operational environments. The inherent discrepancies 
between intent and reality, and thus in relation to the situational logics facing social 
agents and actors, place focus on factors far removed from the relevant levels of socio-
political interaction. The resulting outcomes further reinforce negative situational 
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logics and can easily become a mutually supporting feed-back loop of violence. The 
economic cost in the case of Afghanistan may be carried by international donors, but 
the absolute brunt of the human cost is as usual paid by the weakest and 
disenfranchised as they shape their survival strategies around situational logics 
generated in the interaction of stronger interests and social forces. Interventions need 
to adapt in pace and in level of engagement to the relevant and legitimised shared 
social images. This does not preclude advocating changes to social systems, but 
strategy cannot be built on wishful thinking and people cannot be forced to think in 
specific ways. Trying to do so is potentially damaging to everyone involved and 
counter-productive to the intended outcomes because it encourages rejection of its 
inherently confrontational style of engagement. 
And this is the final contribution aspired to by this framework: to provide a platform 
from which to observe and compare our own approaches to the actual context, a 
meeting ground where the ideologically laden wishes of donors and other 
interventionist forces can be mediated by practitioners with their intimate knowledge 
of the field and their personal experiences with the challenges of interventions. 
Perhaps even a space where starry-eyed idealism and idealised Realism can meet with 
the bitter grind of the cynical scepticism of experience, and together build constructive 
options. 
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